Stranger guests : a socio-economic analysis of hosting refugees and asylum seekers in the UK by Kausar, Rukhsana
\ 1 ~ 1 
.. ~ I 
" ""M;{f~ " 
'I "<'-'i' ~\~:i'\ 
"_ "'\"i' ,l'i,""~ 
Stranger Guests 
A Socio-Economic Analysis of Hosting 
Refugees and Asylum Seekers in the UK 
Rukhsana Kausar 
-
A thesis submitted to the University of Surrey for the Degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy in the Department of Economics 
December 2009 
To all My Motivation and Inspiration 
Syed SarJraz Ahmed Shah 
Abstract 
The main objective of this thesis is to conduct a socio-economic analysis of refugees and asylum 
seekers in the UK and to examine the impact or consequences that refugees often pose for the 
hosting economy e.g. their assimilation in the new society and economy as well as attitudes from 
the host nation towards them. Attempts are made to clearly distinguish between asylum 
seekers/refugees and other immigrants in order to examine how their labour market performance 
varies by constructing an indicator of the immigrant's route's of entry to the UK using 
information from the Labour Force Survey, Home Office and UNHCR sources. 
The thesis is developed as follows: Chapter 1 presents an introduction and overview of the 
different immigration phases in the UK. Some fundamental literature on key issues relating to 
immigrants' socio-economic impact is discussed in Chapter 2, while recent immigration trends 
and policies in Europe and the UK are covered in Chapter 3. In chapters 4 and 5, micro data from 
the Quarterly Labour Force Survey from 2001-2006 is analysed using econometric techniques to 
explore the labour market performance of different categories of immigrants. The social impact 
of refugees and asylum seekers are focused upon in Chapter 6 by examining public attitudes to 
these groups. Chapter 7 contains the concluding comments. 
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Chapter 1 
Immigration- An Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
Immigration has always been a controversial and politically sensitive topic in the UK even 
though immigrants have been coming to the UK for many centuries and also despite of the fact 
that immigration is the complex phenomenon affecting almost every country of the world, either 
as the origin, transit or destination of the immigrants. Possibly because of its political structures 
and heritage, colonial ties or EU membership, the UK has remained amongst the largest 
receivers of asylum seekers. Waves of immigration have always raised the question about the 
positive and negative effects of hosting immigrants and have usually provoked opposition from 
certain sections of the population. 
Immigration means "in-migration" into a country and it can be made up of different types and 
forms depending upon the nature of the stay of migrants e.g. economic migrants, students, 
refugees and asylum seekers. Immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers are often blamed for 
unemployment, insecurity and crime. But it cannot be ignored that they have brought 
considerable benefits to the UK. Researchers often seek to measure the costs and benefits 
associated with immigration but to attribute either impact to migrants alone would be a mistake. 
In this regard, most studies have focussed only immigrants as whole while analysing different 
issues such as their fiscal contribution, labour market performance in terms of their employment. 
earnings and also social attitudes towards them. There has been only one study for the UK so far 
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on refugees and asylum seekers namely by Lindley (2002a) using Labour Force Survey (LFS) 
data for 1995-2000 examining labour market performance of refugees in the UK. Whilst for the 
US, Cortes (2004) uses Public use Micro samples of the 1980 and 1990 censuses to examine 
impact of differences in implicit time horizons on human capital investment of refugees. 
So in terms of a socio-economic analysis, this study provides a comprehensive examination of 
labour market performance of refugees and asylum seekers in the UK using LFS data for the 
period of 2001-2006 than hitherto, using a more robust method of distinguishing between 
refugees/asylum seekers and economic migrants. Therefore my research is an attempt to explore 
differentials in the labour market performance of both groups. Secondly, the literature on social 
attitudes tends to be mostly focused on immigrants as a whole. Therefore it is important to 
analyse attitudes towards refugees and asylum seekers because many of those who have come to 
the UK are now integrated in the labour market. So I have analysed in detail the attitudes of 
British people towards refugees and the main determinants of those attitudes. 
The distinction between the different categories will be discussed later in this chapter, with an 
emphasis placed on refugees and asylum seekers throughout the thesis. Though immigration is 
not a static phenomenon; this thesis will be mainly focussing on the period from 2001 to 2006 as 
during this period immigration figures climbed rapidly before falling back since then, especially 
in terms of asylum seekers. 
1.2 Overview 
According to an encyclopaedia's definition "Immigration is the act of moving to or settling in 
another country or region, temporarily or permanently". Immigration dates back to ancient 
times both in the form of voluntary migration from one place to another or involuntary migration 
such as the slave trade or human trafficking. From 750 Be Greek colonies to European 
colonialism in the period of the 15th to the 20th century and Europeans entrance on American 
ports in the 16th century are just historic examples of human migration. Furthermore, the 
urbanisation and industrialization of the world from the 18th century to present times has 
encouraged the migration process and in-tum immigration has contributed to changes in the 
modem world. Indeed the emergence and existence of new societies and civilizations can be 
affected by human migration. 
The closing years of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21 st century can be called an age of 
international migration. However, current international migration trends must be seen in the 
context of contemporary world developments. For instance, "from traditionally being a country 
of emigration, Ireland has emerged as one of the fastest growing countries of immigration" 
(World Migration Report, 2005). What is distinctive about migration in recent years is its global 
scope, centrality to domestic and international politics and its impact on economic and social 
change. Given the large recent migration flows, it is likely to continue in the years ahead 
because of the growing influence of global integration. 
There are more than 200 million international migrants in the world today (World Migration 
Report, 2008). The number of international migrants would constitute the fifth most populous 
country in the world and women account for 49.6 percent of this global migration (World Bank 
2008)1. This total represents much more than a two fold increase from 76 million in 1960, while 
the world population only roughly doubled from 3 billion in 1960 to 6.7 billion. The number of 
international migrants today is thus around 3.0% of the world's population (United Nations, 
1 http://go.worldbank.orgINN93K4Q420 
2006). However, although migration may not be that high in numbers, its social, economic and 
political impact is far more than predicted by such a small percentage. It can change 
demographic, economic and social structures as well as cultural diversity, which brings in the 
question of national identity, attracting more controversy, in both sending and receiving states. 
This in tum affects immigration policies and people's attitudes towards migrants. 
According to classical and neoclassical theories of economic migration, migration has benefits 
for all those directly involved. The receiving countries gain as it removes labour shortages, 
reduces wage-push inflationary pressure and increases the utilisation of productive capital, 
increases exports and fosters economic growth. For sending countries, emigration can reduce 
unemployment and enhance economic growth through remittances and the enhanced skills of 
returning migrants. Immigration can also serve to change the patterns of international trade, 
given the Heckscher-Ohlin model's assertion that the pattern of international trade is determined 
by differences in factor endowments. Immigration may change the factor endowments of both 
the sending and receiving countries and alter the patterns of international trade. This effect may 
be either pro-or anti trade depending upon whether immigration increases or reduces endowment 
differences with the rest of the world. However, immigrants can also demand products from their 
country of origin and thus stimulate trade. 
This pro trade phenomenon has been confirmed by many studies e.g. Dunlevy and Hutchinson 
(1999) and Mundra (2005), whose findings have supported the hypothesis that immigrants have 
a pro trade effect for both US imports and exports. Migrants in tum gain from higher wages and 
levels of productivity in capital-rich countries. Borjas (1995) argues that natives also gain from 
immigration because of production complementarities between migrant workers and other 
factors of production and the greater the difference between native stocks of inputs and 
immigrants, the larger the benefits. 
1.3 Contemporary Migration in Different World Regions 
Increasing globalisation and the opening of borders following the end of communism in the 
Eastern Bloc and Soviet Union, economic disparities and ethnic conflicts among different 
nations, in addition to geographical changes and political instability during the last two decades, 
have played important roles in boosting a new wave of international migration. International 
migration has affected the regions of world differently, moreover, Europe, America, Asia and 
Africa, each has its own history of immigration. Just a brief review for each region is given 
below (for detail see World Migration Report, 2005 and Castles and Miller, 2003: pp 68-93). 
Labour migration was important in Western and Northern Europe between 1945 and the early 
1970s. The USA, Australia, Canada and New Zealand are considered 'classical countries of 
immigration' having mostly welcomed European immigrants earlier in the twentieth century. 
The UN's data on world migration suggests that North America had more than a 300% increase 
in the stock of migrants during 1970-2000 from 13 million to 41 million, increasing at an 
average rate of3.8 % annually. A growing number of new immigration states have also emerged 
in the post war period. Even Southern European countries, previously known for emigration, 
such as Greece, Italy, Spain as well as Ireland and several Central and Eastern European states 
are becoming immigrant targets. 
The Middle East has an experience of facing complex population movements. Turkey has been 
an attraction for ethnic Turks, Muslims from Eastern Europe, Iranian and Kurdish Refugees. 
Syria and Jordan serve as a refuge for Palestinians. The Gulf states and Saudi Arabia are hosting 
immigrants from the Arab world and as well as from Asia. Iran became home to a large numbers 
of Afghan refugees. Asia has also experienced large-scale international migrations. With 
Pakistan, a single country hosting world's largest number of Afghan refugees and India hosting 
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Bangladeshi, Sri Lankan and Nepali immigrants. East and South East Asian countries are also 
receiving thousands of legal and illegal foreign workers (World Migration Report, 2005). 
During 1970-2000, Africa was a host to the second largest share of all international migrants in 
the developing world, after Asia; but this has since declined (World Migration Report, 2005). 
Many African countries have a significant number of refugees and immigrants both legal and 
illegal. For example, Algeria has a substantial refugee population from Western Sahara and 
Sudan also hosts a large refugee population even though its one of the poorest nations. Many 
Latin American counties have experienced, and are still experiencing movements of refugees or 
foreign workers, especially from their own countries to the USA. There have been massive 
migrations from Mexico, Jamaica and other Caribbean countries to the USA along with the 
settlement of Cuban and Haitians refugees. 
1.4 Fundamental Theories of Immigration 
Reacting to growmg migration has become a challenge to the recelvmg countries. All 
governments have struggled to formulate and design policies to keep immigration at their own 
desired levels. At the same time, the degree of control exercised by different governments varies 
across countries. Likewise, the motives and objectives of migrants are different across different 
regions. In this respect the focus of researchers and policy makers has varied from the receiving 
country to the country of origin to control the global phenomenon of migration (Green, 2002). 
Several theories and explanations have been put forward to explain the causes behind 
international migration. A brief review of most common economic theories of migration is 
presented below. A detailed discussion of neo-classical and other theories can be found in 
Castles and Miller (2003) pp. 22-29. 
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A- The Neo-Classical Approach: The Push and Pull Theory 
This approach is based on orthodox economics and is often known as the "push-pull" theory and 
has its roots in earlier theories on the systematic approach to migration. The neo-classical 
approach emphasises the tendencies of people movements from highly populated areas to less 
populated areas, from low to high income areas or from chain migrations to fluctuations in the 
business cycle to satisfy their human desire of economic betterment. Thus, migration is 
considered in terms of those factors that 'push' people to migrate- these are often structural such 
as poverty, low living standards, flood, famine, political suppression and a general lack of 
economic prospects whilst pull factors are those that attract people to the area of emigration such 
as a high demand for labour, good economic opportunities, political freedom and human rights. 
The theory is individualistic and puts emphasis on the individual decision to migrate, based on 
rational comparative cost and benefit analysis of remaining in the origin or moving to a 
destination country and people invest in migration, in the same fashion as they invest in 
vocational training and education, with a view to increase future earnings. Chiswick (2000) 
argues that people decide to migrate if the expected rate of return through wages is higher in the 
destination country than the costs involved in the migration process. In this way migrants are 
positively self selected and the highly skilled are more likely to move as they get higher returns 
and this may cause a negative effect on the source country in the form of a brain drain. 
Borjas (1989) also put forward a model of immigration based on the neo-classical assumption of 
an individual's utility maximisation i.e. individuals move and choose a country of destination 
which maximises their well being, their search is restricted by the individual's financial means, 
by immigration policies in the host country and emigration rules in the source country. In this 
way both the host and source country affect the number and composition of the immigration flow 
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by altering policies. He further argues that the size, direction and composition of immigrant 
flows varies with changes in economic and political factors and there is no universal law 
characterising all immigrant flows. 
Neo-classical theory tends to neglect the historical causes of migration. This theory fails to 
explain the increase in voluntary labour migration compared to other forms of migration and the 
heterogeneity of migration since the 1970s (Green, 2002). For example, push and pull factors 
predict movements from densely populated areas to less populated areas but countries such as 
Germany and Netherlands themselves are among the most densely populated countries. Similarly 
these factors cannot explain why a group of migrants go to one country rather than another. 
B- Historical-Structural Approach 
This theory has its roots in Marxist political economy and in world systems theory. It sees 
migration as a source of mobilising cheap labour for capital and stresses the uneven distribution 
of economic and political power. In contrast to the push-pull theory which is based on the mainly 
voluntary migration of individuals, its focus remains on the massive recruitment of labour by 
capital rich countries e.g. Germany, America and Australia. For German factories, agribusiness 
in California or infrastructure projects in Australia as well as in Britain, the historical-structure 
can account for the massive recruitment of labour by capital and the availability of labour was 
either due to colonialism, or the result of war and regional inequalities in Europe. 
This theory has been criticised on the basis of placing too much importance on capital and 
neglecting the individual's interests and incentives. Also, if the importance of capital was so 
dominant then the unplanned shift from labour migration to permanent settlement in some 
countries can not be explained in this framework as migration was considered as vital for 
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military hegemony and for the control of world trade and investment in order to keep the Third 
World dependent on the First World (Castle and Miller 2003: pp 25). Both the neo-classical and 
historical structure approach are at two ends of the spectrum, one overlooks the historic causes of 
migration while the other neglects motivations and individual actions. 
c- Migration Systems Theory 
This theory is based on a migration system between two or more countries exchanging migrants 
with each other and studies all the linkages between the host and source country. The objective is 
to analyse regional migration systems such as the South Pacific, West Africa or the Southern 
Cone of Latin America (Kritz et aI, 1992). However other distant regions such as the Caribbean, 
Western Europe and North America and North and West Africa with France may be interlinked 
through such migration systems. It has emerged relatively recently and has been an influential 
approach taking into account the interacting micro and macro structures and economic and 
political collaborations. The migration systems approach means examining both ends of the flow 
and studying all the linkages between the places concerned. These linkages can be characterised 
by "state-to-state relations and comparisons, mass culture connections and family and social 
networks" (Fawcett and Arnold 1987: pp 456-7). 
The macro structure takes into account large institutional factors, political economy, 
international relationships, rules and regulations and the immigration and emigration policies of 
countries. While the micro structure considers individual beliefs, practices and informal social 
networks such as personal relationships and family ties etc. Both are interlinked by meso-
structures, which is an intermediate process. 
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It also combines institutional interactions among countries as its fundamental basis and 
emphasises prior links between sending and receiving countries either through colonisation, 
trade and investment, political or military influence or social and cultural ties. Migration from 
Mexico to the USA, from Korea and Vietnam to the USA and from Pakistan, Bangladesh and 
India to Britain are examples of migration on an economic, military and colonial basis. 
As the migration system approach deals with all dimensions of migration experiences and looks 
closely at socio-economic and political aspects along with other factors responsible for making 
people migrate from one region to another, including factors effecting their settlement such as 
policies and regulations dealing with the settlement process, discrimination, conflict and racism, 
and the effects of migrants on host countries, the theory can cover all types of migrants including 
economic migrants as well as refugees and asylum seekers. 
D-World System Theory 
This relates to Wallerstein's concept of a social system in which the world economy with a 
single division of labour is regulated through the market rather than a political centre for inter-
dependent regions. For world system theories, labour migration was the means of domination for 
capitalist economies to control world trade and investment to keep the third world dependent 
(Castles and Miller, 2003). 
Based upon ownership, capital-rich states hold on to capital-intensive production, are higher 
skilled and are militarily strong while peripheral weak states focus on low skill, labour-intensive 
production and extraction of raw materials. The role of powerful owners may be played by 
governments and multi-national corporations etc. This approach is based on the concept that 
people move from areas with an excess supply of labour to those with high levels of labour 
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demand. The cost of reproduction of capital is met by the sending countries. Migrants move 
simply because of the requirements of capital and the localities from where the migration takes 
place are unimportant. 
The globalisation process has improved technologies as well as the transportation and 
communication sectors and thus made it easier for migrants to have closer links to their origin. 
The theory considers economic globalisation as the root cause of recent trends in international 
migration as globalisation has created a more mobile labour force which seeks methods to 
increase earnings. In this way this theory strengthens international inequalities instead of 
reducing them and furthermore fails to explain fully the diversity in migration flows between 
receiving and sending countries. 
Although each migration theory is based on certain specific historical patterns, it enables us to 
understand the social dynamics behind the migratory process as well as differences between 
economically motivated migration and forced migration. Most economic migration starts with 
young, economically active people to improve their economic conditions at home by saving in 
higher-wage economies and sending back that money as remittances. Those migrants may return 
back home or stay in the host country, where they may have family reunification or permanently 
settle. While the dynamics are different for refugees and asylum seekers as they are the forced 
migrants and leave their countries on the basis of persecution, human rights abuse, violence or 
famine. "Labour migrants, permanent settlers and refugees move under different conditions and 
legal regimes. Yet all these population movements are symptomatic of modernization and 
globalization" (Castles and Miller 2003: pp 32). 
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1.5 A Brief History of Recent Immigration Trends in Europe 
Net migration to Europe has increased in the last few decades but Europe has a long history of 
migration with changes in the scale and composition of migrant flows. However, immigration to 
Europe is relatively a new phenomenon as most European countries have been known as 
countries of emigration until fairly recently. The second half of the 19th century was an era of 
massive emigration from Europe to the US, Canada and South America and over 50 million 
people emigrated from Europe to those countries between 1820 to 1914 (Guardia and 
Pichelmann, 2006). Along with geographical, political and economic factors, the two World 
Wars played an important role in shaping Europe's immigration history. There have been two 
main migration phases in the post war period. The following phases of Europe's immigration 
history are based on the discussion in King (1993). 
1.5.1 Phase 1: 1945 to the early 1970s 
In this phase a large number of migrant workers moved from less developed countries into the 
fast expanding industrial areas of Western Europe, North America and Australia. This period 
comprised of the migration of workers through the Guest Worker system, the migration of 
colonial workers to former colonial powers and European refugees at the end of World War 2. 
Post World War migration in Europe started in the 1950s, occurring on a massive scale and 
reaching a peak in the 1960s and then slowing down in the 1970s. Initially the rising trend was 
due to the restructuring of the world economy after World War 2 and then the oil price crises of 
the early 1970s brought this phase to an end. The recession during the 1980s with high rates of 
unemployment then led to lower migration levels in Europe. 
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One of the common features of the migration movements in the period from 1945-73 was the 
predominant effect of the economic motive. Economic considerations were the stimulating 
forces for migrants, employers and governments. In this period, countries with high net 
immigration e.g. Germany (FRG) and France had higher economic growth rates compared to 
Britain and USA, which had lower net immigration at this time, providing an indication that 
immigration was beneficial in this period. 
1.5.2 Phase 2: Mid 1970s to the 1990s 
The second phase of international migration in the post-war period started in the mid 1970s and 
gained momentum in the late 1980s and 1990s. The post 1973 period was one of a normalisation 
process. The trends of permanent settlement and family reunification continued in this period. As 
a result of the 1973 recession due to the sharp oil price increases, governments encouraged the 
admission, family reunification and settlement process of foreign workers. The migrant 
population in Europe increased from 18.7 million in 1970 to 22.2 million in 1980 and family 
reunification was an important factor in this rise in migration. 
By the late 1980s the European Union began to be seen as a single labour market and migration 
was beginning to be considered more like internal migration within a national economy. In the 
second half of the 1980s, socio-political problems and economic instability in Asia, Africa and 
Latin America re-emerged and migration towards Western Europe began to rise. The new 
immigrants from these countries came as workers (both legal and illegal) but also as asylum 
seekers. Free trade areas are likely to co-ordinate policies towards immigrants in general but 
individual countries may adopt very different regimes towards refugees and asylum seekers. 
Therefore it is difficult to determine what impact an increase in free trade areas has had. 
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Also in the late 1980s the crises within the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe significantly 
contributed to this new wave of immigration, with up to 50 million East-West migrants. By 1995 
the total foreign population of European OECD countries was 19.4 million, of whom only 6.7 
million were EU citizens. There were 2 million North Africans, 2.6 million Turks and 1.4 million 
people from the former Yugoslavia (OECD, 1997: 30). 
In both phases much of the large scale migration has been primarily economic in its motivations; 
but non economic considerations can have a significant impact on the labour market of both 
sending and receiving countries, as even an economic migration can derive its causes from 
social, cultural and political instability. Whatever the cause or motive may be, migration changes 
the demographic and social structure and reshapes the cultural patterns of countries. 
1.5.3 Phase 3: More Recent Trends 
According to the UN's Trends in Total Migration Stock Report 2005, between 1960 and 2005 
the increase in international migration globally was from 75 million in 1960 to 191 million in 
2005, an increase of 121 million in 45 years. Almost a fifth of this increase was due to the 
disintegration of the former Soviet Union into 15 independent states in 1991. There was a sharp 
increase in international migration because those previously considered as internal migrants 
became international migrants now with the independence of those states and the stock of 
international migrants increasing by 21 million during 1990-2000. 
While in Europe, the number of international migrants increased from 10 million to 33 million 
between 1970 and 2000, and their share in the total population increased from 4.1 per cent to 6.4 
per cent. In 2005 Europe was host to 64 million immigrants, the largest number of international 
migrants and EU enlargement through the inclusion of the ten new member states of Cyprus, the 
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Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia on 
1 st May 2004 contributed significantly to this flow of migrants. It is estimated that one out of 
three migrants now lives in Europe (United Nations, 2007). Refugees and asylum seekers were 
very prominent among these new immigrants. In particular Western Europe received more than 
two million asylum applications from the former Eastern bloc countries between 1990 and 2000. 
Moreover, there have been dramatic changes in Europe SInce 1970. By the late 1990s, 
immigration flows to Western Europe had stabilised and in some cases declined from peak levels 
due to certain control measures introduced by the receiving nations and also due to economic and 
political stabilisation in Eastern Europe. However, although the tightened entry rules and border 
controls have reduced immigration, pressure from southern countries remains. Moreover despite 
migration to most European countries being restricted, foreign workers remain an important part 
of the labour force of many countries. Foreign workers constituted at least 5 percent of the labour 
force in eight of the sixteen major European receiving countries in 2001 (OECD, 2004). 
Despite the recent figures showing a downward trend in immigration, the long queues of 
applicants for immigration in the developed world, waiting lists of millions for admission, illegal 
immigration and a rise in those seeking asylum in the developed countries are obvious signs of 
the high levels of population movements. This flow of asylum seekers became controversial 
with the decline in the armed conflicts and large numbers of asylum seekers were no longer 
welcomed in some countries. By the mid 1990s with tightened security and border control 
measures, almost all EU states tried to decrease and regulate asylum applications. But Belgium, 
France, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK experienced a large rise in asylum applications in 
the 1990s and the trend remained upward until the early part of 21 st century mainly because of 
the ongoing wars and armed conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, Western Asia and parts of sub-
Saharan Africa. 
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1.6 A Brief History of UK Immigration 
The population of the UK increased from 50 million in 1950 to an estimated 60 million in 2005 
and is still growing. The total fertility rate (TFR) is 1.74 (children per woman), which is below 
the replacement rate of about 2.1 (World Population Prospects, 2008). The country's population 
is increasing partly due to the momentum effect of the earlier natural increase in the population 
and the lengthening life expectancy but is largely due to high (net) inward migration. The UK is 
the third most densely populated country in Europe after Netherlands and Belgium, and is also 
one of the most crowded countries in the world. 
The UK is unusual among the main immigration countries in North-West Europe, as it has been 
a country of emigration as well as immigration. Britain was thought of as a country of emigration 
in the 1970s, 1980s and even in the 1990s. Mass migration to Britain has for generations been 
dominated by successive waves of particular groups, firstly Jews and the Irish then from New 
Commonwealth countries such as the Caribbean, India, Pakistan and Bangladesh and more 
recently asylum seekers and migrants from Eastern Europe. 
Though there were small levels of black immigration to Britain prior to the 1950s, the majority 
of the present migrant population came to Britain after the 2nd world war. After a relatively warm 
welcome to the initial waves of migrants this has been followed by racial tension leading to more 
and more restrictive policies and legislation. It has been argued that Britain has largely benefited 
in economic and cultural terms from these migration waves and now has a population with quite 
a broad racial and cultural intermix. 
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The post-war wave of migration to Britain began in the late 1940s and gathered strength and 
momentum in the 1950s and 1960s. It occurred in response to various factors including 
economic and demographic conditions in the countries concerned and the economic conditions 
in Britain and in many cases economic factors dominated other cons iderations. Indeed it is 
argued that the economic cause was among the primary motivations in many of the large-scale 
migrations to developed countries since 1945 (Castles and Miller, 2003). 
According to the Office of National Statistics (ONS), International Passenger Survey data 
collected from people moving through UK ports and airports , net flows of migrants (defined as 
people moving into or out of the UK for 12 months or more) has been positive since the mid 
1980s. Trends in emigration, immigration and the total net flow of immigrants to the UK are 
shown in Figure 1.1. There have been fluctuations in emigration and immigration trends but the 
net flow remains upward. In 2004 net migration reached a peak level before falling slightly in the 
following years but has still remained high since then in comparison with earlier years . 
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These large numbers of immigrants include not only visitors, business men, refugees etc but also 
asylum seekers in disguise. Many refugees choose the UK as their destination because of the 
friends and relatives or other contacts here. The present wave of net growth of immigration all 
over the world has been heavily influenced by the growth in asylum applications. Between 1998 
and 2000, 45,000 people from Africa, 22,700 from the Indian sub-continent, 25,000 from Asia 
and 12,000 from America arrived in the UK and almost 125,000 people were allowed to settle in 
the UK. But due to the strictly controlled and complex asylum system, asylum applications have 
fallen substantially in recent years - see Chapter 3 for more details. 
This affected the UK's relative position in terms of accepting asylum seekers, from being the 
main destination country for asylum seekers in 2002, it dropped to second place in 2003 and to 
third in 2004 among 50 industrialised countries (UNHCR, 2005). The present high level of net 
immigration to the UK was initially affected by the growth of asylum applications and more 
recently due to increased migration from Eastern Europe following EU enlargement in 2004. 
At this stage it becomes important to know the difference between different categories of 
immigrants, since on the basis of this the subsequent analysis will focus on different types of 
migrants for a detailed comparison and examination of their labour market success in terms of 
employment and earnings. 
1. 7 Distinctions between Economic Migrants, Refugees and Asylum Seekers 
People tend to move across borders to seek better employment opportunities, a new home or a 
safe place to live. Whatever the reason may be, or whether the initial intention is temporary or 
permanent, many migrants become settlers in the receiving countries. There are many different 
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types of immigrants such as manual workers, highly skilled specialists and entrepreneurs, 
members of previously migrated families as well as refugees or asylum seekers. Excluding 
students and family re-uniters, on the basis of economic and political motives, immigrants can be 
divided into two broad categories: 
1. 7.1 Economic Immigrants 
An economic immigrant is someone who has moved to another country for work purposes. 
These are the people in search of work and better jobs outside their home country, have strong 
social ties with the home country and are free from any constraint and can return to their country 
whenever they desire to do so. They migrate purely on economic motives with the expectation of 
increasing their lifetime income. Their economic behaviour differs in terms of their work effort, 
consumption, savings (remittances) and human capital investment. Their main purpose is to 
earn, save and send money to their families and relatives in the home country. They often plan to 
spend short periods in the host country and are not necessarily interested in making any kind of 
socio economic investment there. 
1.7.2 Non Economic Immigrants: Refugees and Asylum Seekers 
Refugees are the sub group of the broader category of displaced persons and can be described as 
people who seek refuge out of fear of other people as opposed to any other motivational cause. 
At the start of 2004, the number of people of concern to the UNHCR was 17.1 million. This 
included 9.7 million refugees (57%), 985,500 asylum seekers (6%), 1.1 million returned refugees 
(6%), and 4.4 million internally displaced persons (260/0). The number of refugees under the 
UNHCR's responsibility had increased from 9.7 million in 2004 to more than 11 million by the 
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end of 2007. The number of refugees has grown in volume and significance since 1945 and most 
particularly since the mid 1980s. This has been caused by many reasons; the most important of 
these appears to be wars during the last two decades e.g. Afghanistan and Iraq, rampant 
violations of human rights, political, ecological and demographic pressure as well as growing 
income differentials between south and north and the creation of new free trade areas. 
The term refugees includes individuals recognised under the 1951 Geneva Convention, the 1967 
Protocol, the 1969 OAU Convention with further expansion of the definition and covering 
specific aspects of African refugees or those having temporary protection. 
Refugees: The Definition of Refugees according to the 1951 UN Geneva Convention: 
The Refugee Convention, signed by 141 states, was established to cope with the huge number of 
people displaced in Europe by the 2nd World War defines refugees as: 
"The word refugee refers to a person who owing to well founded fear of being persecuted for 
reasons of race, religion, nationality or membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or owing to such fear, is unwilling 
to avail himself of the protection of that country". 
The UNHCR has reclassified the refugee term and those in refugee-like situations are also 
included in the refugee population now (UNHCR, 2007). The definition of an asylum seeker 
may vary from country to country, depending on the laws of each country. However, in most 
countries, the terms asylum seeker/asylee and refugee differ only in the place where an 
individual asks for protection. Thus these terms will gradually be used fairly inter-changeably. 
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An asylum seeker/asylee asks for protection after arriving in the host country, while a refugee 
asks for protection and is granted this protected status outside of the host country. Asylum 
seekers are individuals whose application for refugee status is pending a final decision (UNHCR, 
2007). 
Asylum Seekers: Someone who is fleeing persecution in his or her country and has arrived in 
another country and exercises the legal right to apply for asylum. 
The term 'asylum seeker' refers to a person who requests refugee status in another state, 
normally on the grounds that they have well founded fear of persecution in their country of 
origin, or their life and liberty is threatened by armed conflict and violence (UNHCR, 1993). 
The current UNHCR figure is that one in every 300 people in the world today is living outside 
hislher homeland because of political persecution, violence or civil war, natural disasters, 
problems of forced displacement and/or other situations that threaten their safety and lives. The 
current world refugee crises began to develop in the mid 1970s, with mass departures from 
Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. Soon after, large numbers of refugees began to leave the Lebanon 
and Afghanistan. In Africa, thousands fled from Zaire, Uganda, Namibia and South Africa. In 
Latin America, the suppression of democracy in countries such as Chile and Argentina led to out 
migration. The present wars mainly in Iraq, Afghanistan and Sri Lanka are playing a major role 
in increasing the number of refugees. 
The world wide number of refugees has sharply increased since the early 1970s i.e. rising from 3 
million to a peak of 12 million in 2001. And the number of people seeking asylum in developed 
countries has increased by a factor of 10 over the same period i.e. from about 50,000 per annum 
in the early 1970s to half a million in 2001. While the number of asylum applications in 
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European Union countries increased twenty fold between the early 1970s and the late 1990s _ 
from about 15000 per annum to 300,000 per annum. As far as the UK is concerned, according to 
Home Office statistics published in the first quarter of 2008, asylum applications filed were at 
their lowest level for 14 years in 2007. Despite this successive fall in the number of new asylum 
requests each year, the United Kingdom remained the fifth largest asylum-seeker receiving 
industrialized country in 2007, even though applications reached the lowest level since 1989 
(UNHCR, 2007). 
The figures here are just to give an idea of the number of vulnerable people among the world 
population. This sharp increase in the number of refugees and asylum seekers has been viewed 
as a crisis of rising proportions for two reasons, firstly based on humanitarian grounds and 
secondly the failure of international agencies and governments to solve the refugees problem. 
Despite the recent downward trend of asylum requests in industrialized countries, immigration 
remains a major political issue. The successive waves of immigration have provoked fierce 
political debate about asylum policies. With growing opposition against immigration, and claims 
that many asylum seekers are actually economic migrants, host countries have introduced 
different measures to prevent or deter people from seeking asylum in their countries. 
Owing to these deterrence measures, the number of asylum applications to wealthier regions of 
world has decreased in recent years, even though the global scale of forced displacement has 
continued to grow, but this is achieved at the cost of the protection and safety available to 
refugees, and diversion to other parts of the world and an increase in human trafficking. 
From the other side of the picture we see that asylum seekers and refugees are usually law 
abiding citizens and can contribute to the UK economy. For example many refugees have 
academic or teaching qualifications, 754 refugee teachers were registered with London-based 
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agencies alone. Moreover more than 1,000 medically qualified refugees were recorded on the 
British Medical Association's database in 2001. According to the British Medical Association, it 
only costs £10,000 to prepare a refugee doctor to practice in the UK. But it costs £250,000 to 
train a doctor from scratch (Refugee Council, 2005). 
Asylum Seekers and Refugees Entitlement to Social benefits and Work in the UK: 
Asylum seekers are supported by the NASS (National Asylum Support Service). After getting 
refugee status or leave to remain in the UK they have to find their own housing and their own 
support. Until 1996, asylum seekers had the same legal rights and entitlement to housing and 
social welfare benefits as other people in need. But during the last two decades a number of 
changes in the legislation have taken place and restrictions have been imposed on housing rights 
and public support for asylum seekers in the UK. In the Asylum and Immigration Act of 1996 
restrictions on benefits, housing and employment were imposed and the dispersal policy on a no 
choice basis was introduced by the government to relieve pressure on housing and other services 
in London and the South East. 
In terms of work entitlement those who are granted refugee status can work immediately while 
for asylum seekers the case is different. Asylum seekers are not generally allowed to take up 
employment while their claims are being decided. But there were three exceptions to the policy 
up to 23rd July 2002. According to the Asylum and Immigration Act 1996, asylum seekers could 
seek permission to work if their application remained outstanding for longer than six months 
without an initial decision being made on the claim. This concession was abolished in July 2002 
but some discretion to allow asylum seekers to work was retained until the current rules were 
introduced in 2005. Since February 2005, asylum seekers who have not had an initial decision on 
their asylum claim within a year have been allowed to apply to the Home Office for permission 
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to work as a part of the implementation of the European Council Directive laying down 
minimum standards for the reception conditions of asylum seekers, as a first step towards a 
common European Asylum System. Also paragraph 360 of the Immigration Rules specifies that 
an asylum applicant who has been waiting for 12 months for the initial decision on his asylum 
claim may apply for permission to take employment which shall not include permission to 
become self employed or to engage in a business or professional activity. However such an 
application will only be considered if the delay cannot be attributed to the applicant himself. 
This distinction between refugees and economic immigrants will be followed from now on. This 
study will mainly focus on the socio-economic analysis of refugees and asylum seekers in the 
United Kingdom, particularly considering their performance in the labour market. 
1.8 Research Objectives 
The main objective of this research will be to conduct a socio-economic analysis of refugees and 
asylum seekers in the UK. This will mainly involve examining the labour market performance of 
immigrants particularly refugees in the host country e.g. their assimilation in the new society and 
economy in terms of human capital investment as well as host nation attitudes towards them. 
Moreover, in terms of the economic theory that underlies the different labour market outcome of 
immigrants, this is related to assimilation, which has been explored by many economists such as 
Chiswick and Borjas and in terms of refugees by Cortes (2004) on implicit time horizon 
differences and its effect on human-capital investment. 
The theoretical underpinning behind the thesis is the assimilation hypothesis that after arrival in 
the host country, immigrants' labour market outcomes will adjust towards those of non-
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immigrants or native workers and assimilation takes place through overtime acquisition of 
country specific human capital including labour market knowledge and language proficiency. 
Therefore, this study will explore the differentials in the context of assimilation in the labour 
market of different migrant groups, as well as other factors, considering that it among the main 
determinant of their fiscal contribution in the host society. 
An econometric modelling framework is used to estimate the socio-economic factors which are 
responsible for differentials in earnings and employment outcomes and as well as for 
occupational success of different migrant groups. For example age, returns to education, 
ethnicity and years since migration and how these variables differently affect earnings and 
employment. However, these differentials may be affected by the restrictions and discrimination 
faced by refugees. Given differences in their labour market outcomes, people's attitudes towards 
refugees and the role of socio-economic factors in affecting these attitudes will also be discussed. 
It has also increasingly become evident that host communities within developing and developed 
countries are considerably affected by mass influxes of refugees, whether it is in the arena of the 
economy, politics, the social or environmental impact, or as is often the case, a combination of 
all these factors. This economic and social impact will be explored later in relation to the UK, 
having the 3rd largest foreign population in the European Union, using the Labour Force Survey 
data for the period 2001-2006 and the British Social Attitudes Surveys for the years 1995 and 
2003. 
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1.9 Plan of Chapters 
The thesis is developed as follows: Some fundamental literature on key issues relating to 
immigrants, focussing on the socio-economic impact of immigrants on the host country i.e. their 
economic benefits in terms of their budgetary impact, and their assimilation into the receiving 
country's labour market and the social and demographic impact of immigrants in general will be 
discussed in Chapter 2 and where possible will be related to the circumstances of the refugee and 
asylum seekers. Chapter 3 contains a detailed discussion on the trends in immigration and 
policies and the possible effects of these policies. This chapter also examines the trends and 
changes in asylum and immigration laws in recent decades and also provides information on the 
social and political conditions of the countries sending asylum seekers and refugees. 
In chapters 4 and 5, mIcro data from the Labour Force Survey will be analysed, usmg 
econometric techniques, to explore the labour market performance of immigrants in the UK. 
Chapter 4 will examine labour market performance in terms of economic activity and 
employment and chapter 5 explores earnings and occupational attainment. In both chapters a 
clear distinction is made between different categories of immigrants i.e. refugees/asylum seekers 
and economic migrants. 
Attitudes towards asylum seekers and refugees are discussed in Chapter 6. In particular, the 
change over time in attitudes of the British population towards hosting refugees in the UK will 
be analyzed. British Social Attitudes data will be used to track the changes in attitudes towards 
asylum seekers and refugees between 1995 and 2006, with emphasis placed on the impact of 
demographic characteristics. Chapter 7 contains concluding comments and discussion. 
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review of the Economic and Social Impacts of Immigration 
2.1 Introduction 
Immigration is not just a simple individualistic action but also a collective phenomenon affecting 
both the sending and receiving countries. Immigrants arrive in the host society not only with 
their luggage but also with bundles of different issues related to their presence, issues related to 
the costs and benefits especially in terms of assimilation and integration. They have certain costs 
and benefits associated with them which grow as the number of immigrants increases in the 
society. Therefore the question of concern is which is greater, the cost or benefit? 
Coppel et al. (2001) identified four major consequences of the migration movements, namely the 
effect on the host country's labour market, the influence on the budgetary position of the 
receiving country, a solution to the aging population problem in many OECD countries and the 
economic impact on the source country. The social adoption of immigrants in the new locations 
is also a major concern for refugees as well as the hosting nations. That is why immigrants are 
being viewed as an unwelcome drain on a country's resources despite both positive and negative 
effects associated with them. Evidence suggests that native attitudes are influenced by 
immigrant's labour market position, income, educational backgrounds and with other social and 
demographic characteristics including age, race, religion and ethnicity (Crawley, 2005). 
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As a result of these changes their impact on the host economy has been heatedly debated. The 
immigration issue has been a lively political and academic debate for many years but until 
recently has been surprisingly short of economic analysis, not only from the immigrant's welfare 
point of view but from the host nation's perspective as well. From an initial warm welcome and 
assistance, to rising concerns about the threats and burdens of hosting immigrants or refugees 
and asylum seekers, outright xenophobia has been increasingly widespread within many 
countries. 
The Annual Population Survey from August 2008 shows that among the 61 million population of 
the UK, the number of people living in the UK, who were born abroad, grew to 6.3 million in 
2007, so around 10% of the resident population.2 And this increase has given rise to the negative 
sentiments in the general public. Among those 6 million legal or illegal immigrants in the UK 
many are asylum seekers or refugees as it has been quite easy to apply for asylum and get 
entitlement to free accommodation, health care, children's education as well as legal aid, 
especially in the view of organisations such as Migrationwatch. This implies that asylum seekers 
and refugees impose costs on the government. For example, the budget for the Immigration and 
Nationality Department of the Home Office in the UK increased from £300 million in 1998-99 to 
£1.9 billion for the fiscal year 2002-2003. 
UK immigration policy has had many phases, from a restrictive policy on immigration in the late 
1960s to large scale immigration since 1997 and recently towards a selective migration using a 
points-based system from outside the EU. These changes to some extent reflect the government's 
view that large-scale immigration is beneficial for the UK's economy. These benefits include 
fiscal advantages, a high per capita GDP growth rate, higher labour supply and improvements in 
the age structure. However, as these immigrants are not just economic migrants but also some 
2 http://www.statistics.gov.uklpdfdir/ppmg0808.pdf 
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are seeking asylum and refuge, this potentially implies a greater burden on the government's 
budget. The impact which those immigrants impose on society is greatly concerned with the 
basis on which they move within the host society. Dustmann and Weiss (2007) specify that 
different types of migration have different implications i.e. economic-motives for migration or 
non-economic motives. Migration may be temporary or permanent or even circulatory, with 
recurrent movements between host and source countries, before settling in the final destination 
or contract migration for a fixed term. Finally there is also the return migration voluntarily to 
their country of origin. Each form of migration has its own distinctive impact on the economy. If 
the purpose is to earn money and their own economic improvement and of their families back 
home then they are likely to be active in the labour market and participate in a good or bad way. 
They can be highly skilled personnel in full time employment, with high wages and earnings and 
with greater tax contributions for the government. On the other hand, if their entry is forced by 
certain circumstances in the home country such as is the case for asylum seekers then this can 
impact on the host country differently. 
A small group of refugees and asylum seekers may be welcomed by natives but a massive influx 
is frequently considered as an unnecessary burden. Refugees are often criticised for being a drain 
on resources, taking away jobs and being a serious threat to national identity. But wherever they 
move, due to educational, age, cultural and language differentials, they impose certain economic 
and social implications on hosting countries. Chambers (1986) argues that refugees and asylum 
seekers have been a centre of concern and the focus of many organisations and their impact is 
calculated in terms of the host country government, economies and services but their impact on 
the host population is usually ignored. In this regard, the rich and better off host countries may 
gain from the refugee's presence while those poorer hosts with scarce land and abundant labour 
are actually hidden losers as they have to compete for food, work, wages, and services. 
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This chapter will mainly discuss the literature on some key issues on immigrants from a socio-
economic perspective but there may be other aspects which are overlooked here. Of particular 
note is that most of the existing literature focuses on the impact of immigration in general but 
this chapter will try where possible to relate the issues to the migration of asylum 
seekers/refugees, although there is not much on this aspect previously in the economic literature. 
Therefore, where possible the issues relevant to asylum seekers and refugees will be discussed 
here in addition to aspects related to immigrants in general. 
Impacts of Immigration 
Immigration not only exerts a lot of pressure on the economic and social infrastructure of the 
host countries, competing with the host communities for social and public services, such as 
health, education, water, sanitation, communication and transport, but it also reduces wage 
differentials across regions, helps to fill labour shortages, increases GDP, increases the efficiency 
of local firms, reduces inflationary pressure in the economy and also brings cultural diversity. 
With the associated host-fatigue, immigrants may also bring with them certain social and cultural 
impacts and thus greatly contribute to the diversity of the host society. A variety of foods, the 
provision of cheap labour and thus lowering the costs of production are just some examples of 
their benefits. 
Considering all of the above, migrants can have the following two major impacts on host society. 
(a)- Economic Impact 
(b) - Social Impact 
The constituent elements of these different impacts are shown in Figure 2.1. 
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2.2 The Economic Impact of Immigration 
A research report by the Home Office Research Development and Statistics Directorate (RDS), 
defined economic migration as a voluntary market transaction between a willing buyer (whoever 
is willing to employ the migrant) and a willing seller (the migrant) and hence likely to be both 
economically efficient and beneficial for both parties (Glover et aI, 2001). The only difference 
between migration and trade is that unlike goods and capital, migrants are economic and social 
agents themselves with a degree of control over the migration decision. 
The economic consequences of immigration can be divided into two major categories. 
1. Budgetary/Fiscal Impacts 2. Labour Market Issues 
The one which has mostly received economists' attention is the labour market impacts of 
immigrants. Whilst growing anti-immigrant attitudes has combined with the forces of fiscal 
conservatism to make immigrants an easy target for budget cuts (Huber and Espenshade, 1997). 
At the same time the question of the most suitable immigration policy has involved discussion 
over immigrants' net fiscal contribution. The budgetary costs of immigration and labour market 
concerns are discussed in the following subsections separately. 
2.2.1 Budgetary/Fiscal Impacts 
One of the economic consequences of immigration is the fiscal impact of immigrants. There is a 
growing debate on how much immigrants pay in taxes to central and local governments and how 
many benefits they receive in return and how these two effects are balanced out. 
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Immigrants contribute to a different extent by paying taxes, claiming benefits and consuming 
public goods and services depending upon the group to which they belong. If they contribute 
more/less than they receive in social benefits they can have a positive/negative impact on the 
native population. A positive impact can lead to a reduction in taxes and thus produce an 
increase in disposable income and vice versa. Although how this income is redistributed between 
immigrants and natives is a matter of socio-political debate (Ekberg, 2006). On the basis of their 
contribution and expenditure they are categorised as net contributors or burdens to society and 
on the recommendation of these results, immigration policy can be influenced in favour or 
against immigrants. The overall fiscal impact should take account of the total amount of tax 
contributions by immigrants and the receipt of welfare payments and consumption of public 
goods and services such as education and health care etc. In terms of tax contributions then this 
is no doubt dependent on a person's labour market activity i.e. both their employment status and 
earnmgs. 
A person's skills, with regard to his educational qualifications, and labour market experience, are 
a major determinant of his labour market position which determines his tax contributions. 
Whereas social benefit entitlements are first of all determined by his legal status, age and family 
size along with the factors responsible for net tax contributions, whilst the usage of public goods 
and services is also related to age. Therefore Ekberg (2000) emphasized that age composition is 
a major determinant of immigrants' net contribution to the public sector. 
Therefore the fiscal impact of immigration is directly related with the way migrants interact with 
the labour market. Once immigrants are there, they are likely to have a certain influence in the 
economy at every level through their skills which affects productivity. Nathan (2008) explored 
the impact of immigration on local economies and argues they have a net beneficial effect on 
local areas. Their impacts are mainly affected by the skills, diversity or size of the immigration. 
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Larger urban areas in particular have significantly benefited from the diversity aspect as it opens 
up trade and innovation possibilities. Thus not only immigrants who find work and pay taxes 
benefit the economy but they also do so through their entrepreneurial activities. This implies that 
self-employment is another potentially important labour market activity for immigrants. 
Immigration may have adverse fiscal impacts if immigrants participate in welfare programs more 
intensively than natives. For example, the Borjas (1994) findings for the US where the earnings 
of unskilled native workers declined during the 1980s as newer waves were more likely to 
participate in the welfare programs. So, the fiscal cost is larger for unskilled immigrant flows. 
Fiscal estimates are conditional on the time of calculation because immigrant structure and 
behaviour changes over time, also because of the country's position in the business cycle at that 
point in time. Migrants are easily absorbed into the labour market in boom times and have better 
employment and fiscal outcomes than in a recession. Due to this discrepancy, empirical results 
vary widely and make inter-temporal and international comparison difficult (Gott and Johnston 
(2002)). 
The fiscal contribution of immigrants has been extensively studied in the US and other countries 
and various studies have found that the net contribution of immigrants in the fiscal balance is 
positive. For example Ekberg (1999) calculated that net fiscal contribution of immigrants to the 
Swedish economy was positive during the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s but this net fiscal impact 
turned negative in the 1990s, due to the reduction in the skill level of the later cohorts. Lee and 
Miller (2000) estimated the net fiscal contribution of existing immigrants and their descendents 
in the USA was a surplus of $23.5 billion or 0.35% of GDP. The underlying assumption is that 
none of the cost of debt interest and public goods is allocated to immigrants. Without this 
assumption the results may substantially become negative. 
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Lee and Miller (2000) emphasize that the overall fiscal impact of immigration is quite small and 
should not be a major concern for policy and the education level of immigrants also matters a 
great deal to their fiscal impact. This argument is further supported by a survey of the literature 
by Drinkwater et al. (2003), in that migration of the highly skilled can actually bring about 
positive growth effects, due to human capital formation. 
Estimates for the United Kingdom 
Gott and Johnston (2002) was the first study of the fiscal impact of immigration in the UK and 
was carried by the Research, Development and Statistics Directorate of the Home Office. Gott 
and Johnston (2002) find that immigrants have both direct and indirect effects on the host 
economy. Direct effects come through the contribution in the form of taxes to increase 
government revenues, which is a positive effect, whilst being a drain on the government 
revenues through the claiming of benefits and the consumption of government provided goods is 
the negative effect. 
The Direct Net Annual Fiscal Impact (NAFI) is then measured by the difference between total 
tax and National Insurance contributions (TM) received from migrants and value of government 
expenditures and consumption of public services attributed to migrants (EM), i.e. NAFI= TM -
EM. Indirect effects are produced through their influence on tax receipts (e.g. by increasing or 
decreasing the level of production, employment, efficiency etc). The study was focussed on the 
fiscal contribution of immigrants as a whole in the tax year 1999/2000. The study used Labour 
Force Survey data for the four quarters of 1999 and all foreign born residents of the UK and 
dependent children with two or lone foreign born parents were defined as migrants and this 
constituted 8.4% of the UK population for the period concerned. 
'"'5 .J 
Gott and Johnston (2002) estimate that immigrants are a net contributor to the UK economy and 
calculated a combined fiscal surplus of £2.5 billion after rounding. The following table shows 
the different forms of expenditures and revenues which were used in their study to calculate the 
net fiscal contribution of immigrants. 




Social Security Expenditure 
Housing 
Expenditures on debt interest 
Other categories of expenditure 
e.g. environmental, law and order services etc 
Source: Gott and Johnston, 2002 
Revenues 
Income Tax 
Social Security Contributions 
Inland Revenue Taxation Categories 
Customs and Excise 
Council Tax Revenue 
Net Taxes 
e.g. vehicle excise revenues, oil royalties 
( revenue from licences to extract oil) etc 
The study was further updated and modified by the Institute of Public Policy Research (ippr) in 
Srisikandarajah et al. (2005). This report estimated that immigrants' contribution to government 
had increased from £30 billion in 1999-00 to £41.2 billion in 2003-04 and immigrants' 
consumption of government services had increased even more rapidly from £29 billion to £41.6 
billion, producing a net fiscal contribution of -£004 billion. However, in comparison to the native 
born, immigrants were less of a drain on the government in 2003/4 since the net contribution of 
migrants was -£74 per head, compared to -£892 for natives. Immigrants were also estimated to 
make a large positive contribution from 1999/2000 to 2001/02. Therefore, the study concludes 
that rather than being a drain on the public purse, immigrants are making a larger contribution to 
the government than natives on a per capita basis. The calculations of the fiscal effects are shown 
in Table 2.2. 
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Table 2.2 
An Estimation of the Fiscal Impact of Immigrants in the UK (in Billions) 
1999-00 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 
Expenditure on Migrants 28,956 31802 34,810 38,074 41,606 
Revenue from Migrants 30,835 33494 36,592 37,931 41,181 
Net Contribution 1880 1692 1782 -143 -424 
Expenditure on UK-Born 314,674 335,253 355,736 380,843 417,392 
Revenue from UK-Born 318,453 339,880 343,815 349,785 369,356 
Net Contribution 3778 4627 -11,921 -31,058 -48,036 
Net migrant Contribution £381 £327 £331 £ -25 £ -74 
Per capita 
Net UK-Born Contribution £70 £86 £222 £ -579 £ -892 
Per capita 
.. Source: SnslkandaraJah et ai, 2005 
Musgrave (2008) has criticized this study and pointed out that in calculating the estimates the 
study has ignored the additional cost of infrastructure investments on natives due to immigrants. 
He estimated that counting those investments costs £10.3 billion, including the cost of immigrant 
crime (£3bn), remittances (£lbn) and half the cost of educating the children of mixed parentage 
(£2.6bn). By doing this the net fiscal deficit reached £12bn, while the immigrant contribution is 
just £4.9 billion. He further argues that a very small portion of migration actually fills skill 
shortages and the rest of migration is the mass movement of people which costs £12bn to the 
UK, an already over-crowded island. 
Rowthom (2008) has also pointed out a number of favourable and unfavourable items associated 
with migrants, which the IPPR study excluded from their analysis. The unfavourable items 
include security, asylum support, ethnic relations support, excess medical costs and children of 
mixed parentage. The favourable items include defence and a balanced budget. And when all 
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adjustments are included, the net contribution of migrants is virtually zero, estimated to be £OA 
billion, equivalent to 0.040/0 of GDP and 0.07% of individual consumption. 
In contrast, the most recent study by Dustmann et al. (2009) finds that immigrants from Central 
and Eastern European countries (A8 countries) have made a positive contribution to UK public 
finances in each fiscal year since the enlargement of the European Union in 2004. The study has 
evaluated the fiscal impact of A8 immigration to the UK for the fiscal years 2005-06, 2006-07, 
2007 -08, and 2008-09 by comparing the receipt of tax contributions to additional costs due to 
provision of benefits and government services to the immigrants. Table 2.3 summarises the 
criteria used for government's receipts and expenditures on immigrants. 
Table 2.3 
Expenditures and Revenues Allocation Criteria 
Expenditures 
"Pure" Public goods 
Other Publicly provided goods and services 
Law Courts and Prisons 
Housing Development 
Health (except health research) 
Social Protection: Social exclusion n.e.c. 
Compulsory Education 
Post-Secondary Education 
Immigration and Citizenship police services 
Other police services 
Social protection ( except housing, social 
exclusion n.e.c., R&D social protection, social 
protection n.e.c.) 
Source: Dustmann et aI, 2009 
Receipts 
Income Tax and National Insurance 
Income Tax Credits 
V AT and Excise Duties 
Vehicle Excise Duties 






On the basis of these expenditures and receipts criteria, Table 2.4 shows the computation of the 
net fiscal contribution of natives and A8 immigrants to the UK economy using data from 
governments accounts and the LFS for the fiscal years 2005-06 to 2008-09. 
Table 2.4 
Fiscal Year Computation 2005-06 to 2008-09 
Fiscal % Population Expenditures Revenues RevlExp 
Year A8 Natives Total %A8 %Natives Total %A8 %Natives A8 Natives 
(£million) (£million) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
2005-06 0.25 90.47 524173 0.16 91.20 485700 0.24 86.26 1.39 0.88 
2006-07 0.52 89.88 550116 0.33 90.82 519700 0.56 85.31 1.60 0.89 
2007-08 0.87 89.24 582676 0.57 90.30 548000 0.81 84.38 1.35 0.88 
2008-09 0.91 88.80 620685 0.60 89.89 530700 0.96 83.86 1.37 0.80 
Source: Dustmann et ai, 2009 
A8 immigrants are 60% less likely than natives to receive benefits or tax credits and 58% less 
likely to live in social housing. Even those, sharing the same demographic characteristics like 
age, education, children and disability, are 13% less likely to claim benefits and 28% less likely 
to be in social housing. This is because of their higher participation in the labour market and 
more payment in the form of indirect taxes and lower use of social benefits. Their net fiscal 
contribution may be lower due to lower wages but this is offset by higher participation and 
higher employment rates. However, it may be argued that this is a specific group of migrants, 
dominated by labour migrants. 
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Static versus Dynamic Approaches 
Most of the studies discussed above have focused on static analysis but some recent approaches 
have also included dynamic aspects. The static/cross-section approach considers a particular 
group classified as migrants and estimates their fiscal contribution for a specified period by the 
difference in their tax contributions and expenditures to the government. 
The dynamic approach incorporates all the future taxes and expenditures associated with that 
particular group and their descendents. The Net Present Value (NPV) of the capital sum of these 
taxes and expenditures is considered by discounting back to a base year. Actually the dynamic 
approach considers the impact of immigrants over time so the age dependency of tax 
contributions and the school age popUlation of immigrants cannot be ignored. 
Taking this approach, Auerbach and Oreopoulos (1999) analysed the fiscal impacts of US 
immigration using generational accounting techniques as it considers not only the net 
contribution of immigrants to fiscal balances but also the size of this impact relative to the 
overall imbalance. Their findings indicate that immigration should not be viewed as a source of 
the present fiscal imbalance or a solution to this imbalance. Secondly they find that the net fiscal 
cost or benefit depends on the extent of the fiscal imbalance borne by the future generation and 
the overall fiscal effect is ambiguous as it depends on government purchases as well. Finally, 
policy which focuses on the composition of immigration rather than the level of immigration can 
potentially reduce the fiscal burden on future generations. Thus the policy of admitting highly 
educated working age young people should be a fiscal benefit to government and society. 
Storesletten (2003) calculated discounted government gains from immigration by NPV from the 
Sweden tax system and detailed government expenditures. The model predicts large gains of 
40 
over 0.2 million SEK per immigrant if they are aged between 20 and 30 and there is a net cost of 
1.1 million SEK per immigrant if they are over 50 years of age. On average, the government 
loses 175,000 SEK or $20,500 per immigrant. It is also found that the net gain is sensitively 
conditional on the labour market situation of immigrants, particularly the rate of employment 
and assimilation of the second generation of immigrants. 
Most studies find that highly skilled migrants make large fiscal benefits and unskilled migrants 
are a burden on natives. Immigrant fiscal contributions are dependent on their age and the extent 
to which they integrate in the labour market. The net fiscal contribution of immigrants lies within 
the range of +/- 1 % of GDP and according to Rowthom (2008) there is no strong fiscal case for 
or against sustained large-scale migration. 
2.2.2 Labour Market Issues 
The key question here is how do immigrants affect the employment and earnings of natives in 
the domestic labour market? This is because the labour market performance, human capital 
investment and assimilation of different groups of immigrants are important issues for the 
government and researchers alike. Many economists agree that the economic impact is difficult 
to measure but immigration has generally been found to have only a small effect on the domestic 
labour market. 
2.2.2.1 Effect on Native Employment and Wages 
Despite the general perception of the public that immigrants have an adverse effect on the wages 
and employment of the native-born population, there is little evidence of economically 
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significant reductions in native employment or wages. A considerable number of papers have 
focussed on the labour market performance of immigrants for the US and European countries 
and find very small effects of immigrant presence on employment and wages. For example 
Friedberg and Hunt (1995) in their survey of empirical research from the US and other countries 
find that a 10 percent increase in the share of immigrants in the population reduces native wages 
by at most 1 percent and even those natives who should be the closest substitutes with immigrant 
labour have not been found to suffer significantly as a result of increased immigration. Card 
(2001) also finds no partial effects of immigration on the wages of similarly skilled workers. 
Peri (2007) obtained similar findings while analyzing the effects of immigration on the 
employment and wages of US natives in California. He finds no evidence that immigrant inflows 
over the period of 1960-2004 worsened the employment situation of native workers with similar 
skills i.e. education and experience. Rather immigration did lower the wages of previous 
immigrants in this period. While Borjas (2003) argues that workers with similar education and 
different experiences are not perfect substitutes and by analysing this supply shift across 
education-experience groups, the skill cell approach, he finds that a 10 percent increase in 
immigrants reduces native wages by 3-4 percent and thus the labour demand curve is downward 
sloping. 
In terms of other countries, Hansen and Lofstrom (2003) used a large panel data set for Sweden 
and found that an increase in number of immigrants, unemployment and changes in the 
composition of immigrants were important causes of an increase in welfare utilization in 
Sweden. But Pischke and VeIling (1997) in their analysis based on Germany data did not find 
any great evidence of displacement effect of immigrants on employment rates and particularly 
unemployment rates using a data set of county-level variables for the late 1980s. Their results 
indicate no detrimental effect of immigration. For the UK, Dustmann, Fabbri and Preston (2005) 
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analysed the impact of immigration on wages and employment using the LFS for the period 
1983-2000 and found no significant effect on the overall employment of natives. Also they found 
no indication of negative wage effects but rather an overall positive wage effect if anything. 
Immigration can affect the labour market only if immigrants change the skill structure of the 
natives in the host economy and these effects are distributed differently across different parts of 
the wage distribution (Dustmann et aI, 2008). The assumption about the elasticity of the capital 
supply is crucial. If capital is perfectly elastic then immigrants with similar skills will not affect 
natives' labour market outcomes and the economy will expand to absorb any additional supply 
of labour. But in the absence of any adjustment mechanism and with different skill composition, 
absorption will cause wage adjustment through re-distribution and in this case natives with 
similar skills may lose out and those with different skills may gain from immigration, and the 
overall picture can be positive. 
Therefore, Dustmann et al. (2008) argue that the overall impact on average wages will depend 
upon the assumption regarding the elasticity of the capital supply. But the findings of Dustmann, 
Frattini and Preston (2008) for the UK (where recent immigrants are generally well educated, but 
their skills, education and experience are not properly recognized in the labour market) show that 
at least 26% of highly skilled and educated migrants work in routine and semi routine 
occupations. This downgrading of immigrants upon arrival leads to wage pressure and 
competition towards the bottom end of the wage distribution and as a result the greater concerns 
of the low skilled population may be justified. 
The evidence is further supported by Nathan (2008), who finds that at low entry level jobs there 
is some risk of a negative impact as migrants provide cheap labour to employers but in this way 
it may actually help in keeping local economies at a lower cost with long term benefits. 
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On the whole, apart from few exceptions, the literature suggests that immigrants have no 
significant impact on the wages and employment of natives. Their impact does however depend 
upon the skill structure of natives, since if immigrants are competing with similar skilled workers 
then they may put a deflationary pressure on wages. But if they are complements they may 
increase wages. Overall it can be argued from the balance of evidence that they do not have any 
significant detrimental impact on native employment or wages, but if there is any, it is for low 
skilled natives. For a useful summary of the evidence, please see Appendix 2 for a summary 
table on some of the empirical studies examining the impact of immigrants on the labour market 
outcomes of natives. 
In this regard, refugees/asylum seekers are more likely to compete with low skilled natives at 
entry level jobs as their skills and education are less likely to be recognized upon their arrival. 
This may lead to restrictive approach to higher level jobs and thus they are more likely to rely on 
state funds with less contribution towards government revenue. The associated greater costs with 
refugees and asylum seekers suggest that there exists a considerable difference between the 
performances of different immigrant groups. Table 2.5 uses LFS data to show differences in the 
economic activities of refugee/asylum seekers and economic migrants. A detailed discussion of 
the data and construction of the variables is presented in chapter 4 of the thesis. 
Just a glance at Table 2.5 reveals that there are larger differences between the economIC 
activities of the two groups i.e. refugee/ asylum seekers and economic migrants. This table has 
just focussed on two groups of immigrants but the economic activities of more categories of 
immigrants are discussed in detail in chapter 4. 
Table 2.5: Economic Activity and Earnings of Immigrants 
Category Refugees & Economic 
Asylum Seekers Migrants 
Employed 49.300/0 74.09% 
Unemployed 9.39% 5.31% 
Students 5.15% 2.65% 
Looking after Family/ Home 14.03% 8.35% 
Temporarily Sick! Injured/ Disabled 2.270/0 1.33% 
Long Term Sick! Injured/ Disabled 8.26% 3.90% 
Not Looking Jobs 11.60% 4.37% 
Gross Hourly Earnings £ 8.56 £11.72 
0/0 Earning> £15 an hour 9.72% 21.44% 
A far higher percentage of economic migrants are in employment, almost three-quarters of them 
are employed compared to less than half of refugees and asylum seekers, and thus a greater 
proportion of refugees/asylum seekers are either unemployed or inactive due to various other 
reasons. For example, the percentage that is long term sick/injured or disabled is around twice as 
high for refugees and asylum seekers as compared to economic migrants. An even larger 
difference is present for those who are not currently looking for jobs. Therefore, a larger 
proportion of refugees and asylum seekers are out of work either as unemployed, temporary or 
long term sick. These individuals are more likely to use social benefits especially those who are 
long term sick, injured or disabled. 
Also the hourly earnings of asylum seekers is less than those of economic migrants which means 
they are paying less in taxes as compared to economic migrants. On average, refugees and 
asylum seekers earn approximately one-third less than economic migrants. Moreover. the 
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percentage earning more than £15 an hour is more than double for economic migrants compared 
to refugees and asylum seekers and thus they are more likely to pay taxes at the higher 40% rate. 
Thus, a vast majority of refugees and asylum seekers are relatively poor and so pay fewer taxes 
and receive more public funds than other immigrants and also likely to pay taxes at the higher 
rate (see Chapter 5 for more details). 
2.2.2.2 Immigrant Assimilation 
Under whatever conditions immigrants, either economIC migrants or refugees and asylum 
seekers, move or take refuge or asylum in the host country, with the new specific human capital, 
environment, labour market conditions, restrictive approach to the employment especially for 
refugees and asylum seekers, they often face certain difficulties in adjusting into the new 
economy and society. Damm and Rosholm (2005) argue that spatial dispersal policies have a 
significant effect on the labour market assimilation of refugees and asylum seekers. Assimilation 
and integration is not just a matter of their educational qualifications and labour market 
experience but it largely depends on the time spent in the host society and accumulation of 
country-specific human capital. A number of studies have found a correlation between 
immigrant earnings assimilation and the time horizon in the host country. Research has also 
highlighted the link between country-specific human capital and assimilation, especially English 
language skills (Chiswick (1978), Carliner (1995), Duleep and Regets (1999)). 
As refugees and asylum seekers are the main focus, their assimilation in the labour market of the 
host country is of particular concern. In this regard, Cortes (2004) analyzed implicit time horizon 
differences, which have significant effects on human capital investment and the wage 
assimilation of refugees and economic migrants using Public Use Micro data Samples of the 
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1980 and 1990 US censuses for the labour market outcomes of immigrants in USA who arrived 
from 1975 to 1980. 
Cortes (2004) used the following conceptual model of country-specific human capital investment 
with immigrants having the potential choice of returning home. Immigrants are assumed to work 
for two periods and their utility function is equal to their net earnings. Immigrants maximize 
their intertemporal expected utility giving by earnings in the first period plus earnings in the 
second period multiplied by a discount factor ~: 
Max E[UJ = E[yl(WH ,H .... 8) + pYz,j("'j,H~ .. e)] 
{ e} 
In the first period the immigrant's net earnings are Y1 (WH' H~, 9) whereas 
WH = Market rate of return on per unit human capital in the host country 
(2.1) 
(J = Choice variable for time spent in investing in human capital (versus working) 
He = Initial level of Human Capital 
and in the second period, immigrants either remain in the host country (H) or return to source 
country (S) receiving net earnings ,BYz,j("'j,H",,8) where j = H, Sand P= Discount factor. 
Let Y1 and Yz.j have the following functional forms: 
Yl = WHHII(l- 6), (2.2) 
Yz,j = Wj[H" + f(Ha,B)] j=H, S (2.3) 
where f(H ... ,{J) is the human capital production function and is assumed to be strictly concave. As 
only a fraction of the initial human capital of immigrants can be transferred to the host country, 
therefore additional acquisition is required for assimilation in the host labour market. So 
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immigrants invest some time in human capital in the first period. How much time they invest in 
these country-specific skills depends on their decision of staying in the host country or returning 
back to the source country in the second period. By substituting back equations 2.2 and 2.3 into 
2.1 for earnings maximization, an expression for the optimal choice of human capital investment 
of immigrants can be obtained. 
Let p be the probability of staying in the host country, and (l-p) the probability of emigrating 
back to the source country in the second period. By substituting these expressions for earnings 
into the maximization problem, the optimal choice of human capital investment for immigrant 
i.e. ()* is determined by 
Max wHH .. (l- 9) + fJp[wHH .. + wR f(H .. ,8)] + P(l - p)[wsH. + wsfCH", e)]. (2.4) { e } 
where the foc is (2.5) 
The effect of p on the optimal choice of human capital investment is derived by solving for the 
first order condition as follows; 




af(H .. ,fJ*(P)) 
D = ae < 0 
a2f(H .. ,()*CP)[Ws + (1 _ It's)] 
ae 2 W~ p W~ 
The above expression is positive as the wages in the host country are greater than wages in the 
source country and 0 < P < 1, and thus implies the concavity of human capital production 
function. 
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Equation (2.6) shows that a higher probability of remaining in the host country results in the 
greater human capital investment of immigrants. This implies that a refugee's investment in 
country-specific human capital is higher than economic immigrants as they are more likely to 
live longer in the host country due to their circumstances and therefore their assimilation 
increases over time. 
Cortes (2004) found that refugees made substantial gams over period of time and with 
approximately the same level of English language skills, refugee immigrants in the 1980 cohort 
earned 6% less and worked 14% fewer hours than economic immigrants but both groups had 
made substantial gains by 1990. However, refugees had made greater gains and earned 20% 
more, worked 4% more hours, and improved their English skills by 11 % relative to economic 
immigrants and accumulated higher levels of human capital. The reason behind this assimilation 
is since they are more likely to stay and are unable to return to their country, they are more likely 
to invest in the country-specific human capital and that's why they assimilate at a greater rate as 
compared to other immigrants. 
Lindley (2002a) produces results for the UK which show that refugee earnings differ from non-
refugee immigrants, indicating that they assimilate differently from economic migrants. There 
exist unexplainable earnings and employment penalties relative to UK born South Asians and 
non-whites, and to native born whites, suggesting some element of discrimination. 
As discussed before in Table 2.5 there are obvious differences in the labour market participation 
of both groups of immigrants in terms of employment and economic activity. Thus immediately 
after entry, refugees and asylum seekers are more likely to rely on state funds and claim benefits 
as compared to other immigrants. 
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In other words, overall they are not contributing enough to support and bear their own needs and 
are an initial burden on government and society. However, with the passage of time they may 
accumulate more human capital to assimilate in the host society and may contribute more than 
other migrants, with their assimilation mainly dependent on years since migration. 
The composition of economic activities of these two distinct groups clearly shows that one has a 
more profoundly adverse effect and imposes certain burdens or costs on the government and the 
other is more likely to contribute to government revenues. This negative impact increases as the 
share of this population increases. However, both groups have their own costs and benefits on 
the economy as well as society, the latter of which will now be discussed. 
2.3 The Social Impact of Immigration 
The social integration of immigrants, especially refugees/asylum seekers in the host country is a 
cause for concern for the refugees as well as the hosting nations. Refugees/Asylum seekers and 
other immigrants are blamed not only for adversely affecting government' finances but also for 
crime, drugs, terrorism and smuggling, depleting natural resources, environmental damage and 
law and order problems in areas where they concentrate. 
Coleman and Rowthorn (2004) argued that sustained large scale immigration has its 
demographic, social, and environmental impacts and has provoked an unexpected new growth in 
housing demand and population, social divisions and a corresponding weakening of national 
identity and cohesion. 
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2.3.1 The Effect of Multiculturalism on Cohesion 
The Oxford dictionary defines multiculturalism as 'the policy or process whereby the distinctive 
identities of the cultural groups within a society are maintained or supported'. Culture refers to 
people's socio-political values, religion, beliefs, language and perception of right and wrong. 
Culture is not rigid but a dynamic phenomenon which can change over time under the influence 
of different factors. Immigrants generally come from different social and cultural backgrounds to 
natives and the heterogeneity of migrants has influenced the cultural contexts in European 
societies in different ways. 
Ethnic diversity and social and cultural heterogeneity is a phenomenon affecting almost every 
single advanced country, mainly resulting from the recent increases in immigration. It will 
therefore increase in future if there is a continued high level of immigration. This ethnic diversity 
is actually the foundation of a multicultural society. 
Putnam (2007) considers ethnic diversity as an asset and argues that in the long fUll, immigration 
and ethnic diversity are likely to have an important social and cultural impact on society, 
however in the short run it tends to decrease social solidarity and social capital and there is a 
trade off between diversity and community. Multiculturalism relates to the transition due to the 
accumulation of social capital. Social capital comes in different forms and effects e.g. different 
civic groups strengthen democracy. Social networks are positive externalities and evidence 
shows that high social capital areas display a healthy growth of children, increased life 
expectancy, and more generally a better, safer and more educated community with democracy 
and the economy working for the betterment of the society. 
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Similar to other advanced countries, immigration has provoked not only an economic impact but 
also has political implications in the UK as well. Zetter et al (2006) explore the interaction 
between migrants, their social capital and relationships and the formation of a concrete and 
integrated society at the local level and also discuss the affect of increasing the volume and 
diversity of migration on the political landscape of the UK. They argue that the importance of 
social cohesion has forced the government to shift its focus from multicultural race relations and 
acceptance of differences to emphasizing social cohesion in order to achieve a cohesive national 
identity. 
On the other hand, Hickman et al (2008) suggest that multiple deprivation and the limited 
opportunities for the settled population in different parts of the UK undermines social cohesion 
and the issues of deprivation, discrimination and disadvantages impact on both the ethnic 
majority and minority settlers in the UK. The study further emphasizes that cohesion is about 
maintaining the right balance between isolation and communities. 
Immigrants may keep their own identities or integrate into society, or may have a balanced 
approach between these two, and this is likely to determine their cultural impact on society. 
Likewise, immigrants have brought enormous cultural benefits to the UK. A wider variety of 
food choices and the ethnic diversity of football/sporting stars is just a cultural bonus from the 
large influx of immigrants to the UK. According to a report by the European Migration Network 
(2006), food production and consumption patterns, the sports and fashion industries have been 
greatly influenced by immigrants. 
2.3.2 Discrimination and Crime 
In a social context, immigration by economic migrants and refugees/asylum seekers has been 
argued to have led to increasing xenophobia and discrimination. The effects of the large influx of 
those immigrants must be recognized to get the full picture of this "host fatigue". The following 
are the major concerns for the public and government; 
~ Discrimination and Xenophobic Attitudes ( sentiments leading to social umest) 
~ Asylum Seekers and Immigrants are blamed for crimes, 
~ Security concerns including terrorism 
Hazel Blears, the former Communities and Local Government Secretary, acknowledged in a 
statement that the scale of present migration had increased public concern and is fuelling social 
tension in some parts of the country which were unused to large communities of foreigners.3 
Whilst according to a web consultation survey by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation, "the British 
people feel a deep sense of unease about some of the changes shaping British society. On the 
social evil of immigration and responses to immigration, some participants felt that local 
residents lost out to immigrants in competition for scarce resources" (Watts, 2008). 
Dustmann and Preston (2000) find that both welfare and labour market concerns matter for the 
hostile attitudes towards immigrants but the single most important factor is for racially motivated 
reasons. These negative attitudes towards more immigration are strongly linked to factors 
affecting Asians and West Indians, while are less strong for European migrants. The increase in 
immigration leads to a concentration of different ethnic groups in specific areas and locations 
3 http://www.telegraph.co.uklnews/newstopics/politics/2110734lHazel-Blears-Immigration-fuels-social-tension.html 
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which may increase social diversity but at the same time gives rise to social problems such as 
discrimination, resulting in anger from the immigrants often as a reaction to the increase in social 
crimes. Recent police figures for the worst-affected areas show one in ten of all those arrested 
have come to the UK from the eight fonner Soviet states which joined the EU in 2004.4 Coleman 
(2008) estimated a £3.08 billion additional annual cost to the government by the excessive 
crimes committed by ethnic minority immigrants. 
Robinson and Reeve (2006) discuss how new immigrants experiencing social and economic 
disadvantages can affect the local neighbourhood. New immigrants usually prefer to live near 
people of same ethnic background and this is often seen as problematic but their impact at the 
local neighbourhood level varies with the local socio-economic context, ethnicity, identity and 
local media portrayal of immigrants and asylum seekers. Regardless of legal status or ethnicity 
they live in poor quality housing in deprived inner city areas and face hostility and difficulties 
even though they can make a positive contribution locally and nationally and help revive 
declining neighbourhoods. 
2.3.3 Demographic Impacts 
Immigration puts an extra pressure not only on social and economic resources but it also has 
certain demographic impacts on the host society. The impact may be good or bad depending 
upon the age structure and consumption patterns of the inflows. Thus the impact on the aging 
population and environmental and congestion costs are not necessarily straightforward and must 
be taken in to account. 
4 http://www.dailymail.co.uklnews/article-413985IEastem-European-immigrants-carry-tenth-crime.html 
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2.3.3.1 Impact on the Age Distribution 
Bauer et al. (2004) stressed that in many European countries the demographic development 
pattern will result in an increased demand for immigration to slow down the aging of the 
population. Official figures published by the ONS for 2007 show that migration is still the 
largest source of population growth. This means that with a higher dependency rate, with fewer 
working age people supporting a greater number of people, due to lower fertility and increasing 
numbers of the elderly in the short term and relatively fewer taxpayers to support the aging 
population in the long term, immigration can have an important role to play in partly reducing 
the imbalance. 
But Lee and Edwards (2001) consider an aging population to be a natural and an inevitable 
demographic transition for the US but in their opinion immigration is a weak policy instrument 
to reduce the fiscal consequences of the aging population. The aging population increases health 
costs and thus in tum increases government expenditures. Lee and Miller (2000) argue that an 
increase in immigration has helped the US to overcome this future crises by slowing down 
population aging and paying for social security and health care. But a high fertility rate and the 
low education of some immigrants may not be beneficial for society but this high fertility may 
temporarily ease the projected fiscal burden of the retiring population in future decades. 
Razin and Sadka (2000) discuss the consequences of migration on the pension system. They 
argued that in a static model even low skilled young immigrants can help to pay the benefits of 
the current elderly population but they adversely affect the current younger age population as 
being the net beneficiaries of the welfare state. But in a dynamic model, with constant factor 
prices due to capital or goods mobility, migration is greatly supported by the political economy. 
If factor prices are not pegged then this pro-migration feature can be weakened. 
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2.3.3.2 Congestion and Environmental Costs 
According to the Optimum Population Trust, there is a limit to the size of population that any 
country can sustain environmentally. Excess immigration into an already densely populated 
country can cause substantial economic and environmental damage. The impact may not be 
visible until the pressure on resources becomes really intense. "For example projected population 
growth of more than 10 million in the UK by 2074 would involve the building of 57 more towns 
the size of Luton - before taking into account household fragmentation" (OPT Press Release 20th 
October 2005). Immigration, therefore can increase transport problems, put upward pressure on 
housing and erode the green belt. 
Massive migration for settlement not only puts an excessive burden on the host society but it 
undermines the existing underlying problems of the source countries by encouraging the brain 
drain, from the movement to another country and thus giving governments an opportunity to 
postpone the possible solutions. 
Furthermore, one may consider that immigration has little effect on global population growth as 
it is simply a re-distribution of people from one part of the world to another part. But even at the 
global level, international migration affects population growth if the living standard of 
immigrants is improved compared to the one prevailing in their country. Then they are said to be 
affecting the global environment by increasing their ecological foot prints (a measure of an 
individual's impact on the environment). Therefore it is the responsibility of the government to 
ensure sustainable green growth in relation to its popUlation and immigration policies whilst such 
issues can be more acute at the nationai/locallevei. 
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2.4 Conclusion 
Immigrants bring along with them certain costs and benefits for the host society. Immigrants, 
whether they are legal or illegal, economic migrants or refugees and asylum seekers, often in the 
beginning have to rely on some kind of support either from their relatives, friends or from the 
government. And when they get this support from the state they impose certain costs on the 
economy and society. On the benefit side, they can contribute to the fiscal budget, increase per 
capita GDP growth rates, raise labour supply and cause improvements in the age structure. 
However they can also drain government resources through the receipt of welfare and the 
consumption of public goods and services such as education and health care etc. If they utilize 
more in terms of social welfare programmes than they contribute then they are a net fiscal 
burden but if they pay more in form of taxes and consume less then they make a net positive 
contribution. 
On the social side, irrespective of their economic contribution, it has been argued that hostility to 
immigrants has been increasing due to rising flows of both economic immigrants and 
refugees/asylum seekers. The reasons for these attitudes are sometimes related to economic and 
labour market concerns or sometimes just due to underlying racial attitudes. Demographically, 
on the one hand immigrants slow down the aging process in a country but at the same time their 
ecological impact cannot be ignored. 
The thesis goes on to explore aspects of both the economic and social impacts of immigrants, for 
both economic migrants and refugees and asylum seekers. In terms of the economic impact, the 
most important determinant of an individual's net fiscal contribution is a person's economic 
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activity i.e. his employment and earnings. In other words the labour market performance of the 
immigrants is the main determinant of their net fiscal contribution. 
A large literature has discussed this issue but the forthcoming chapters will investigate the 
relative role of refugee and asylum seekers in the fiscal contribution by exploring their labour 
market performance in terms of their employment and earnings using LFS data for the period 
2001-2006. The study will compare their employment and earnings with economic migrants. 
To examine the social impact of refugee and asylum seekers, changing attitudes towards this 
group almost over the last decade will be investigated using British Social Attitudes Survey data 
for the years 1995 and 2006. A key element of this analysis will be the identification of the 
socio-economic factors underlying these attitudes. In this way, the groups most affected by 
immigration, especially by refugees/asylum seekers can be established. 
Before movmg on to these analyses, the next chapter discusses policies and trends in 
immigration in Europe and particularly in the UK over the last few decades. On the basis of 
these trends the distinction between refugees and asylum seekers and economic migrants will be 
made, which is then used in the analysis using the LFS. 
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Appendix 2.1 
Summary of Labour Market Impact of Immigrants across Different Countries 
Author Country Approach/ Methodology Findings 
No-evidence of economically 
Friedberg and US and Survey of the Empirical significant effect on wages and a 
Hunt(1995) Other Literature 10% increase in immigrants 
Countries reduces native wages by 1 %. 
Reduced form approach No detrimental effect of 
Pischke and Germany based on a comparative immigrants on native wages. 
Velling (1997) static relationship 
A 10% increase in immigrants 
Borjas (2003) US Skill-Cell Approach reduces native wages by 3-4 %. 
Dustman, Flexible empirical strategy Slightly positive overall wage 
Frattini and UK not relying on pre- effect of immigrants across 
Preston (2008) allocating immigrants to a wage distribution. 
particular skill group 
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Chapter 3 
Trends in and the Evolution of Immigration Policies in Europe and the UK 
3.1 Introduction 
The 20th century was an era of enormous change and uncertainty, which encompassed many 
contradictory trends and issues like the emergence of international migration. Throughout the 
centuries, people facing war, starvation, drought or other calamities have fled to other countries. 
Along with the usual pressures and motivations such as income and employment disparities, 
often issues such as political disruption, armed conflicts, poverty and human rights-abuses have 
become new types of migration. Grahl-Madsen (1983) considers poverty and power politics two 
main reasons that compelled people to leave their homes and their countries. Migration for 
overseas study is another expanding phenomenon, growing rapidly in the US, Australia, China, 
Japan, Germany and the UK, and has become a new form of long term skilled migration. 
On the other hand in a qualitative study of asylum applications to Germany, Rotte, Volger and 
Zimmermann (1997) found that political terror in the source country was a key factor in 
generating asylum seekers but the improvements in political rights and civil liberties increase the 
numbers too. While Thieleman (2003a) estimated a pooled regression across 20 OECD countries 
from 1985 to 1999, and found for refugees that the unemployment rate, the existing stock of 
foreign nationals and the country's reputation in terms of development aid were the key 
destination country variables. For whatever reasons immigrants decide to migrate, their free 
movement across borders is restricted according to international rules and regulations and 
furthermore their entry to a particular country or state is dependent on the immigration policy of 
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that country. The choice of an appropriate immigration policy can directly affect the country's 
economic growth and performance as well as people's perceptions. 
The European Commission Glossary of Justice and Home Affairs consider an immigration 
policy to be the laws and procedures dealing with people entering a particular jurisdiction. There 
have been different policies for different countries depending upon the country's labour market 
conditions and demands. Basically immigration policy represents a government's efforts to 
resolve politically the conflict between the economic need for labour and the political definitions 
of citizenship. 
Borjas (1995) suggested that according to the positive theory of immigration policy the main aim 
of policy should be to increase the national income of natives. Analysis has also proved that 
immigrants produce a redistribution effect of wealth, reducing the income of competitors and 
increasing the income of capitalists and other users of immigrants. Immigrants can be substitutes 
to natives by offering similar skills to natives, competing directly with natives and lowering their 
economic returns or can be complements, having unique skills and actually raising the 
productivity of other workers, also filling skill shortages (White and Liang, 1998). 
Immigration policy is important from the viewpoint of the immigrant's performance in the 
labour market and their assimilation. These policies may give priorities to different groups 
depending upon their labour market needs. Such immigration policies, such as those 
implemented in Canada and New Zealand, seem to be successful not only for attracting skilful 
migrants but also altering the national origin mix of immigrants. These policies may reduce 
social tensions and help in achieving better economic performance in the host country (Bauer et 
aI, 2000). 
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The reasons for a more and more restrictive immigration policy are based on commonly held 
presumption that immigrants have a crowding out effect on natives in the labour market and 
continued levels of racism and xenophobia in society. Especially in Europe, high levels of 
unemployment have led the public to the fear that foreign workers cause a decline in the 
domestic labour force's wages and further in the case of inflexible wages even increase 
unemployment. But migration can successfully increase the flexibility of the labour market and 
slowdown wage growth; in this case the more open that the European Union is towards 
immigration policy seems desirable (Zimmermann, 1995). 
Before examining the labour market performance of immigrants, including asylum seekers and 
attitudes towards them in the following chapters, we firstly discuss the ever changing, and 
increasingly restrictive immigration policies of Europe and the UK in this chapter. This chapter 
will also take a closer look at the trends in the number of asylum seekers entering the UK and the 
changes in immigration and asylum policies and their effectiveness at a time when the number of 
asylum seekers was rising. 
The discussion of immigration policies in the UK and information on the socio-political history 
of different countries and regions provides a basis for the allocation of immigrants into four 
different categories in the empirical analysis in Chapters 4 and 5. Also, the number of asylum 
applications filed and accepted each year provides a basis for constructing a proxy for defining 
different categories of immigrants. This information is then matched to LFS data to define four 
different categories of immigrants including refugees/asylum seekers and economic migrants. A 
brief review of European asylum policies will also be presented here before discussing asylum 
policies in the UK. 
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3.2 An Overview of European Asylum Policies 
At the end of the Second World War, Europe faced challenges not only to rebuild its 
infrastructure and economy but also for the resettlement or repatriation of over 40 million 
people. In addition, around 200,000 people fled as a result of the Soviet crushing of a Hungarian 
uprising. Refugees continued to arrive in Europe during the 1970s. The 1951 UN Refugee 
Convention provided a legal framework for the protection of these refugees. By the 1980s 
Europe was the direct destination for people from all over the world and resulted in a massive 
increase in asylum claims. The number of asylum seekers increased from 70,000 in 1983 to over 
200,000 in 1989 and peaked to the height of nearly 700,000 in Western Europe in early 2000s. 
The internal conflicts and human rights violations in Africa, Asia, Latin America and Middle 
East were a driving force for this massive migration (UNHCR- The State of the World's 
Refugees 2000). 
Net migration to Europe increased during 1998-2003 with a recent tendency to stabilise due to 
regulatory policies. But an increasing number of asylum seekers during the last decade has put 
an upward pressure on net migration to Europe. Germany, France and the UK which have the 
highest number of asylum applications were among the traditionally asylum seeking countries 
but number of asylum applications filed in Italy, Spain and Ireland has also rise recently 
(Guardia and Pichelmann, 2006). Against this background a new defensiveness appeared in 
Western European countries' asylum policies as the receiving states were not prepared for such a 
large influx of asylum seekers and refugees. The new restrictive asylum policies were aimed at 
combating illegal immigration and the abuse of the asylum system in Western Europe. The term 
"fortress Europe" has become shorthand for this. Some also argue that the threat of increasing 
unemployment has been the motivation behind European immigration policies. 
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Hatton and Williamson (2004) discuss the causes of refugee displacement and asylum flows, 
including the effects of wars and conflict, political upheaval and the economic incentives to 
migrate. The paper also focuses on the evolution of asylum policies in Europe and the 
effectiveness of policy to deter asylum seekers and the need for international cooperation and 
burden sharing. The empirical findings of the paper show that the deterrent effects of policy 
shifts in the 1990s are substantial, but the deflection effects are uncertain. 
Hatton (2004) presented a detailed analysis of the evolution of asylum flows and policies across 
the EU since the 1980s. Regression analysis was also used to examine the impact of war, 
conflict, economic incentives and asylum policies on trends in asylum applications from 1981-
99. He concludes that larger flows of asylum seekers have become a salient feature of most EU 
countries and a number of immigration policies have been implemented in different EU countries 
but these have a minimum effect. Given this scenario, an EU-wide integrated point-based policy 
would be a more radical solution to this problem, including humanitarian points. 
A brief overview of European asylum policies from Hatton (2004) is now presented below. 
The 1951 Geneva Convention 
The international legal framework for assistance to refugees was formed in the 1950s and 1960s, 
The Refugee Convention of 1951 and The Refugee Protocol of 1967 being the major 
instruments. The Geneva Convention of 1951, relating to the Status of Refugees, was originally 
signed by 29 countries, is the fundamental basis for policy towards asylum seekers. The 
Convention does not guarantee a permanent right of abode in the host country except insofar as 
this is provided by the non-refoulement clause. 
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The 1967 Protocol to the Geneva Convention extended its coverage to refugees outside Europe 
and to those displaced before 1951. It was signed by seven of the current EU members at the 
time of enforcement (1954) and subsequently signed up to by other states both in terms of the 
Convention and the Protocol, the last being Portugal (1976) and Spain (1978). The Convention is 
the basic legal foundation of EU policy towards asylum seekers and ratifying it is now a 
condition of EU membership. 
1986 Single European Act (effective 1992) and The Schengen Convention (1992) were based 
on the 1985 agreement between six member states to create a single internal market by the end of 
1992. Both policies have been aimed at tightening external border controls following on from the 
relaxation of internal borders and to harmonize visa policies and regulations among member 
states. 
The Maastricht Treaty (effective from 1993) provided free movements between participating 
states (only for EU passport holders), improved judicial and police co-operation and ever-closer 
harmonization of policies and introduced carrier sanctions i.e. imposed penalties on airlines and 
other carriers for transporting to the EU those without appropriate visas. 
The 1990 Dublin Convention (effective from 1997) established common criteria for EU 
member states to determine the state responsible for examining an asylum request. It put an end 
to 'asylum shopping' by stipulating that an asylum claim would be dealt with by one state only-
specifically the state of first entry. Prior to this, asylum seekers could lodge asylum claims in 
several EU countries in turn. 
The London resolutions European community ministers responsible for immigration approved 
a consensus based on three principals in London in 1992. The three resolutions are as follows: 
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a-'safe third country' concept i.e. to refuse to consider asylum claims if the applicant had 
transited through a country deemed 'safe'. 
b- To determine that 'manifestly unfounded' asylum claims could be summarily rejected without 
a right of appeal. 
c- The designation of 'safe countries of origin' where there is a presumption of no serious risk of 
persecution. 
In 1995 a set of minimum guarantees was agreed for asylum procedures that included guarantees 
that claimants would be informed about their rights and duties in a language they could 
understand and would not be removed while an appeal was still ongoing. 
The 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam gave the European Commission the sole right to propose 
legislation, starting in 2002. This included a commitment by member states to develop common 
immigration policies within five years. The treaty came into effect on 15t May 1999. 
The 1999 European Council meeting in Finland, EU ministers reaffirmed that any common 
European asylum regulations would be based on a 'full and inclusive' application of the Geneva 
Convention, and in particular the principle of non-refoulement thus ensuring that nobody is sent 
back to persecution, i.e. maintaining the principle of non- refoulement. 
The European Refugee Fund (2000) was a major step towards burden and cost sharing of 
projects for the economic integration of refugees and to finance the emergency temporary 
protection in the case of a mass influx of refugees. By the mid-1990s, almost all EU states tried 
to decrease and regulate asylum seeking with tightened security and border control measures. 
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But Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK all experienced a rise in the asylum 
applications over the 1990s and the trend remained steeply upward until the early part of the 21 st 
century, mainly because of the ongoing wars and armed conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, Western 
Asia and parts of Sub-Saharan Africa. Table 3.1 shows this increase from under 234,000 in the 
late 1970s to almost 2.5 million in the early 1990s. It also reports how applications to EU 
countries have varied, with almost 1.4 million applications made to Germany in the early 1990s, 
but with the UK becoming the most popular destination in the early 2000s. 
Table 3.1 
Asylum applications to the EU-15 by Destination Country (thousands) 
Year/country 1975-9 1980-4 1985-9 1990-4 1995-9 2000-3 
Total EU 233.7 540.2 1102.3 2419.8 1613.5 1489.0 
applications 
Austria 14.7 63.2 64.4 76.1 53.5 120.1 
Beleium 6.6 14.5 32.1 87.0 93.4 103.0 
Denmark 1.3 5.6 42.1 76.4 36.0 35.4 
Finland - 0.1 0.3 11.4 6.9 11.5 
France 40.5 106.3 178.7 184.5 112.2 211.8 
Germany 121.8 249.6 455.3 1374.7 749.6 288.5 
Greece 9.2 6.4 24.0 12.8 11.8 22.4 
Ireland - - - 0.5 21.2 41.0 
Italy 9.2 16.5 26.3 40.8 48.8 54.6 
Luxemburg - - - 0.1 5.7 3.9 
Netherlands 5.3 8.8 46.4 151.1 170.4 108.5 
Portugal 1.7 4.3 1.3 3.9 1.7 0.8 
Spain - 5.4 15.7 53.1 30.4 29.6 
Sweden - 41.9 97.1 197.0 48.5 104.2 
UK 3.4 17.5 28.5 150.8 222.3 353.6 
Source: Hatton (2005) 
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3.3 Trends and Phases of Immigration Control in the UK 
Immigration and emigration have been significant characteristics of Britain's history. In the 
eighteenth and nineteenth century, Britain was an exporter of labour to its empire, mainly the 
officer class and settlers who took over land in empire emigrated. Immigration also has a long 
history as Britain has not only accepted labours and workers but also refugees from all over the 
world over a long period of time. The first massive migration was from Ireland starting from 
seasonal migration following the famine in 1846 and in numerical terms Irish migration over the 
past two centuries has been higher than other immigrant groups but government response to 
regulate Irish immigration has been very little as compared to government's response to Jewish 
and Black migration in the UK (Solomos, 2003). 
A vast majority of migrants came to Britain after the Second World War in search of work. 
During the period from the 1940s to the 1960s, the main migratory flows were from the West 
Indies, Ireland, India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. In 1955 there were 2.1 million foreign citizens in 
the UK. The largest groups were the Irish (443000), Indian (114000), US citizens (110000), 
West Africans (87000), those from the Caribbean and Guyana (82000), and Pakistanis (81000). 
The ethnic minority population was 5.5% of the total population in 1951 (Home Office, 1981). 
The post-1945 period's upsurge in international migration is a crucial part of the global 
transformation. Labour recruitment and migration of both foreign workers and colonial workers 
was very significant in this period with a trend to family reunification and permanent settlement 
for colonial workers. It was the period of growing diversity because of the increasing cultural 
differences between immigrants and the receiving population and black migrants started to 
experience racist and discriminatory attitudes. Despite the UK's diversity and multiculturalism, 
the UK government have attempted to control this immigration in connection with the number of 
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new entrants, by claiming limits to the tolerance of the British people. Immigration control has 
become normalised as a part of common thinking since the first 1905 Aliens Act. 
A large proportion of the UK immigrant population is white emanating from European countries 
and former settler colonies such as Canada, Australia and New Zealand. But immigration from 
other parts of the commonwealth over the last few decades (especially India, Pakistan, 
Bangladesh, the Caribbean and African countries such as Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and Uganda) 
and recent inflows from other parts of the world (notably Somalia, Afghanistan, China and Iraq), 
have contributed a lot to the increasing ethnic diversity in the UK. 
Immigration control in Britain can be divided into the following four phases. 
1. Control of Jewish immigration (1905-1950s), the control of 'aliens' from Europe, 
mainly Jews from the start of twentieth century to the Second World War. 
2. Control on Black commonwealth immigration (1960s onwards), the government 
reconstructed its British citizenship to imposed selective control on black immigration 
from Commonwealth countries to exclude this group of immigrants. 
3. Controls on Asylum Seekers (late 1980s onwards), the period of control on entry and 
rights of asylum seekers. 
4. Managed Migration (from 2000 onwards), opening up of skilled labour migration in 
the country along with a stricter control on asylum and irregular migration from outside 
EU, especially after huge influx from new EU countries in Eastern Europe following the 
2004 enlargement. 
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3.3.1 Current Trends in Asylum Seekers 
According to the 2006 Global Refugee Trends, 596,000 new or appealed asylum applications 
were launched at UNHCR offices across the world, which was 11 % less than in 2005. Europe 
received the largest number of applications (299,000) followed by Africa, USA, Asia and 
Oceania, including failed applicants who filed subsequent appeals. In 2006 the countries 
receiving the largest number of new asylum applications were South Africa (53,400), the USA 
(50,800), Kenya (37,300), France (30,800), the UK (27,800), Sweden (24,300) and Canada 
(22,900). However what these recent statistics do not show is that there has been dramatic 
increase in the number of asylum applications in the UK over the past two decades. Being a 
member of EU and due to its colonial links, the UK has been a great attraction for asylum 
seekers. In early and mid 1990s the number of asylum application was between 20,000 and 
40,000 per year and this was followed by a dramatic rise from 29,640 applications in 1996 to 
84,130 applications in 2002 confirming that number of applications lodged in the UK had 
actually doubled over the previous three years (Home Office, 2002). 
This was the time when asylum issues topped the political agenda and opened up a broader 
political debate. The remarkable increase in the number applications submitted for asylum led to 
a number of asylum and immigration policy changes. Before discussing these policies in detail 
an overview of annual and regional trends is provided in the following sub section. 
3.3.1.1 Annual Trends 
A major cause of the net growth of immigration in the UK in recent decades has been the growth 
of asylum applications as other forms of immigration came under control. The increasing flow of 
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asylum seekers has started a fierce political debate about asylum policies in the UK, making the 
issue of immigration even more controversial. 
Figure 3.1 
Number of Asylum Applications made in the UK 1989-2006 
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Figure 3.1 reports asylum applications for each year from 1989 to 2006 and shows that the 
general trend is quite fluctuating but movement remains upward and there is overall rise from 
1996 to 2002 applications more or less increased persistently, before reaching a peak of 84,130 
asylum applications submitted in a single year in 2002. From 2003 the direction reverses and has 
been continuously decreasing each year since then. 
Following the introduction of a new screening procedure, there was a sharp down fall in the 
number of asylum applications submitted in 2003 and the trend remains downward since then 
and is still declining. Stricter asylum policies can explain this decrease. 
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The UNHCR reported that following these trends the number of new asylum claims in the K 
decreased by 23% (15 ,500) during the first half of 2005 compared to first half of 2004 (20 ,000) 
and by more than a half (-51 %) compared to the first half of 2003 (31,800). Despite this sharp 
fall the UK remains among the first five largest asylum-seeker receiving countries. 
3.3.1.2 Region-wise Trends 
Africa, Asia and Eastern Europe are the main asylum sending regions to the UK. Africa has the 
largest share of the asylum sending regions, followed by Asia, Europe, the Middle East and a 
negligible share for the Americas. This pattern is shown in Figure 3.2 for asylum applications 
pooled across all years for 1989 to 2006. 
Figure 3.2 Asylum Sending Regions to the UK 
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According to a BBC report, " immigration and asylum seekers have played a great part In 
increasing the number of immigrants in the UK and between 1998 and 2000, 45000 people from 
Africa, 22700 from the Indian sub-continent, 25000 from Asia and 12000 from the Americas 
72 
arrived in the UK and almost 125 ,000 people were allowed to settle in the UK".) Since virtuall y 
all other possibilities for migrating from third world countries for economic betterment had been 
closed off during the last decade of the 20th century, the increase in migration by concealed 
means in the form of political asylum became an obvious option for people who would otherwise 
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It is quite relevant at this stage to analyse the brief history of each region over time as each 
displays a different trend over the period under consideration. Figure 3.3 shows that each region 
has initially an increasing and then decreasing trend but reaches its peak at different times, 
depending on the regions, socio-economic conditions and political stability. 
5 http ://news .bbc.co.uklhi/english/static/ in _ depth/ukl2002Irace/short _ history _ oCimmigrat ion.stm 
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In terms of individual countries, Somalia, Iraq, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, Turkey, Pakistan, Serbia 
and Monte neagro, Iran, China, India, Nigeria, EU Accession states, Zimbabwe, former 
Yugoslavia, Angola, Ghana, Zaire, Algeria, Romania, Sierra Leone, former USSR, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia have each produced more than 10,000 asylum seekers 
over the period 1989-2006. Wars in countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan, the break up of the 
USSR and former Yugoslavia into new states, poverty and armed conflicts in African countries 
played a major role in the arrival of asylum seekers and refugees to the UK. A brief history of 
the socio-political and economic instability in some of the countries of each region is given 
below; the discussion is mostly based on information from UNHCR Publications. A full record 
of asylum applications by country and year appears in Appendix 3.1 and 3.2. 
Europe: A high number of asylum applications from Europe in 1998-2002 and in some years 
before this was due to the break up of the USSR and former Yugoslavia into its constituent 
states, as well as from the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe. The political disruption 
first started in Poland in 1989, which led to a course of mostly peaceful revolutions in East 
Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Bulgaria. Among the Eastern Bloc, Romania was the 
only country to execute its head of state and threw out the communist regime with violence. The 
revolutions of 1989 consequently caused the collapse of the Soviet-Union. Although the collapse 
actually began in 1985, as feelings of discontent and dissatisfaction increased among the general 
public due to war in Afghanistan and years of military build up, whilst the chronic disaster of 
Chernobyl in 1986, poor economic growth and domestic development and failed reforms and 
stagnating economy were further causes. The Baltic States of Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia 
started resisting central control which finally led to the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, 
producing high numbers of asylum seekers under risk of persecution for one or another reason. 
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The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) was also a communist state which formally 
dissolved in 1992 into its independent states of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of 
Macedonia, Croatia, and Slovenia. The remaining two states of Montenegro and Serbia 
committed to form a union of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which was never recognized 
as a successor of the FRY by the international community. The violent break up of the Socialist 
Republic of Yugoslavia in June-1991 when Slovenia and Croatia both declared independence, 
resulted in the largest refugee crises in the world since the Second World War. The persistent 
outbreak of violence in Croatia became known as 'ethnic cleansing' and thousands of Croats 
were expelled from areas under Serb control. Consequently thousands of Serbs were expelled by 
Croatian forces. In Croatia alone in 1991 some 20,000 people were killed, more than 200,000 
refugees fled the country and some 35,000 people were internally displaced. 
In 1992 the war spread to neighbouring Bosnia and Herzegovina, the most ethnically mixed part 
of Yugoslavia. When Bosnia and Herzegovina declared independence, the Serbian government 
started to fight against Muslims and Croats on behalf of the Serb minority and expelled and 
killed many residents. By mid-June 1992 Serb forces had controlled two thirds of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and 95% of Muslims and Croats were forced from their homes and almost one 
million fled their homes. In early 1993 another period of ethnic cleansing started and war broke 
out between Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats backed by Croat forces. More than half of the 
4.4 million population were displaced by the time war ended in 1995. As the war ended another 
crises was occurring in the Balkans in Kosovo, a Serbian province with majority of ethnic 
Albanians and a smaller population of Serbs, Bosnians, Turks and Romanians. Between 1989 
and 1998 more than 3 million Kosovo Albanians left Kosovo at one stage or other. 
The crises started to heat up again in 1998 when Serbian security forces intensified attacks on 
Kosovo Albanians with suspected involvement in the Kosovo Liberation Army. A temporary 
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cease fire took place at the end of 1998 but the fighting continued further fuelled by the air 
attacks of NATO against the FRY and targeted Kosovo to stop the actual and potential killing in 
this region. But those air attacks triggered the violence on the ground and thousands of Kosovo 
Albanians were killed and some 800,000 fled or were expelled from Kosovo. "The big increase 
in 1999 in Britain's share of asylum applications in the Europe on total, from 15.6% to 20% was 
partly the result of recalculations by UNHCR in a report published in February 2000, to include 
dependants, but as in Europe it was mainly the war in Kosovo" (Hayter, 2004: p 70). 
Africa: Among African countries, Somalia, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Angola, Ghana, Zaire, Algeria, 
Sierra Leone, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan and Kenya are the top 
asylum sending countries in descending order. Somalia gained independence in 1960 and since 
then had been facing problems in creating an effective civil government. The moral authority of 
the government was questioned after the defeat by Ethiopia in the Ogaden war of 1977. The first 
major massive departure of refugees occurred in 1998 when government forces bombed the 
north-west part of the country. Around 50,000 were estimated to have been killed by government 
troops. This wholesale kind of killing resulted in a massive internal displacement of people and 
by mid 1990 around two million had been displaced as a result of this conflict. The response of 
the international community was quite slow and hundreds of thousands of people had been killed 
by starvation and disease or as a result of fighting before the arrival of UN peace-keeping forces. 
With the continued civil war until 2006, invasion by Ethiopia, another bad humanitarian disaster 
caused by the tsunami in 2004 and torrential rains and flooding in 2006, Somalia is truly an 
unsettled and unstable country sending hundreds of thousands of refugees and asylum seekers all 
over the world. The war and tribal rivalry in Somalia has created a large Somali Diaspora. 
Somali refugees fleeing from the country added to migrant workers living in Western Europe 
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and the Gulf region before 1988. The former colonial links between the UK and northern parts of 
Somalia now means settled communities in the UK. 
During the 1990s, Nigeria was another country sending high numbers of refugees and asylum 
seekers suffered two military wars causing large scale violence and brutalities. The conflict 
fuelled by oil wealth competition in the Niger Delta, between ethnic minorities has continued 
through the 1990s and still persisted in 2006. Ethnic violence over the oil producing Niger Delta 
region, inter religious relations and inadequate infrastructure, corruption and serious human 
rights abuses are the causes of refugees from Nigeria. 
Similarly recent years have seen many African countries involved in war, internal or external 
conflicts. Countries such as Rwanda, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia, Chad and Burundi 
have become directly involved in the First Congo War 1996-97 and the second Congo War 
1998-2003 with the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). While there have been civil wars in 
EthiopialEritrea and Sierra Leone during 1991-2003, killing hundreds of thousands during these 
wars. Similarly, ongoing crises in Zimbabwe formerly known as Rhodesia started from 1965 
with the imposition of white-minority rule by Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) 
from Britain, the Zimbabwe War of Liberation lasted from 1965-1979 (www.crisesgroup.org). 
During the 1980s, due to ethnic divisions, guerrilla activities, security situations and anti-
government protests the government kept a state of emergency which gave the government an 
endless power and resulted in widespread violence and a low level civil war. During the 1990s 
and more recently, growing political and economic instability in the Mugabe regime has resulted 
in a violation of human rights to food, shelter, freedom of movement, freedom of assembly and 
the failure of the protection of the law. This coupled with alleged assaults on human and civil 
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rights activists, political opposition and media, which forced a large number to seek refuge and 
asylum in other countries (Human Rights Watch, 2007). 
Asia: Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, China, India and Pakistan are the major asylum sending countries 
in this region. Especially important here are the continuous wars for more than two decades 
posing a constant threat to the people's lives in Afghanistan and Sri Lanka. The civil war in 
Afghanistan began in 1978 and has continued since then, though it has many phases. 
1- Soviet War in Afghanistan 1979-1989 started with the involvement of Soviet armed 
forces to support the newly formed communist government in Afghanistan to curb 
resistance to its programmes but the Soviet armed forces failed and were withdrawn in 
1989. 
2- Civil War and anarchy began after the withdrawal of Soviet forces, between the Afghan 
Government and the Mujahideen. The Mujahideen took power in 1992 but fighting began 
between them as well. The Pashtun Taliban movement started and took control of the 
capital in 1996. 
3- Taliban Control 1996-2001 and the US initiated war 2001-present The Taliban had 
taken over almost 95% of Afghanistan by 2001. After the September 11, 2001 attacks, 
the US and allies with the help of Northern Alliance overthrew the Taliban and 
established a US approved government. Taliban resistance still continues in the southern 
part of the country along the borders with Pakistan. 
The years of war, ground attacks and bombings have destroyed almost every village in 
Afghanistan and killed countless members of the rural population, triggering a massive exodus 
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of refugees. Since 1978 refugees have continued to flee and by December 1990, according to a 
UNHCR report, there were 6.3 million Afghan refugees in neighbouring countries, including 3.3 
million in Pakistan and 3 million in Iran. The process is still ongoing and Afghans have the 
largest refugee population in the world. 
The Sri Lankan Civil War is an ongoing conflict in the country since 1983. There has been an on 
and off civil war between the government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE, also 
known as the Tamil Tigers), a separatist militant organization fighting for an independent state in 
the North and East of the island. It is estimated that around 70,000 people have died in the war 
since it started in 1983 and it has caused significant harm to the population and economy of the 
country. The name given to initial phases of the war (between the governments and LTTE) is 
Eelame War 1. There have been almost five phases of Eelame Wars with the latest two in 2005 
and December 2006. 
India also became involved in the conflict supporting both sides through its intelligence agency 
RA W for a number of reasons including its leaders' desire to project India as the regional power 
in the area and worries about India's own Tamils, seeking independence in Tamil Nadu. Along 
with the persistent large scale killing, violence and brutalities of this civil war, the Indian Ocean 
Tsunami in Sri Lanka killed more than 30,000 people and left many more homeless. 
Disagreement also arose on the distribution of aid in the Tamil region. The security conditions 
further deteriorated in 2006 leading to a rapid decline in the security and safety of the people in 
the East and North of the country and it is believed that humanitarian situation will worsen 
further. The upsurge of violence in 2006 has resulted in the displacement of more than 207,000 
people. 
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Pakistan has long faced political and economic instability under four military dictatorships. The 
long running dispute over Kashmir with India from 1989 to present, a territorial dispute between 
India, Pakistan and China over the north-western region of the Indian sub-continent, political 
repression and tensions, instability in its largest province and more recent conflict in Waziristan 
has caused a significant number of people to flee from the country and seek asylum in other parts 
of the world. Along with this, Pakistan is the largest refugee hosting country. Similarly, a large 
number of asylum seekers and refugees continued to arrive in the UK fleeing persecution from 
India, China, Hong Kong and Bangladesh being former colonies of the British Empire. 
Middle East: Iran and Iraq are the main asylum sending countries in the Middle East. Following 
a long history of border disputes, both countries had been involved in a war lasting from 
September 1980 to August 1988 also known as the first Persian Gulf War followed by the Iraq-
Kuwait conflict. The second Gulf-War or Persian Gulf War (Aug1990-Feb 1991, which 
officially ended in 1995) was a conflict between Iraq and Coalition forces from 35 countries in 
order to liberate Kuwait, which it did and also penetrated Iraqi territory. The 2003 invasion of 
Iraq by the United States, United Kingdom, Australia and other countries, launched another Iraq 
war which is still ongoing. The official reason declared by the US for the invasion was that Iraq 
had weapons of mass destruction and had failed to disarm its nuclear, chemical and biological 
weapons and posed an immediate threat to world peace. 
Following the invasion, the situation further deteriorated and by 2007, the conflicts between the 
Iraqi Sunni and Shi'a factions started a civil war. According to the UNHCR and Iraqi 
government estimates, more than 365,000 Iraqis have been displaced since the 2006 bombings, 
bringing the total number of Iraqi refugees to more than 1.6 million. 
A list of contemporary and ongoing civil wars in the world is given in Appendix 3.3. 
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3.4 Asylum and Immigration Policies in the UK 
There have been many variations in the ideological and political responses to the arrival and 
settlement of immigrants in the UK. Immigration legislation has mainly been used in a 
reactionary way against the settlement of groups of refugees and migrant workers since the early 
1900s. But despite a 20-year effort to tighten immigration, the stock of the foreign born 
population is ever increasing. Moreover, migrants from many different ethnic and social 
backgrounds come to the UK. The issue has become much more intense as government efforts to 
balance persistent skill shortages have increased. Different immigration acts and policies in the 
UK are discussed below in detail. 
3.4.1 Immigration Acts since the Nineteenth Century 
There have been different phases of the immigration acts and policies at different times in the 
UK, depending upon the situation of the country and possibility of receiving immigrants. 
Immigration policy has a number of determinants including socio-economic situation of the 
receiving country and as well as public attitudes and opinion may influence the government to 
pass different legislation. Timmer and William (1998) explore the degree to which one country's 
policy may have been influenced by the policies of others and also the extent to which policy has 
responded to the impact of labour market conditions and immigrant quality. However much of 
the recent literature on UK immigration policy has focussed on immigration legislation and other 
measures taken by governments to regulate and halt the arrival of black migration (Solomos, 
2003). A summary of different policy changes in the UK immigration history is provided below. 
For a more detailed discussion, see Solomos, (2003): pp 48- 75 and Hayter (2004): pp 21-63. 
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The Aliens Act, 1905 
The most significant factor in the politics behind this immigration legislation was the arrival of 
large numbers of Jewish migrants in the nineteenth century from Eastern Europe. This was the 
first in a series of permanent restrictive pieces of legislation on immigration in Britain. The law 
was applicable to the entry into Britain of all non-United Kingdom subjects, or otherwise defined 
as an 'alien'. Its main objective was to prevent refugees, mainly Jewish and some gypsies, from 
seeking refuge in Britain. The most important provision of this legislation was (a) that aliens 
could be refused permission to enter Britain (b) that an alien could be expelled from Britain 
without a trial or appeal. 
In this period the British government emphasized Britain could host only a limited number of 
Jewish refugees due to its own large population and high unemployment. During this period 
55,000 refugees from Germany, Austria and Czechoslovakia came into Britain. The government 
response to this wave of Jewish refugees was similar and comparable with the post-1945 politics 
of black immigration. The main reason for the opposition was not only the number of 
immigrants but other socio-economic crises such as high unemployment and the slogan of 
'England for English' . 
The Aliens Restriction Act, 1914 
This act was passed in one day as part of the impending national emergency in circumstances of 
war (the start of First World War). The legislation enabled the government to decide, prohibit, 
deport and make restrictions on the living and travelling of immigrants. It was meant to last only 
as long as the national emergency lasted. 
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However, after the end of First Wodd War the Aliens Restriction (Amendment) Act of 1919 
repeated the 1905 legislation and extended the 1914 Act for one more year even though the 
original justification applied no longer. Under the Aliens Order of 1920 immigration officers 
obtained the right to refuse entry to an alien who was considered unable to provide his or her 
own support. Aliens had to register their address and changes thereof. 
The British Nationality Act of 1948 
Under the British Nationality Act of 1948, all citizens of Commonwealth countries were granted 
dual status. They were citizens of one country belonging to Commonwealth countries, but also 
had a status superior to this citizenship i.e. they were British subjects. It confirmed the right of 
the vast majority of British subjects in the colonies and dominions to enter and settle in Britain 
without being subject to immigration control and when in Britain they were entitled to vote and 
serve on juries. They can still vote and serve the juries but the term 'British subject' has been 
replaced by 'commonwealth citizen'. The act also made the distinction between British subjects 
into categories such as the Citizen of the UK and Colonies and Commonwealth citizens by 
granting independence to the Indian sub continent. 
Coloured immigration remained the focus of the government as early as the 1950s and 
racialisation of immigration was not an open issue rather appeared in coded words and linked to 
Commonwealth immigration. 
The 1962 Immigration Act 
Britain was said to be a profoundly racist country III 1961 and it was common for 
accommodation advertisements, in the press and on notices on front doors to bear the words, . No 
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Coloureds' and bank managers could refuse a coloured as their customers would not like it' 
(Dummett, 2001).This was the start of the UK's modem legislation to control the immigration of 
overseas citizens of the UK and its colonies and the racial tension. These issues led the 
Conservative government to introduce the Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1962. 
The control measures of the Bill were justified by the argument that it was essential to restrict 
black migration due to the limited ability of the host country to assimilate coloured migration. It 
was the first time in British history that immigration controls had been applied against 
Commonwealth citizens. Apart from those born in Britain or holding British passports or those 
included in the passport of either of the earlier mentioned persons, all Commonwealth passport 
holders were subject to immigration control. 
The Act was not racially discriminatory in form but its motivation was purely racial. The racial 
divide was even more heightened when, in practice, it was seen that white Commonwealth 
citizens were not subject to controls while black Commonwealth citizens had now to apply for 
work vouchers. Similarly, no measures were taken to control the entry of immigrants from the 
Irish Republic. 
The Act provided three different types of vouchers under its Voucher System Scheme: 
Type A: Commonwealth citizen who had a specific job to go to in Britain 
Type B: Applicants who had a recognized skill or qualification that was in short supply 
in Britain. 
Type C: All other applicants, priority being given to those who had served in the British 
forces during the wars. 
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These different categories were aimed to halt black immigrants entering the country, though in 
coded terms, and public views were quite split and not all favouring this act (Solomos, 2003). 
The 1968 Commonwealth Immigrants Act 
During the 1960s the term 'immigration' came itself to be a code word to mean coloured 
immigration, especially from the Indian sub-continent and the Caribbean, and was not applied to 
white people immigrating from Australia, Ireland and elsewhere. From 1962 onwards, imposing 
controls on immigration from the Commonwealth became an easy way for government to soothe 
racist agitation. One of the main features of the 1962 Act was that all Commonwealth citizens 
who were British passport holders were exempted from immigration control. This included a 
large number of Europeans as well as a large majority of Asians in Kenya and Uganda. 
Between 1965 and 1967, there was a large influx of immigrants to Britain, which started a heated 
debate to stop their arrival. The debate was ended by the introduction of second Commonwealth 
Immigrants Act in 1968, which was even harsher than the 1962 Act. The underlying policy was 
to exclude hundreds of thousands of East African Asians settled in Kenya and Uganda who were 
UK passport holders. 
The act controlled the East Asian migration flow by bringing them under immigration control. 
Under this new law any British or its colonial citizen, holding a British passport would be subject 
to immigration control unless they or at least one parent or grandparent had been born, adopted, 
naturalised or registered in Britain as a British or its colonies citizens. These Acts were followed 
by the Immigration Appeals Act of 1969, which established an appeal system. This act 
provided the right of appeal as well as it institutionalised the deportation of people breaking the 
entry conditions. 
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The 1971 Immigration Act 
In 1971 a new immigration act was passed with an objective of bringing primary immigration to 
an end at the time when the same government was taking Britain into the European Community 
allowing free entry of all member states nationals. The 1971 Immigration Act was introduced by 
the Conservative government on the basis of their election campaign promise that there would be 
no further permanent immigration. This immigration act was a finale of the above three Acts , 
although it has been increasingly amended by subsequent Acts, mostly in the 1990s. 
Each of the subsequent Acts has introduced harsher controls on asylum seekers and has given 
more powers to immigration officers. The 1971 Act introduced a racial concept of 'patriality' 
into immigration law, a status to be held by those born, registered or naturalised, or having a 
parent born in Britain. New terms of 'Patrial' and 'non-Patrial' were introduced in the 1971 
Act while differentiating between British and its colonies citizens. The term Patrial was used for: 
"Britain and its colonies citizen who were entitled to citizenship on the basis of birth, adoption, 
naturalisation or registration in Britain or having grandparent with such citizenship" 
"Citizen of Britain and its colonies who had settled in Britain and who had resided at least five or 
more than five years in Britain" 
After the Act came into force on New Year's Day, 1973, all non Patrial aliens and 
commonwealth citizens were under immigration control. This Act ended the previous right of 
settlement for commonwealth citizens entering under the Voucher system (Dummett, 2001). 
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The 1981 British Nationality Act 
This law was passed by the conservative government and came into force in 1983. The 1981 Act 
was introduced to replace the 1948 Nationality Act. It re-categorised the rights of people of 
British colonies and former colonies to British citizenship, confining these rights to 'patrials' or 
the processor of British parent or grand parent and abolished the ius soli principal (anyone born 
on British soil entitled to citizenship) by ius saguinii (entitled only those of British blood, whose 
parents were British or settled in Britain) (Hayter, 2004). 
The government argued that it had created the automatic right of abode in the Britain by dividing 
citizenship into three categories: British citizens, British Dependent Citizens and British 
Overseas Citizens. Despite the government argument that the law had made immigration less 
arbitrary, it received much criticism from the public and parliament for the reinforcement of 
racial discrimination (Layton-Henry, 1984). 
3.4.2 From Immigration to Refugees 
From 1961 onwards, every new restriction was being justified with the slogan, "Fair but firm 
immigration control is the key to good race relations". This shift from immigrants to refugees 
was provoked by the two major parties, playing a game with the voting public that a flood of 
coloured immigrants was still pouring into the country. This continued racism over the following 
two decades shifted the focus of government policy from immigrants to refugees and asylum 
seekers, which are two completely different groups. This continued levels of racism over the 
following two decades changed the direction and attention of government policy, which changed 
as much against refugees as immigrants, which are two completely different groups. 
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The Conservative government of the 1980s and 1990s, followed in this by its Labour successor, 
did its utmost to blur the distinction, not only referring constantly to 'bogus-asylum seekers' but 
frequently describing them as 'economic migrants' 'illegal immigrants' or as 'abusing the 
system' (Dummett, 2001). 
Visa Control on Visitors 1986 
The first move in the Government's campaign to restrict the number of refugees entering the UK 
was to impose visa restrictions. Visa restrictions were imposed virtually overnight on visitors 
coming from India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nigeria, Ghana and Sri Lanka, from which many 
Tamils had been escaping to claim asylum in other countries and particularly in Britain. The 
proposed objective was to control the number of illegal immigrants from these countries. "The 
fact that only 222 out of 452,000 visitors from the above five countries illegally remained in 
Britain in 1985 did not prevent the use of visa controls as another symbolic means of holding 
back the tide of immigrants" (The Guardian, 2nd September 1986). Though, it was obvious that 
people fleeing persecution were hardly able to obtain visas. 
The Carriers' Liability Act of 1987 
The purpose of British government policy was that as few of the persecuted as possible could 
reach the country. To obtain this objective further, the Carrier's Liability Act of 1987 imposed a 
fine of £1000 per head on air or shipping lines for each passenger arriving without papers fully in 
order. In so doing airline staff was thereby converted into immigration officers. The penalty 
charge was doubled to £2000 in 1991 and may be imposed even if the person concerned is 
granted asylum. 
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The Immigration Act of 1988 
This Act did not alter the basic framework of immigration control in the 1971 Act but repealed 
Section 1(5) of the 1971 Act which had assured Commonwealth citizens settled in the UK before 
1 January 1973 that wives and children would have the freedom to enter the UK and further 
restricting the right of appeal for those who had been refused leave to enter, restricting the issues 
of appeal after deportation orders after less than seven years in the UK with an exception for 
those claiming asylum. 
The visa restrictions were further extended to all passengers seeking admission to the United 
Kingdom, further restricting entry clearance in the case of the polygamous marriages. 
The Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act, 1993 
As a consequence of the collapse of the communist bloc in Eastern Europe the issue of refugees 
and asylum seekers and legislation to deal with this issue became a focus of major concern in the 
1990s. The main objective of the law was to reduce the number of asylum seekers and hence 
refugees who could claim sanctuary. 
It incorporated the 1951 Refugee Convention into the immigration rules and allowed asylum 
seekers to appeal decisions and during the period between claiming asylum and receiving the 
final decision or appeal they could not be removed forcefully. 
It extended the right of appeal to all asylum seekers against negative decisions. This Act was 
extended in 1996. 
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The Asylum and immigration Act 1996 
The Asylum and Immigration Act of 1996 introduced restrictions on benefits, housing and 
employment for asylum applicants. It included provisions to deny welfare benefits to all asylum 
seekers rather than to some of them and substitute food vouchers and one 'no choice' offer of 
accommodation, and other measures to toughen procedures. Under this act, a 'White List' of 
countries was introduced in which there was believed to be no serious risk of persecution and 
thereby departure from an individual's right to examine his or her case individually (Solomos, 
2003). Applications from these countries were subject to an accelerated appeal procedure. 
The Labour Party of the time heavily criticised the list as it was a clear departure from the 
principle right of every individual to have an individual analysis and decision on his or her 
application. 
The Immigration and Asylum Act, 1999 
This Act removed benefits from asylum applicants and introduced the National Asylum Support 
Service (NASS) to support and disperse destitute asylum seekers. A new legal framework for 
asylum seekers detention and a crackdown on marriage for immigration purposes was put 
forward. It can be seen as a continuation of Conservative policies in many ways regarding pre 
entry controls and welfare support for asylum seekers, imposed by the Labour government 
Solomos, 2003). 
It not only started the practice of detention but also increased the number of detention centres, 
especially prisons. The first detention centre dedicated to families was set up at Oakington in 
Cambridge in March 2000, followed by one at Harmondsworth near Heathrow and another at 
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Yarl's Wood. A system of enforced dispersal outside London on a no choice basis was another 
significant element of the 1999 Act. 
The Labour government introduced a number of subsequent measures to keep the number of 
asylum seekers limited including the extended carrier sanction to carriers travelling through the 
Channel tunnel and also increased the number of airline liaison officers abroad to limit the 
numbers travelling to Britain on bogus papers. 
The Nationality Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 
By September 2000 the government had realised the extent of skill shortages in Britain and 
stressed the positive role of immigration could play with the argument that immigration was 
inevitably good for the country and economy. So the next major piece of legislation, was based 
on the white paper on immigration policy entitled 'Secure Border, Safe Haven: Integration with 
Diversity in Modem Britain' and a proposal which would encourage migration 'on a sensible 
and managed basis' . 
This meant a new immigration policy, simplifying the system for those coming to work through 
authorised channels, but enforcing harsh conditions on asylum seekers and their children, by 
increasing detention centres. 
The Asylum and Immigration Act, 2004 
The Labour government introduced a practical system of control to limit immigration by 
managing, controlling and selecting migrants and tightened border control with the introduction 
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of technology. It also introduced a new system of appeals with an asylum and immigration 
tribunal, and entrance without a valid passport would be considered as a criminal offence. 
A 'Certificate of Approval' was also required from the secretary of state for marriages involving 
a person under immigration control. The Act set different criteria for migration and asylum. 
On Migration 
This new strategy of encouraging only skilled migration was based on a points system and put an 
end to chain migration and rights of appeals, financial bonds for specific categories to guarantee 
that migrants return home. There was no right of appeal when applying from abroad for work or 
study. Fixed penalty fines for employers for employment of each illegal worker they employ, 
was also introduced to discourage illegal working under Asylum and Immigration Act 2004. 
On Asylum 
In terms of asylum, the objective remains granting temporary leave to refugees and asylum-
seekers rather than permanent status and keeping the situation in their country under review. The 
focus became on the expansion of detention estates, fast-track processing of all unfounded 
asylum seekers, closer management with electronic tagging and more detention of failed asylum 
seekers, and the strengthening of border controls by the use of new technology with 
fingerprinting of all visa applicants and electronic checking on all those entering or leaving the 
country. 
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Asylum and Immigration Act 2006 
A new asylum model was introduced for greater control over asylum seekers, different 
procedures were adopted for different nationalities under the segmentation of asylum claims into 
different categories involving different procedures, with a fast track procedure for those 
detained. Refugees granted temporary to permanent status will be reviewed after five years. 
Failed asylum seekers will be liable to electronic tagging or detention. The Act also introduced 
the pilot return of unaccompanied asylum seeker children. 
Further acts and measures have been taken after the Asylum and Immigration Act of 2006 but 
these are beyond the scope of this study as it will focus up to 2006. Hence, it can be concluded 
from the above discussion of the history of British immigration and asylum acts that the 
immigration legislation in Britain was always passed with a targeted group in mind either it was 
Jews at the end of the 19th century, West Indians in the 1960s, East African Asians in the 1970s 
or more recently asylum seekers. 
Racial prejudice or more generally prejudice against foreigners has been the underlying principle 
of the exclusionist immigration policies in Britain and thus "immigration controls embody, 
legitimate and institutionalise racism" (Hayter, 2004: p 21). 
However, as with other countries such as US and Australia, the trends are changing in Britain 
now as new immigration policies are points-based to qualify for economic immigration from 
outside the EU. 
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3.5 Acceptance Ratios for Asylum Seekers' Applications 
Most Western countries changed their immigration policies to provide special consideration for 
political and economic refugees as prior to the 1930s such a classification did not exist. 
Similarly, most new migration policies in the UK have attempted to reduce the amount of 
immigrants, and recently efforts have been expanded to reduce the upward pressure of asylum 
applications, as previously discussed in this chapter. Nothing happened overnight, it took years 
to put on more and more restrictions on the number of immigrants. However some pieces of 
legislation had the opposite effect from their intended aim. 
The Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1962 not only reduced the number of immigrants but 
played a major role in causing immigrants to hasten their entry into Britain. It was a period of 
recession when immigrant levels rose against the expectations of a decline. 
However, the first move of the British government to curb the number of refugees and asylum 
seekers was to impose visa restrictions in 1985 and a second move was to impose the Carrier's 
Liability Act of 1987 and the third device adopted was to introduce detention centres. The 
objective was to bring under stricter immigration control the ever increasing influx of 
immigrants, including refugees and asylum seekers. Even though the government spent a lot 
effort in putting pressure on asylum seekers arriving in the country, their effort did not bear the 
results they wanted. "The constant changes in immigration laws are themselves a reflection of 
their inability to control the movements of the people" (Hayter, 2004). 
In particular, the large number of increased asylum applications in 1999 and 2000 is a bit of a 
mystery since the three Asylum Acts in 1993, 1996 and 1999 aimed to decrease the amount of 
asylum claims. This minimal deterrence effect of these restrictive policies is particularly 
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puzzling. Several reasons have been put forward to explain this dilemma. These reasons are 
presented here are from Hatton (2004). 
• General social security benefits in the UK. Asylum seekers are attracted to the UK by 
relatively generous social security benefits as compared to some other countries. 
However, there is a little evidence for this belief. There may have been a misconception 
that this was the case as until 1996 asylum seekers had the same legal rights for social 
benefits as other people in need. 
• Slow appeals procedures and delayed decisions build up the backlog and provide asylum 
seekers a longer period of stay in the UK. This large backlog of cases resulted in the idea 
of a general amnesty for those whose cases have not been dealt with. 
• The UK is being targeted by traffickers who knew they could take advantage of the 
administrative weaknesses of the system. For example an absence of identity documents 
is a difficulty in the removal of unsuccessful applicants. 
• The sending countries are mostly former colonies, with instability, persecution and whose 
citizens look to their mother country for protection. 
• Provisions of the Dublin convention had no desirable effect as the UK's geographical 
position does not form any defensive barrier. 
From Figure 3.4 it can be concluded that the immigration policies had no significant impact on 
number of asylum applications submitted each year until 2002, after which a downward trend 
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can be seen. However, it also shows the number of asylum acceptances, which are low in each 
year apart from 2000 and 2001. 
Furthermore, the number of asylum applications accepted also rose until 2002 and followina this 
o 
there is a gradual fall in the number accepted. The insignificant effect of policies can be 
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According to a Home Office report, removals of principal asylum applicants were increased by 
91 % between 1997 and 2005 (Home Office, 2006b). However, the focus of the government is 
now on managed migration, and not asylum seekers. This relates to allowing migration when it is 
in national interest and stopping when it is not. The comparison of asylum applications filed and 
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accepted each year clearly shows that despite the narrowest of the criteria applied in the granting 
of asylum and asylum applications processing being extremely slow, the number applying for 
asylum continuously rose from 1989 to 2002. 
It is also worthwhile looking at the asylum acceptance ratio. Again it generally shows an 
increasing trend, from 1989 to 2001, then leaping to an all time high to a peak of almost 16% in 
200l. Figure 3.5 then shows the rate falling back, to around the previous rates after 200l. 
Figure 3.5 
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Source: Home Office 
One explanation for the blip III 2001 might be the narrowest criteria and extremely slow 
processing of asylum applications resulted in a massive and growing backlog of asylum 
applications and in January 2000 the backlog had risen from 70,000 to 103,000. The 
government's effort to speed this up was initially disastrous as the Home Office new computer 
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system failed and at the same time it was moving its Croydon offices. It was estimated that 
"Lunar House in Croydon had more than 200,000 paper files occupying 14 miles of shelyes" 
(Hayter, 2004: p 8). 
In January 2000, a report by the House of Commons Public Accounts Committee recognised that 
the delay 'has caused enormous personal distress hundreds of thousands of applicants and their 
family" (Hayter, 2004: p 8). 
To deal with unresolved asylum cases, the government decided to clear a part of this backlog and 
announced an administrative reform in a parliamentary 'White Paper' called "Fairer, Faster, 
Firmer - A Modem Approach to Immigration and Asylum". The government used the following 
criteria to clear the backlog. Applications filed for asylum before 1995 which had not received 
an initial decision from the Home Office were divided into two categories; 
• Those who applied before the 1993 Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act came into 
force in July 1993, under this category around 10,000 asylum seekers were given 
indefinite leave to enter or remain (ILR), unless they had committed a serious criminal 
offence or had applied for asylum after the removal or deportation process had started. 
• Another 20,000 who applied between July 1993 and December 1995 were granted 
Exceptional Leave to Remain (ELR) on compassionate or exceptional factors, possibly 
losing their full right to refugee status, see also Appendix 3.3. And the 20,000 who were 
waiting for several years for their appeals to be heard against Home Office refusal, and a 
further 20,000 who had applied for asylum after 1995 and were waiting for initial 
decisions by the Home Office, were unaffected by the measures. 
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Therefore although the percentage of asylum seekers granted settlement in anyone year is low, 
not normally greater than 10% and in extreme case just 1.1 % in 1991, because of the backlog 
being cleared by 2001, this meant a large number could stay in the UK. From Appendix 3.3 it is 
obvious that the maximum number of asylum seekers were granted asylum during years 1999-
2001 considering the above mentioned criteria. Also, the number granted ILR or ELR is highest 
for this year, which has added to the peak of the asylum acceptance ratio in 2001. 
Despite those efforts from government to speed up the asylum process, the backlog remains in 
the system. As the number of asylum seekers accepted each year is extremely low compared to 
the asylum applications filed and thus leading to more and more applications in the queuing 
procedure for decisions and appeals in the case of failure and thereby creating a backlog each 
year. This backlog may have encouraged those disguised or bogus asylum seekers to disappear in 
the society. So the question of illegal immigrants as well as those who disappear remains and 
may create some potential bias in the data and interpretation of results of the subsequent 
empirical analysis in this study. 
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3.6 Conclusion 
The detailed analysis of trends in asylum seekers and refugees and the evolution of immigration 
policies, gives a clear understanding of the issues affecting the source and host societies. Also. in 
explaining how immigration control has evolved and been influenced by politicians and the 
media, leading to stricter immigration control thus strengthening borders against truly and 
vulnerable people. This provides a useful background and motivation behind the actual analysis 
to follow. 
The chapter is also helpful as it provides a useful framework for defining asylum seekers in the 
following empirical analysis according to their time of arrival, the source country's actual 
political, social and economic conditions, making it easier to differentiate between different 
categories of immigrants. The asylum process is based on deciding whether an asylum seeker has 
a well-founded fear of being persecuted in their country of origin. Therefore accurate and up-to-
date country of origin information plays an essential role in making a proper decision at all 
stages of the asylum process and in differentiating between categories of immigrants. 
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Appendix 3.1: continued 
Nationality 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Iran 350 455 530 405 365 520 615 585 585 
Iraq 215 985 915 700 495 550 930 965 1075 
Lebanon 180 1110 755 380 285 215 150 145 160 
Libya 
· · · · · · 
100 
· · Syria 
· · · · · 
50 
· · Other 35 100 340 495 370 695 600 455 525 
Middle East Total 780 2650 2540 1980 1520 1985 2295 2150 2335 
Afghanistan 70 175 210 270 315 325 580 675 1085 
Bangladesh 
· · · · · · 
545 
· China 85 240 525 330 215 425 790 820 1945 
India 630 1530 2075 1450 1275 2030 3255 2220 1285 
Pakistan 250 1475 3245 1700 1125 1810 2915 1915 1615 
Sri Lanka 1790 3330 3765 2085 1965 2350 2070 1340 1830 
Vietnam 
· · · · · · · · 
10 
Asia Other 60 135 675 270 285 575 1075 920 255 
Asia Total 2885 6890 10495 6100 5175 7515 10685 7885 8570 
Nationality Not Known 110 350 410 
· 
100 125 50 80 105 
Grand Total 11640 26205 44940 24605 22370 32830 43965 29640 32500 
Source: Home Office 
Appendix 3.2: Number of Asylum Applications made 1998-2006 
Nationality 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Albania 560 1310 1490 1065 1150 595 295 175 155 
Bulgaria 
· · · · · · · · 
Cyprus 
· · · · · · · · · 
Czech Republic 515 1790 
· · · · · · 
FRY 7395 11465 
· · · · · · · 
Macedonia 50 90 65 755 310 60 15 5 
Moldova 25 180 235 425 820 380 170 115 45 
Poland 1585 1860 
· · · · · 
· · 
Romania 1015 1985 2160 1400 1210 550 295 115 75 
Russia 185 685 1000 450 295 280 190 130 115 
Serbia & Montenegro 7395 11465 6070 3230 2265 815 290 155 70 
Turkey 2015 2850 3990 3695 2835 2390 1230 755 425 
Ukraine 370 775 770 445 365 300 120 55 50 
E U Accession States 4975 5350 3745 2025 3200 310 75 10 10 
Former USSR 2260 2640 1050 485 615 520 315 265 220 
Former Yugoslavia 585 2715 
· · · · 
· · 
Europe Other 855 2715 2310 245 175 85 35 35 45 
Europe Total 17745 28280 22880 14215 13235 6295 3025 1810 1210 
Colombia 425 1000 505 365 420 220 120 70 60 
Ecuador 280 610 445 255 315 150 35 10 15 
Jamaica 105 180 310 525 1310 965 455 325 215 
America Other 165 240 155 170 240 230 130 100 95 
Americas Total 975 2025 1420 1315 2290 1560 740 505 385 
Algeria 1260 1385 1635 1140 1060 550 490 255 225 
Angola 150 545 800 1015 1420 850 400 145 95 
Burundi 215 780 620 610 700 650 265 90 35 
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Appendix 3.2: continued 
Nationality 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Cameroon 95 245 355 380 615 505 360 290 260 
Congo 150 450 485 540 600 320 150 65 45 
Dem Rep. Congo 660 1240 1030 1370 2215 1540 1475 1080 570 
Eritrea 345 565 505 620 1180 950 1105 1760 2585 
Ethiopia 345 455 415 610 700 640 540 385 200 
Gambia 45 30 50 65 130 95 100 90 110 
Ghana 225 195 285 190 275 325 355 230 130 
Ivory Coast 95 190 445 275 315 390 280 210 170 
Kenya 885 485 455 305 350 220 145 100 95 
Liberia 70 65 55 115 450 740 405 175 50 
Nigeria 1380 945 835 810 1125 1010 1090 1025 790 
Rwanda 280 820 760 530 655 260 75 40 20 
Sierra Leone 565 1125 1330 1940 1155 380 230 135 125 
Somalia 4685 7495 5020 6420 6540 5090 2585 1760 1845 
Sudan 250 280 415 390 655 930 1305 885 670 
Tanzania 80 80 60 80 40 30 20 20 15 
Togo 
· · · · · · · Uganda 210 420 740 480 715 705 405 205 165 
Zaire 





Zimbabwe 80 230 1010 2140 7655 3295 2065 1075 1650 
Africa Other 305 400 615 555 845 895 910 615 480 
Africa Total 12380 18435 17920 20590 29390 20370 14745 10640 10340 
Iran 745 1320 5610 3420 2630 2875 3455 3150 2375 
Iraq 1295 1800 7475 6680 14570 4015 1695 1415 945 
Lebanon 





Libya 115 115 155 140 200 145 160 125 90 
Syria 65 95 140 110 70 110 350 330 160 
Other 565 835 1035 915 850 825 870 715 735 
Middle East Total 2785 4165 14415 11265 18315 7970 6525 5730 4305 
Afghanistan 2395 3975 5555 8920 7205 2280 1395 1580 2400 
Bangladesh 460 530 795 510 720 735 510 425 440 
China 1925 2625 4000 2390 3675 3450 2365 1730 1945 
India 1030 1365 2120 1850 1865 2290 1405 940 680 
Pakistan 1975 2615 3165 2860 2405 1915 1710 1145 965 
Sri Lanka 3505 5130 6395 5510 3130 705 330 395 525 
Vietnam 35 105 180 400 840 1125 755 380 90 
Asia Other 615 1120 1025 1040 915 655 375 320 275 
Asia Total 11940 17465 23230 23480 20755 13155 8850 6915 7320 
Nationality Not Known 190 785 450 160 145 55 70 105 50 
Grand Total 46015 71160 80315 71025 84130 49405 33960 25710 23610 
Source: Home Office 
Appendix 3.3: Contemporary Civil Wars 
The following civil wars are ongoing or ended in the past decade, as of2006. 
o Afghan Civil War, 1992-2001, armed conflicts persist 
o Algerian Civil War, 1991-2002, conflicts persist 
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o Angolan Civil War, 1974-1989, 1995-1997, 1998-2002 
o Burundi Civil War, 1988-1991, 1993-2005 
o Cabindan Civil War, Angola, 1975-2006 
o Cambodia, 1978-1993, 1997-1998 
o Casamance Conflict, Senegal, 1990-present 
o Colombian armed conflict, 1964-present 
o Congo Civil War, 1996-1997, 1998-2003 
o Cote d'Ivoire Civil War, 1999-2000, 2002-present 
o Darfur Conflict, Sudan, 2003-present 
o East Timor/Indonesia, 1975-1999 
o Georgian Civil War, Abkhazia, South Ossetia in Georgia, 1988-present 
o Guatemalan Civil War, 1960-1996 
o Guinea-Bissau Civil War, 1998-1999 
o Haiti Rebellion, 2004 
o Israeli -Palestinian conflict 1948-present 
o Iraq Civil War, 2003-present 
o Kashmir Conflict, 1989-present 
o Kurdistan, Kurdish Democratic Party, Patriotic Union of Kurdi stan , 1961-70, 1988-2003 
o Liberian Civil War, 1989-1996, 1999-2003 
o Nepalese Civil War, 1996-2006 
o Northern Irish civil war, 1969-1998 (Considered ongoing by extremist minority groups) 
o Palestinian Civil War, 2006-present 
o Rwandan Civil War, 1990-1994 
o Sierra Leone Civil War, 1991-2002 
o Somali Civil War, 1991-present 
o Sri Lankan Civil War, 1983-present 
o Sudanese Civil War, 1955-1972, 1983-2005 
o Tajikistan Civil War, 1992-1997 
o Ugandan Civil War, 1987-present 
o Yemen Civil War, 1979-1989, 1994, 2000s 
o Yugoslav Wars, 1991-1995, Breakup - Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia (lst NATO 
intervention), Kosovo (2nd NATO intervention), Presevo valley, Macedonia - Kosovo 
War 1996-1999 
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Appendix 3.4: Asylum Applications, Decisions and other Information for 
Principal Applicants (excluding Dependents) 1998-2006 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Applications 46,015 71,160 80,315 71,025 84,130 49,405 33,960 25,710 23,610 Received 
Decisions 31,570 33,720 109,205 120,950 83,540 64,940 46,020 27,395 20,930 (year of 
outcome) 
Granted 5,345 7,815 10,595 13,490 10,255 4,300 2,085 2,225 2,285 Asylum 
Granted 3,910 2,465 11,420 21,600 21,015 7,550 4,205 2,930 2,410 ELR, HP, 
DL 
Refused 22,315 11,025 62,720 89,115 54,305 55,890 44,070 24,730 17,050 Asylum 













10,955 4,875 1,695 1,230 40 recognized 4,270 .. .. .. .. .. .. ...... 
refugees 
2,405 7,280 7,310 8,580 21,865 14,525 .. .. .. .. .. .. ...... 
WithELR 
Family ILR ...... 9,235 11,245 5,000 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ... .. .. .. 
Exercise 
Total 6,680 22,505 22,355 17,965 18,235 12,190 19,510 34,340 19,565 
Source: Home Office 
Note: Figures rounded to the nearest 5, may not sum due to rounding, ...... data not available 
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Chapter 4 
Economic Activity and Emplovment of Asylum Seekers and Refugees 
4.1 Introduction 
People move across borders seeking better employment opportunities, a new home or a safer 
place to live. Whatever the reason may be, or whether the initial intention is to stay temporarily 
or permanently, many migrants have settled in receiving countries. Their settlement is mainly 
dependent upon their economic activities and employment prospects. The Information Centre 
about Asylum and Refugees (leAR) briefing for September 2008 stated that the Home Office 
emphasizes health, education, housing and employment among the key determinants of 
integration and integration is an important part of the wider policy of managed migration. 
In June 2008, a report by the Secretary of State for the Home Office suggested "Britain's 
immigration system is not just designed for economic migration but to offer humanitarian 
protection to people requiring sanctuary and fleeing persecution, family reunification and 
attracting skills through work and study for a positive contribution to the UK". Immigrants can 
be classified into economic and non-economic migrants including refugees and asylum seekers. 
Asylum is different from migration as it is the protection given by a country to someone on the 
basis of a well founded fear of persecution. This difference can also be seen in the economic 
performance of different groups. 
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Distinguishing between economIC migrants and refugees/asylum seekers has always been a 
complicated question in Britain, both for government officials as well as for the public as the 
process involves assumptions about authenticity of genuine political asylum seekers and 
individuals migrating for solely economic reasons (Adelson, 2004). 
A focus on asylum has emerged in the UK in the last two decades but there are many gaps in 
economic research regarding the different impacts of immigrants especially in differentiating 
between types of immigrants. Indeed, there has been a lack of research examining the differences 
between the labour market performance of immigrants i.e. asylum seekers and economic 
migrants. When considering the performance of different migrant groups, then on average, one 
would expect economic migrants to be more likely to be in work, earn more, to pay more in 
taxes and to be a lighter burden on the host economy than refugees and asylum seekers. 
However, this may be due to them possessing different characteristics. 
This chapter will attempt to differentiate refugees and asylum seekers from economic migrants 
using Home Office data and UNHCR information in conjunction with Labour Force Survey 
(LFS) data for the UK. Refugees and asylum seekers will be the main focus of the study here and 
their performance in terms economic activity and employment will be explored in relation to 
other immigrants in the UK. The differentials in rates of assimilation and returns to education of 
different migrant categories will be discussed in particular, especially as assimilation is the 
underlying economic theory responsible for their different labour market outcomes. The main 
objective is to make a comprehensive analysis including the use of regression techniques to 
compare the employment differentials between asylum seekers/refugees and economic 
immigrants using Labour Force Survey data from 2001-2006. 
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4.2 Review of the Empirical Literature 
Recent research on immigrants across different countries, exploring their labour market 
performance and other socio-economic impacts, has taken place at a great pace. How they 
perform in the host economy and how well they assimilate are the main concerns for economists 
as well as for politicians, though with a different perspective for each. Despite the predictions of 
economic theory, most studies have found that immigration has had only a small effect on native 
employment and wages, including for the UK (Dustmann et aI, 2005). But their own labour 
market performance is also very important as their employment is an indication of their 
economic and social welfare, which varies across different groups in the UK. 
Employment outcomes vary not only across different immigrant categories but also across 
different ethnic groups within those categories. For example Blackaby et al. (1997) using the 
1991 UK Census of the Population found employment differentials between different migrant 
and British born minority groups and there existed higher unemployment rates for foreign-born 
ethnic minorities relative to British-born ethnic minorities, with particularly Pakistanis and 
Bangladeshis having lower employment probabilities. Similarly Wheatley-Price (2001) used 
LFS data for 1993-1994 to show that all immigrants have initially lower employment 
probabilities, bur the differentials decreases over time for white immigrants but remains to some 
extent for non-white immigrants. Dustmann and Fabbri (2003) in their analysis based on the 
Fourth National Survey of Ethnic Minorities (FNSEM) and Family and Working Lives Survey 
(FWLS) confirm lower employment probabilities for immigrants as compared to minority and 
white British-born individuals and also verify the Blackaby et al. (1997) results for Bangladeshi 
and Pakistani immigrants. Dustmann and Fabbri (2005) using a pooled sample of LFS data for 
the years 1979-2004 undertake an extensive analysis of labour market outcomes such as labour 
force participation, employment, wages and self employment for different immigrant groups as 
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compared to the British-born white population. Their main findings indicate that immigrants' 
origin composition has changed over the last 20 years and their skill composition has improved 
in a similar way to the British born population. They also found the existence of substantial 
differences in economic outcomes between white and ethnic minority immigrants as the 
employment and participation rates of immigrants are lower than for British-born whites. In 
general, white immigrants are more successful and females from some ethnic groups such as 
Pakistanis and Bangladeshis have the lowest levels of performance. 
Other studies have also compared the improvement over time in employment and the 
assimilation of different ethnic minority immigrant groups as well as focussing on the different 
socio-economic factors responsible for their assimilation and labour market success. Clark and 
Lindley (2006) estimated models of earnings and employment outcomes using the LFS for 1992-
2002 for a sample of white and non-white male immigrants and found the existence of varied 
patterns of assimilations depending upon ethnicity and the reason for entry and also that whites 
and education entrants perform better than non-whites and labour market entrants. 
Clark and Drinkwater (2007) find that different ethnic minorities have diverse labour market 
outcomes, but that there was an overall improvement in the employment performance of most 
ethnic minority groups between 1991 and 2001. However some persistent differences remain 
with some groups such as the Chinese and Indians performing relatively well and Pakistanis and 
Bangladeshis much worse. 
Economic performance for immigrants in the host society is also determined by their human 
capital endowment but despite strong educational achievements, ethnic minority immigrants and 
their British born children exhibit lower employment probabilities than their white native born 
peers (Dustmann and Theodoropoulos; 2006). This accords with the findings of Drinkwater, 
109 
Eade and Garapich (2006) using LFS data, showing the employment in low paying jobs of 
relatively highly educated people (especially Polish workers) in the UK labour market, meaning 
that these workers have lower return to their human capital investments as compared to other 
immigrants. 
Language fluency also plays a vital role in enhancing migrants' economic success. Leslie and 
Lindley (2001) using the FNSEM consider lack of fluency in English as an important cause of 
high unemployment and inactivity rates of ethnic minority men and women in Britain and also 
establish how much of the lower unemployment and higher earnings enjoyed by whites is due to 
their comparative advantage of language. Religion is another factor affecting economic activities 
of immigrant groups, particularly the South Asian ethnic group. Brown (2000) shows religion 
significantly affects the economic activity of British South Asians and Lindley (2002b) also 
confirms that religion has a significant impact on the earnings and employment of all ethnic 
groups. 
Although ethnic minority immigrants and their UK-born counterparts have been the focus of 
recent studies, this research is especially lacking in terms of analysis of the labour market 
performance of refugees and asylum seekers among different categories of immigrants and their 
assimilation over time. An exception to this is Lindley (2002a) who focused on the labour 
market performance of different immigrant groups using LFS data for 1995-2000 for the UK. 
She separates out refugees and non-refugees immigrants using country of origin, UK arrival time 
and various other statistics from refugees sending countries. The labour market performance of 
these immigrant groups is compared and her main findings are that there are larger penalties for 
immigrants from refugee sending countries and significant unexplainable ethnic penalties for 
South Asian males and females. 
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The study here adds to the literature in this area by focusing on the relative labour market 
performance of asylum seekers and refugees in the UK by making a clear distinction between 
asylum seekers/refugees and other immigrants in order to examine how their labour market 
performance varies. Given that most social surveys do not separately identify these two groups, 
it is necessary to impute an indicator of the immigrant's reason for entering the UK. This is 
achieved by following the methodology used by Cortes (2004) for differentiating US refugees 
from other immigrants and Lindley (2002a) for UK refugees and asylum seekers and applying it 
to micro data from the LFS for 2001-2006. In particular, by matching the information on the 
immigrant's country of origin and year of arrival in the UK from the LFS to Home Office 
Asylum Statistics for the period 1989-2006 and UNHCR reports, this allows four different 
categories of immigrants to be defined. This study differs from the existing literature as it has 
adopted a more robust approach to distinguishing between different categories of immigrants and 
has taken account of trends over time as well as constructing a refugee-business ratio to create a 
more complete categorization by defining four different categories of immigrants compared to 
just two. Given the already relatively large literature referred to above that compares immigrants 
with UK born groups, only immigrants are examined in the following analysis. 
4.3 Data Sources 
Two different data sources are used to classify the different types of migrants. Given that the 
. 
LFS contains information on the immigrant's country of origin, year of arrival in the UK, 
economic activity, education, earnings and other socio-economic characteristics then this is the 
main data source used in the analysis. However, there is no indicator in the LFS that can be used 
to identify different types of immigrants e.g. asylum seekers/refugees and economic migrants. 
III 
Therefore in order to examine the labour market performance of asylum seekers/refugees it is 
necessary to combine the information on the migrant's country of origin and year of arrival from 
the LFS with other data sources. Thus an immigrant type variable (ImmiYi) is constructed using 
the information from the following sources along with the LFS. 
(i)- For labour market socio-economic variables: 
Micro data from the LFS for the period of 2001-2006 is used here. The LFS is the largest social 
survey carried out across the UK. The LFS began in 1973 as a result of a requirement of the 
European Economic Community for the UK to submit employment and unemployment statistics. 
Up to 1983 the survey was carried out on a biannual basis, after 1983 the LFS was conducted 
annually. In 1991 the survey was redeveloped so that for the first time in spring 1992, data was 
made available on a quarterly basis. From 1998 the LFS has been providing headline 
employment and unemployment figures for each month of the preceding quarter. The main 
purpose of the LFS is to provide internationally comparable statistics on the levels and changes 
in employment, unemployment and economic inactivity. 6 
It is a panel of nearly 60,000 households and approximately 138,000 respondents interviewed 
each quarter for five consecutive quarters with basic core questions along with varying non-core 
questions asked in each quarter. It provides a wide range of data on labour market statistics 
including employment, wages and economic activities along with other social and demographic 
information. The survey consists of two parts; the first part is related to basic information on 
household family structure, basic housing information and other demographic details of the 
individuals while second part contains information on respondents' economic activity_ 
6 http://qb.soc.surrey.ac.uk!surveys/lfs/lfsintro.htm 
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employment, hourly earnmgs, education and health etc. Apart from 2001, only wave 1 
information has been used here to avoid double counting and due to the fact that information on 
earnings is available in waves I and 5. Also only working-age individuals, excluding full-time 
students are included in the sample. 
However given the lack of a direct question in the LFS about an immigrant's status, additional 
data sources are used to identify asylum seekers/refugees from economic migrants and to create 
the different categories of immigrants. Information on country of origin along with the year of 
arrival is then matched with the other data sources to decide on whether the country is a refugee 
sending country or not in that period. 
(ii)- For the Definition of Immigrant Categories: 
Immigrants move for different reasons depending upon their own and their country's social, 
political and economic conditions. They adopt different methods for reaching the destination 
country, either directly as genuine refugees and asylum seekers, economic migrants or economic 
migrants in the guise of refugees and asylum seekers i.e. bogus asylum seekers. The people 
migrating via business or work permits have obvious economic objectives and are clearly 
defined under the economic migrant category but the problem lies in the differentiation of the 
true refugees and asylum seekers from bogus asylum seekers. 
The definition of an asylum seeker may vary from country to country, depending on the laws of 
each country. However, in most countries, the terms asylum seekerlasylee and refugee differ 
only in the place where an individual asks for protection. An asylum seeker/asylee asks for 
protection after arriving in the host country, while a refugee asks for protection and is granted 
this protected status outside of the host country. 
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In the UK, asylum seekers are individuals who claim to be refugees who are waiting for a 
decision from the Home Office on their case. The UK has a tradition of providing a safe haven 
for genuine refugees and is a signatory to the 1951 Geneva Convention and its 1967 Protocol. 
Globally it is among the 17 countries accepting quota refugees on a regular basis. 
Therefore the term asylum seeker will refer here to all those who claimed asylum in the UK 
during a specific period of persecution (for reasons of race, religion, nationality or membership 
of a particular social group), political violence, communal conflict, ecological disaster or poverty 
in their country of origin. They are protected by the principle of non-refoulement, which forbids 
states from returning people to countries where they might be at risk of persecution. Asylum 
seekers can make their application at their port of entry to the UK or after entry at the UK Border 
Agency (UKBA) formerly known as Immigration and Nationality Directorate (IND). Therefore 
the information published by the following various sources have been used to define the different 
categories of immigrants. Only data from 1989 is included because of the difficulty of obtaining 
consistent information before then, as well as the fact that asylum applications to the UK only 
really started to grow in the 1990s. 
~ Asylum Statistics United Kingdom 1989-2006: Home Office Statistical Bulletin 
~ Home Office Control of Immigration Statistics United Kingdom: 2000, 2003 and 2006 
~ The State of the World's Refugees, UNHCR-1997-98 & 2000-A Humanitarian Agenda 
~ Global Refugee Trends-2006-UNHCR and Asylum Levels and Trends in Industrialized 
Countries- Second Quarter 2007, UNHCR. 
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Construction of the Immigrant Category Variable{Immigi ): 
The immigrant category variable (lmmigi) is constructed using the information from the above 
mentioned sources along with the LFS. To construct the lmmiih variable, information on the 
immigrant's country of origin and year of arrival is used from the LFS to place each immigrant 
into a particular category decided on the basis of the information provided by the Asylum 
Statistics, Home Office Statistical Bulletins and Control of Immigration statistics. The Asylum 
Statistics Bulletin provides detailed information on the number of asylum applications filled and 
accepted each year (from 1989-2006) for each country in the world in tabular form, while the 
Control of Immigration statistics (for 2000, 2003 and 2006) contains additional information on 
entry control at ports and after control, work permits, asylum and migration and grants of 
settlements by nationality and category. The grants of settlement table provides information on 
number of applications accepted for settlement under criterion of work permits, businesses, 
recognized refugees, exceptional and discretionary leave under humanitarian protection, 
dependent categories and all other acceptances for each nationality. 
The grant of settlement information for the years 2000, 2003 and 2006 is used as these are the 
years when the number of asylum seekers was high in the UK and also for availability reasons. 
All settlements recorded as recognized refugees, exceptional or discretionary leave and under 
humanitarian protections are aggregated as a total refugees figure and business and work permit 
settlements under a total Business figure. These two figures are then used to construct a 
Refugees-Business (RB) Ratio for each nationality for 2000,2003 and 2006. 
The RB-ratio is obviously high if the source country is a sending high numbers of 
refugees/asylum seekers and the ratio is lower for countries sending a higher number of business 
and economic migrants. For example, the RB-ratio is very high for countries having internal 
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conflicts or civil wars over a long period and is sending a high number of refugees and asylum 
seekers as compared to other business migrants. Such countries include Ethiopia, Somalia, 
Uganda, Algeria, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Iran and Iraq. For some countries it is high for a 
certain period and lower otherwise, depending upon the country's socio-political conditions. For 
example, for Ethiopia and Somalia the ratio has been greater than 5 since 1989 and for Ghana the 
ratio is between 1-5 in 2000 and 2006 and less than 1 in 2003 and some countries do not send 
any refugees or asylum seekers at all, having a RB-ratio equal to O. 
Because of the fact that immigrants from some countries consist of both asylum seekers and 
economic migrants, all immigrants are divided into the following four categories using the above 
information along with knowledge of the country's socio-political history. In particular these 
categories are defined using information from the UNHCR, Home Office publications for the 
asylum seekers in the UK and the RB-ratio based on grants of settlement (an indication of 
categories is shown below). This information is then matched to the LFS data by country of 
origin and year of arrival to classify the immigrants into one of the four categories. 
Category I: Refugees and asylum seekers 
Category II: Mixed Refugees and Economic Migrants 
Category III: Mainly Economic Migrants 
Category IV: Economic Migrants 
RB-ratio >5 
RB-ratio 1 - 5 
RB-ratio 0< & < 1 
RB-ratio = 0 
For all above four categories those who arrived as other family members such as spouses, 
children and other dependants under family reunification are classified on the same basis and are 
included in the same category as would be the main applicant. 
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Category I: Refugees and asylum seekers 
This category refers to all those who have almost certainly claimed asylum in the UK during a 
specific period of high risk of persecution (for reasons of race, religion, nationality or 
membership of a particular social group), political violence, communal conflict, ecological 
disaster or poverty in their country of origin and are protected by the principal of non-
refoulement. This category is intended to include only true refugees and asylum seekers as the 
RB-ratio is very high (>5) for this group, numbers seeking asylum are high and the country's 
circumstances are also such that they verify them as pure refugees and asylum seekers for that 
particular time period, rather than economic migrants. 
Category II: Mixed Refugees and Economic Migrants 
The category of Mixed Refugees and Economic Migrants includes immigrants from countries 
which have sent relatively high numbers of asylum seekers and refugees along with some 
economic migrants to the UK in certain time periods. So a mixed category is created to include 
the migrants from those countries and times when it is difficult to distinguish between them. The 
RB-ratio for this category is generally between 1 and 5. 
Category III: Mainly Economic Migrants 
This category contains immigrants who have mainly moved to the UK to work or look for work. 
The RB-ratio is generally between 0 and 1 for this category and includes all those countries 
sending some refugees and asylum seekers to the UK but also a high percentage of other 
immigrants using information from the publications noted above. This category includes 
migrants from countries such as China, India and Pakistan. 
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Category IV: Economic Migrants 
This category is intended to include only economic migrants and consists of countries sending 
migrants with the sole purpose of economic preferences and so the RB- ratio is 0 for this 
category. This includes countries such as Australia, USA, New Zealand and Malaysia. An 
example of the division of immigrants from different countries into each category is presented 
here in tabular form to show how an immigrant from a certain country and time period is placed 
into that category on the information used from the previously mentioned sources. 
Countries in each Category 
LFS Code County No. of Asylum Refugee-Business Category 
Applications Ratio I, II, III, IV 
11 k\ustralia ----- 0 IV 
14 Kenya tHigh in Mid 1990s 1-5 II 
16 Tanzania tHigh 1993-96 1-5 I: 1989-96 
11:>=1997 
Jamaica tNothing until 1996, >5:2000 IV: 1989-95 
26 tHigh in early 2000 <1 :2003 & 2006 111:>=1996 
108 Iraq tHigh in late 1990s >5 I: >=1989 
& early 2000s 
Note: Please see Appendix 4.1 for details of which countries are III each category. 
Appendix 4.2 contains the percentage accounted by each country in each category. 
Furthermore, given that it is quite difficult to compute a precise 0 and 1 distribution, categories 2 
and 3 have been defined to capture individuals who lie in the middle. The trends over time make 
sure that a country is correctly specified for each category and over each time period, e.g. 
Zimbabwe was not an asylum sending country until 1997, so it is only included in category 1 
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only from 1997. However, as in any exercise of this type, there are bound to be some individuals 
who are incorrectly classified but the study has tried to keep that number to a minimum in 
comparison to other studies. 
4.4 Descriptive Statistics: 
Before using regression analysis to examine the labour market performance of the different 
migrant categories, some descriptive statistics are discussed below. 
(i) Social and Demographic Characteristics 
Table 4.1 shows cross-tabulations for some social and demographic characteristics e.g. age, sex, 
marital status, region, ethnicity and education etc. Females comprise more than half of the 
overall sample and as well as being in the majority for each category of immigrants. It is obvious 
from the table that regarding age the highest percentage of each category is within the 26-35 age 
group, as migration is much easier when you are young as this group has the ability and 
flexibility to adjust to new circumstances. This age group accounts for almost half of category III 
(mainly economic) migrants and a slightly lower proportion for the other categories of 
immigrants. Almost a quarter of each category is in the 36-45 age group and over 45 is the least 
common age group for each category (with highest percentage almost 12% for refugees and 
asylum seekers as they are not self-selecting for obvious reasons). This shows that age is an 
important obstacle to movements across countries. 
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Table 4.1 Social and Demographic Statistics by Immigrant Categories 
Refugees Mixed Mainly Economic 
Category & Asylum Refugees& Economic Migrants Total Seekers Eco. Migrants 
Migrants 
1- Sex category 
Males 48.67 % 47.89 % 45.95 % 43.77% 45.77 % 
Females 51.33 % 52.11 % 54.05 % 56.23% 54.23 % 
2-Age category 
16-25 17.60 % 19.58% 16.48 % 17.13 % 17.53 % 
26-35 41.75 % 45.84 % 48.91 % 47.61 % 46.42 % 
36-45 28.48 % 25.50 % 23.64 % 25.15 % 25.58 % 
Over 45 12.18 % 9.08 % 10.97 % 10.10 % 10.47 % 
3-Marital Status 
Married 31.54 % 21.28 % 26.19 % 43.89% 34.67 % 
Unmarried 68.46 % 78.72 % 73.81 % 56.11% 65.33 % 
4-Region 
North 11.73 % 23.13 % 14.85 % 12.10 % 14.39 % 
Midlands 8.64% 14.54 % 15.37 % 8.40 % 10.68 % 
East 4.66% 7.71 % 8.17% 10.10 % 08.34 % 
London 61.14 % 37.64 % 35.20 % 40.07 % 42.80 % 
South 10.26 % 12.52 % 19.86 % 19.95 % 16.84 % 
Wales 1.18 % 1.40 % 2.18 % 2.19 % 1.86 % 
Scotland 2.15 % 2.57% 3.13 % 4.81 % 3.64% 
Northern Ireland 0.24% 0.49% 1.24% 2.38 % 1.46 % 
5-Ethnic Origin 
White 35.92 % 9.11 % 31.15 % 67.75 % 45.29 % 
South Asians 19.10 % 51.84 % 45.68 % 11.02 % 25.55 % 
Black 21.65 % 24.68 % 7.62% 7.03 % 12.95 % 
Mixed & Others 23.33 % 14.37 % 15.54 % 14.21 % 16.20 % 
6- Education (Levels) 
Low (:S 17) 38.44 % 40.31 % 26.41 % 26.06 % 30.89 % 
Medium (18-20) 28.57 % 24.92 % 25.69 % 27.67 % 27.03 % 
High (2: 21) 32.99 % 34.78 % 47.90 % 46.26 % 42.08 % 
7-Arrival Time 
Pre - 2000 70.58 % 60.18 % 50.31 % 56.26 % 58.61 % 
Early- 2000 26.06 % 33.02 % 40.28 % 30.61 % 31.82 % 
Since- 2000 3.36% 6.80% 9.41 % 13.13 % 9.57% 
8-Year of Interview 
2001 24.20 % 18.04 % 17.65 % 22.74 % 21.34 % 
2002 14.59 % 13.60 % 13.51 % 13.62 % 13.78 % 
2003 14.21 % 14.96 % 14.72 % 13.26% 13.98 % 
2004 16.04 % 15.42 % 15.92 % 14.70 % 15.28 % 
2005 16.98 % 19.36 % 20.25 % 18.31 % 18.57 % 
2006 13.97 % 18.64 % 17.94 % 17.38 % 17.05 % 
No. of Observations 3392 3074 3071 8445 17982 
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Also a majority of immigrants prefer to migrate as single or unmarried people for the obvious 
reasons of it being easier to travel and settle for single persons. The percentage of married people 
is highest for category IV (economic migrants). Except for economic migrants, around three-
quarters of each category is single or unmarried but for economic migrants almost a half of them 
are married as for them it is more likely that they can obtain a family visa as compared to other 
categories for whom the whole process of reaching a destination country and claiming asylum 
involves a lot more difficulties. Edin et al (2003) find substantial evidence in a study for Sweden 
that recent migrants tend to locate within ethnic enclaves within metropolitan areas and these 
improve the labour market outcomes of less skilled migrants with an earnings gain of 13% in 
ethnic concentrations. However, a number of other studies including Clark and Drinkwater 
(2002) find that enclaves have a negative impact on labour market outcomes. The concentration 
of immigrant groups is verified here for the UK and the regional distribution shows some 
interesting patterns. The majority of refugees and asylum-seekers (over 60%) live in Greater 
London may be because of the cosmopolitan nature of London or perhaps the network effect i.e. 
locating close to other migrants from the same country. Dustmann and Fabbri (2005) also find 
heavy concentration of immigrants (around 40% of all immigrants) in London, which is also 
shown for categories II-IV in the table. In contrast, the Northern regions, as well as the other 
parts of the UK are relatively more popular locations for the other three categories (II-IV). 
More than one third of asylum seekers and refugees are white and almost a quarter is from mixed 
and other ethnic backgrounds. While South Asians contribute to nearly half of the category II 
and category III migrants and around two-thirds of economic migrants are white. Blacks have the 
lowest presence in the economic migrant category. 
As far as education is concerned, immigrants come from countries that have different levels of 
qualifications according to their own education system which mayor may not be equivalent to 
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the UK education system. For this reason, years of education are used here and in the regression 
analysis. In the table, education is divided into low, medium and high level depending upon the 
age left full time education. It shows the highest percentage with a high level of education is seen 
for mainly economic and economic migrants i.e. categories III and IV and that the highest 
percentage with low levels of education is in categories I and II i.e. refugees and asylum seekers. 
As economic migrants often come through the work permit system including the highly skilled 
migrant program (HSMP) for which certain high levels of education are required, it seems 
obvious that there will be a relatively high percentage in the high level education group. 
The arrival time shows that the majority of each category came in the pre-2000 periods, with this 
being most notable for asylum seekers and refugees. The highest percentage of almost each 
category was interviewed in 2001 because Wave 5 information is used in this year as well. 
Economic Activitv: 
As the analysis and comparison of labour market performance of refugees and asylum seekers 
with other immigrants' categories is the main focus of this study, descriptive statistics for labour 
market activities of different immigrant categories are presented here separately for males and 
females. 
Males 
Table 4.2(a) displays employment and economic activity for males from each of the four migrant 
categories. More than three-quarters of immigrant males are employed and this percentage is 
highest for the mainly economic migrant and economic migrant categories, while it is lowest for 
refugees and asylum seekers. Likewise unemployment is highest for male refugees and asylum 
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seekers and lowest for mainly economIC and economic migrants. A larger percentage of 
refugees/asylum seekers are also inactive due to various reasons. A relatively high proportion 
(given full-time students have been excluded) of refugee/asylum seekers fall in the student 
category relative to other immigrants, which may reflect that they are more inclined to invest in 
and accumulate country specific human capital due to their longer time horizon in the host 
country (Cortes, 2004). 
Table 4.2(a) Economic Activityllnactivity by Immigrant Category; Males 
Refugees & Mixed Mainly Economic 
Category Asylum Seekers Refugees & Economic Migrants Total 
Eco. Migrants Mif(rants 
Employed 60.17 % 76.03 % 87.82 % 86.21 % 79.48 % 
Unemployed 12.33 % 9.38% 4.80% 5.69% 7.52% 
Students 3.33 % 1.51 % 1.15 % 1.20 % 1.67 % 
Looking after Family/ 1.110/0 0.82% 0.79% 0.63% 0.79% 
Home 
Temporarily Sick! 2.34% 2.05% 0.86% 0.79% 1.34 % 
InjuredlDisabled 
Long Term Sick! 4.99% 3.08 % 1.22 % 1.58 % 2.47 % 
InjuredlDisabled 
Not Looking Jobs 15.72 % 7.12 % 3.37% 3.90% 6.74% 
No. of Observations 1622 1460 1396 3670 8148 
Categories I and II males are also more likely to be inactive due to being temporarily or long 
tenn sick/injured /disabled or due to other reasons and is more than double for the refugee and 
mixed migrant categories. However, a negligible percentage of male immigrants are looking 
after the family or home. Not surprisingly the largest percentage of refugees/asylum seekers is 
inactive either being temporary or long term sick/disabled! injured. 
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The percentage of male refugees and asylum seekers not looking for jobs is almost double that of 
the mixed migrant category II and is four times higher than mainly economic and economic 
migrant categories. 
Females 
Table 4.2(b) shows economIC activity and inactivity for the female immigrant categories. 
Females from all immigrant categories perform poorly compared to males as almost 45% are not 
in employment. Employment rates are similar for categories I and II and are between 25 and 30 
percentage points lower than for categories III and IV. 
Table 4.2(b) Economic Activity/lnactivity by Immigrant Category; Females 
Refugees & Mixed Mainly Economic 
Category Asylum Seekers Refugees& Economic Migrants Total 
Eco. Migrants Migrants 
Employed 36.54 % 36.55 % 61.41 % 66.10 % 55.20 % 
Unemployed 5.95 % 4.91 % 5.44 % 4.60% 5.04% 
Students 3.62% 1.89 % 1.47 % 1.29% 1.83 % 
Looking after Family/ 29.66 % 33.71 % 18.35 % 16.22 % 21.84 % 
Home 
Temporarily Sick! 1.81 % 1.70 % 0.98% 0.85 % 1.18 % 
InjuredlDisabled 
Long Term Sick! 11.68 % 13.36 % 6.79% 5.55 % 8.13 % 
InjuredlDisabled 
Not Looking Jobs 10.74 % 7.88 % 5.57% 5.38 % 6.78 % 
No. of Observations 1713 1587 1635 4717 9652 
Unemployment is also pretty similar for categories II-IV females and approximately two percent 
higher for female refugees and asylum seekers as compared to economic migrants. Inactivity due 
to looking after the family or home is highest form of economic inactivity and nearly a quarter of 
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all females immigrants are looking after the family or home. Around one-third of 
refugees/asylum seekers and mixed migrants are in this category. Nearly one tenth of immigrant 
females are out of the labour market due to long or short term sickness/injuries or disability. A 
further 7% are not looking for jobs due to various other reasons, with this being highest for the 
main and mixed categories of refugees/asylum seekers. 
Comparisons between immigrant males and females shows that the employment rate is around 
half as high for female refugees/asylum seekers and unemployment is over double that of 
economic migrants for males. Interestingly the percentage with a long term sickness/disability is 
more than three times as high for females as it is for males and among all the immigrant 
categories this percentage is greatest for female refugees/asylum seekers. Male refugees/asylum 
seekers are more likely not to be looking for jobs possibly because they are unable to work 
because of their working restrictions. 
On the whole immigrant males are more active than females and perform better in terms of 
employment. While both males and females who are categorised as refugees and asylum seekers 
perform far worse in terms of employment compared to other categories of immigrants. 
Types of Job: 
Comparison of types of jobs i.e. permanent, temporary and self-employment among different 
categories of immigrants are presented in Table 4.2(c). The comparison shows that the majority 
of both male and female immigrants are permanently employed and around three-quarters of 
males and almost 80% of females are in this category. This percentage is slightly lower for male 
refugees and asylum seekers and slightly higher for their female counterparts as compared to 
other immigrant categories. 
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Table 4.2(c) Employment Job Type by Immigrant Category 
Refugees & Mixed Mainly Economic 
Category Asylum Seekers Refugees & Economic Migrants Total 
Eco. Migrants Migrants 
Males 
Permanent 70.85 % 77.15 % 76.05 % 77.04 % 75.95 % 
Temporary 10.89 % 8.16 % 12.38 % 9.97% 10.25 % 
Self-Employed 18.26 % 14.69 % 11.56 % 12.99 % 13.80 % 
No. of Observations 964 1103 1220 3149 6436 
Females 
Permanent 81.45 % 82.02 % 79.14 % 79.13 % 79.72 % 
Temporary 12.26 % 12.04 % 13.24 % 12.79 % 12.73 % 
Self-Employed 6.29% 5.93 % 7.62% 8.08 % 7.55 % 
No. of Observations 620 573 997 3095 5285 
Temporary employment is highest for mainly economic migrants for both males and females 
whilst self-employment ratios are highest for refugees/asylum seekers for males but not for 
females. Consistent with other UK findings (e.g. Clark and Drinkwater, 2002), it is found that 
self-employment rates for immigrant females are much lower than they are for males. 
4.5 Empirical Methodology 
The main contribution of this study is that it analyses the labour market performance of asylum 
seekers/refugees and economic immigrants separately and thus is able to conduct a comparison 
between these groups. This study will also investigate ethnic variations within immigrant groups 
and focuses on differences in employment and its determinants in this chapter and earnings and 
on occupational success in the next chapter. The objective is to undertake a comprehensive 
analysis using regression techniques to compare employment differentials between different 
categories of immigrants. Separate analysis for males and females will be reported here and this 
distinction will be kept throughout the analysis. 
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Employment Equation: 
The following equation is used to compare the employment for refugees/asyl k I· urn see ers re atIve 
to economic immigrants. 
(4.l) 
where 
Ei= 0 if not employed and Ei= 1 if employed 
Zi= A Set of control variables 
}' = Associated vector of coefficients for Zi 
lmmig,,= Set of Dummies for Immigrant category 
& = Associated vector of coefficients for ImmiYi 
CQ = Constant and £ = Error Term 
Employability using Equation (4.1) will be estimated using Ordinary Least Square (OLS) to 
compare the different immigrant categories. In terms of deciding on which empirical 
specification to use, the approach adopted was to include explanatory variables on the basis of 
findings of some of the key papers in the literature. These include Wheatley-Price (2001), 
Lindley (2002a), Dustmann and Fabbri (2005) and Clark and Lindley (2006). Thus the choice of 
specification is as follows: 
Firstly, age in quadratic form and dummy variables for educational level will be included. 
Education is categorised as high, medium and low based on age left full-time education. Controls 
are also added for ethnic origin, region dummies, marital status and year of interview. Finally 
dummies are included for the number of dependent children in the family and years since 
migration - a key variable for assessing the extent of assimilation. Information about language is 
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important for understanding and assimilation in the society but information about language 
spoken at home is not available in the LFS on consistent basis. Therefore a language dummy 
could not be included in the analysis unfortunately. At the same time, there is the possibility that 
the LFS of excludes those individuals who claim asylum and then abscond due to various 
reasons such as low education, poverty or fears of forced removals. This may have the impact of 
inflating the proportion of refugees and asylum seekers with high levels of education. More 
generally, the LFS is likely to under sample the number of immigrants, especially from certain 
groups and areas but remains the most appropriate data source to analyse how they perform in 
the labour market (Dustmann and Fabbri, 2005). 
The models are estimated using OLS for the ease of interpretation but Appendix 4.3 contains 
probit and logit estimates for comparison, the results of which are quantitatively very similar. As 
probits and logits generally produce similar results but differ in magnitude and logit coefficients 
tend to be about 1.7/1.8 times larger than the corresponding probit coefficients. For the same 
reason OLS will be the main estimation method used for empirical analysis in the remainder of 
the thesis. 
Furthermore, marginal probabilities for some of the key variables of interest such as education, 
years since migration and categories of immigrants are given in Appendix 4.4 in order to 
compare the three different methods of estimation. This table shows quantitatively very similar 
results for all of the variables with same signs and significance levels. The estimates from each 
of the models are qualitatively very similar and also generally in tenns of the magnitudes of the 
marginal effects. One slight exception is for immigrant group for males, where mainly economic 
migrants have the highest employment probability, whilst in the probit and logit it is economic 
migrants, but the differences in the effects are not great. The closeness of the estimates between 
the models also holds in the remainder of the analysis. Also, the employment equations are also 
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estimated separately for each immigrant category following the pooled analysis. Finally, 
endogeneity which is a problem in many econometric models should not be too bl .. pro ematlc III 
the context of affecting estimates of the impact of immigrant category on employment since it is 
unlikely that these will be determined jointly. 
Job Type Equation: 
Three types of employment i.e. permanent, temporary and self-employment will be estimated 
using a multinomial logit model. Permanent employment will be the omitted category. The 
probability of an individual i being in employment type j is given as 
p __ = exp (Zf,Yj) 
"} 2:k1 exp (Zion) j ~ 1,2, ....... n (4.2) 
Where Z is a vector of individual-level characteristics and Yj is a state-specific vector of 
parameters to be estimated (Clark and Drinkwater, 2002). The z vector contains the same set of 
characteristics as in the employment equation. Separate models for males and females will again 
be estimated. The following four tables present estimates using the above models. Firstly 
employment estimates are reported for males and females for all immigrants. This is followed by 
separate estimates for each immigrant group and gender. Finally multinomiallogit estimates are 
reported separately by gender. Robust standard errors are used to correct for heteroskedasticity 
and these are reported in parentheses below the estimates. Furthermore, adjusted R-squared 
statistics and the number of observations are reported at the end of each table. 
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4.6. Regression Results for Employment 
4.6.1 Estimates for Employment for Males and Females 
Table 4.3 reports separate regression estimates for males and females for employment for all 
immigrants and includes the migrant group dummies. The results show that most of the variables 
are significant at the 5% level and many at the 1 % level for both sexes. It also shows the typical 
influence of key factors such as age, education, marital status and years since migration on 
employment. A brief discussion of the employment estimates is given below. A comparison 
between the results for males and females reveals that employment differentials are fairly 
similar, with refugees and asylum seekers performing worse than the other groups. Generally the 
signs and significance levels are similar for both genders but some differences are present. 
The effect of age is found to be very similar and equally significant for both genders with a 
slightly greater impact for females. It reveals that employment increases with age but at a 
decreasing rate. Marital status also significantly affects employment and marriage has a very 
significant positive effect for males but a negative effect on female employment. Married 
females are less likely to be employed than their single counterparts due to 
family responsibilities. Being married is associated with a 7 percentage point higher employment 
rate for males but a 8 percentage point lower employment rate for females. 
The regional dummies show that employment rates are highest for immigrants in the East, the 
South and Wales for males. The results for females are similar, with employment lowest in the 
North and London. Employment of immigrants is higher in the East, the South and Wales by 
around 8 percentage points than in the North. 
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Table 4.3: Regression Estimates for Employment for Males and Females 
Males Females 









Medium Education 0.096*** 0.021 *** 
(0.012) (0.012) 










South 0.084*** 0.086*** 
(0.015) (0.016) 
Wales 0.093** 0.080** 
(0.029) (0.036) 
Scotland 0.012 0.070* 
(0.024) (0.025) 































No. of Dependent Children 
-0.023*** -0.119*** 
(0.004) (0.005) 
Mixed Refugees & Economic Migrants 0.141 *** 0.087*** 
(0.016) (0.016) 
Mainly Economic Migrants 0.227*** 0.219*** 
(0.015) (0.013) 
Economic Migrants 0.206*** 0.169*** 
(0.014) (0.013) 
Years since Migration 0.009*** 0.012*** 
(0.001) (0.001) 
No. of Observations 8039 9555 
Adjusted R-squared 0.140 0.247 
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Default categories are single, low education, living in the North, 
White, year 2006 and refugees and asylum seekers (Category 1). * p<O.1; ** P <0.005; *** p<O.OI (two-tailed tests) 
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More years spent in education boost employment opportunities as a result of the positive returns 
to education for employment. Employability increases with education for both males and females 
with higher levels of education having a similar influence for both sexes but the return to 
medium levels of education is much higher for males for employment in comparison to those 
with low levels of education. Years since migration is also significantly associated with higher 
employment showing over time integration and assimilation in the labour market. The impact is 
again similar for males and females but slightly stronger for the latter, with an extra year in the 
UK increasing the employment rate by around 1 percentage point. 
Ethnicity has an important impact on employment for immigrants. All non-white immigrants are 
significantly less likely to be employed compared to the reference category of whites. This 
possibly indicates some sort of discrimination, although cultural factors are also important (Clark 
and Drinkwater, 2007). For males the disadvantage is highest for the mixed and other ethnic 
group while females Asians are the most disadvantaged group. Again Asian females' cultural 
and social background can be an explanation for this. Employment rates are highest for those 
interviewed in 2006 compared to the other years. 
The number of dependent children is also important and has a negative impact on employment 
but this effect is much more pronounced for females as compared to males with an extra child 
reducing employment by around 12 percentage points. Finally, the employment estimates show 
that all categories of immigrants are significantly more likely to be in employment compared to 
asylum seekers and refugees. Mainly economic migrants seem to do best in terms of employment 
after controlling for the other explanatory variables with an employment rate which is 22-23 
percentage points higher than asylum seekers/refugees for both males and females. 
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Thus mainly economic migrants appear to perform best for employment, consistent with the 
descriptive findings as mainly economic migrants have higher raw employment rates than 
economic migrants. Economic migrants have an employment rate which is approximately 17 
percentage points higher than asylum seekers/refugees (after controlling for other variables) for 
females and 21 percentage points for males. Whilst it is 14 percentage points higher for the 
mixed refugees/economic migrant males and 9 points higher for females. 
Therefore asylum seekers and refugees are least likely to be employed as compared to other 
migrants. Possible explanations for this may be restrictions on their ability to be in full time paid 
job, problems of non-recognition of qualifications or a lack of suitable skills so that it may take 
a refugee many years to regain a recognized professional qualification and employment. There 
may also be a stigma attached to being an asylum seeker/refugee in the labour market. 
4.6.2 Regression Estimates by Immigrant Category, Males 
Employment estimates for all four categories of immigrants are presented for males in Table 4.4. 
These can be used to detect different returns to education and ethnic group by immigrant 
categories and also the effect of other social and demographic factors in detail separately for 
each group and gender. Age has a positive but declining impact on employment for all groups 
but is largest for asylum seekers/refugees (including the mixed category) and is smallest for 
mainly economic migrants. 
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Table 4.4 
Regression Estimates for Em~loyment by Immigrant Categon:; Males 
Refugees & Mixed Refugees & Mainly Economic Economic Migrants 
Asy}um Seekers Economic Migrants Migrants 
Age 0.041 *** 0.045*** 0.018** 0.037*** 
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.005) 
Age Squared -0.060*** -0.060*** -0.020*** -0.050*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Married 0.073** 0.145*** 0.070*** 0.048*** 
(0.030) (0.034) (0.025) (0.013) 
Medium Education 0.155*** 0.060** 0.037 0.070*** 
(0.028) (0.029) (0.029) (0.016) 
High Education 0.183*** 0.085*** 0.082*** 0.094*** 
(0.028) (0.027) (0.023) (0.015) 
Midlands -0.019 -0.034 -0.035 0.047* 
(0.047) (0.037) (0.034) (0.025) 
East 0.105 0.061 0.041 0.108*** 
(0.062) (0.041) (0.034) (0.022) 
London -0.006 -0.035 -0.016 0.029 
(0.037) (0.031) (0.028) (0.020) 
South 0.151** 0.067** 0.062** 0.077*** 
(0.047) (0.37) (0.027) (0.021) 
Wales*1 0.251 ** 0.068 0.059 0.083** 
(0.111) (0.092) (0.039) (0.039) 
Scotland -0.022 -0.072 0.039 0.043 
(0.074) (0.068) (0.051) (0.031) 
N. Ireland 0.046 0.108 -0.019 
(0.183) (0.076) (0.114) 
Asians 0.059** -0.069* -0.024 -0.097*** 
(0.029) (0.039) (0.017) (0.022) 
Black -0.018 -0.030 -0.191 *** 
-0.197*** 
(0.034) (0.039) (0.051) (0.030) 
Mixed & Others -0.122*** -0.129*** -0.098*** -0.040** 
(0.031) (0.046) (0.030) (0.017) 
Year 2001 -0.092** -0.057 -0.047 
-0.053*** 
(0.039) (0.037) (0.027) (0.016) 
2002 -0.057 -0.004 -0.026 
-0.047** 
(0.044) (0.039) (0.027) (0.019) 
2003 -0.065 0.022 -0.044 
-0.080*** 
(0.043) (0.038) (0.028) (0.020) 
2004 -0.028 -0.043 -0.032 
-0.018 
(0.043) (0.038) (0.027) (0.017) 
2005 -0.023 0.025 -0.039 
-0.041 ** 
(0.042) (0.035) (0.026) (0.017) 
No. of Dependent -0.047*** -0.026*** -0.029*** 
-0.007 
Children (0.011) (0.009) (0.010) 
(0.005) 
Years since 0.029*** 0.006*** 0.008*** 
0.002 
Migration (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
(0.001) 
No. of Observations 1617 1455 1386 
3581 
Adj R-squared 0.167 0.063 0.082 
0.081 
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Default categories are single, low education, living in North, white 
and year 2006, * p<O.l; ** P <0.005; *** p<O.Ol (two-tailed tests) . 
* 1 Wales and N. Ireland is the combined region for category I due to a small number of observatIons. 
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The effect of marriage is greatest for the mixed refugees category II and lowest for economic 
migrants. Similar effects are observed for refugees/asylum seekers and economic migrants. 
Regional effects vary for each category and are not very significant but the probabilities of 
employment are highest in the East, Wales, Midlands and the South for economic migrants, in 
the East for mixed refugees and economic migrants and in the South, Wales and N. Ireland for 
refugees and asylum seekers as the regions of Wales and N. Ireland have been combined for this 
category due to a small number of observations. 
The effect of education on employment by immigrant group indicates that returns are highest for 
refugees/asylum seekers. This effect varies across all other immigrant categories and the returns 
to education are least for mainly economic migrants both for medium and high education groups 
as compared to all other immigrant categories. For example, for refugees/asylum seekers 
compared to those with low levels of education, individuals with medium levels are 16 
percentage points and those with high levels are 18 points more likely to be employed. The 
equivalent figures for mainly economic migrants are 4 and 8 percentage points respectively. 
Ethnicity in general does not show significant differences but being from an Asian background 
actually increases the employability for refugees and asylum seekers relative to whites. All other 
ethnic backgrounds suffer some degree of disadvantage and are less likely to be employed as 
compared to reference category of whites. Again the disadvantage is highest for mixed and other 
groups, both refugees/asylum seekers and mixed refugees and economic migrants, categories I 
and II. They have around a 13 percentage point lower employment rate than whites after 
controlling for other characteristics. For the economic migrant categories, blacks appear to be the 
most disadvantaged. 
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Apart from a few cases, the year of interview dummies are not very significant. The number of 
dependent children and years since migration are significant for categories I-III of immigrants 
but not for economic migrants for whom employment is independent of both effects. This may 
be because economic migrants often arrive on the basis of work permits with a job offer before 
arrival or as highly skilled migrants and are more likely to be employed on arrival. The effect of 
years since migration is particularly strong for refugees/asylum seekers with an extra year in the 
UK increasing employment by 3 percentage points, compared with less than 1 percentage point 
for the other categories. 
4.6.3 Regression Estimates by Immigrant Category, Females 
Regression estimates for employment by female immigrant category are reported in Table 4.5. 
Age is significant for all female immigrant groups but this time the effect of age is greatest for 
mainly economic migrants unlike for males where it is weakest for mainly economic migrants. 
Marital status is not significant for female refugees and asylum seekers but is highly significant, 
decreasing the employment probabilities of female economic migrants. 
Regional dummies are not very significant for all immigrant categories apart from the South 
region, which is highly significant for refugees/asylum seekers and mixed refugees and 
economic migrants. A year since migration is important for all groups of female immigrants but 
it affects female refugees and asylum seekers most strongly again relative to other immigrant 
categories, with the impact being very similar to that observed for males. 
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Table 4.5 
Regression Estimates for Em~loyment by Immigrant Catego!:Yi Females 
Refugees & Mixed Refugees & Mainly Economic Economic Migrants AS'y"lum Seekers Economic Migrants Migrants 
Age 0.039*** 0.028*** 0.044*** 0.035*** (0.008) (0.004) (0.010) (0.006) 
Age Squared -0.010*** -0.030*** 
-0.050*** 
-0.050*** ((0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Married -0.011 -0.077** 
-0.075** 
-0.091 *** (0.026) (0.031) (0.029) (0.015) 
Medium Education 0.168*** 0.102*** 0.121*** 0.074*** (0.025) (0.027) (0.032) (0.018) 
High Education 0.193*** 0.076*** 0.138*** 0.074*** 
(0.025) (0.026) (0.030) (0.017) 
Midlands -0.014 0.065** 
-0.003 0.038 
(0.049) (0.030) (0.043) (0.028) 
East 0.132** 0.073 0.064 0.056** 
(0.059) (0.044) (0.047) (0.027) 
London -0.086** 0.011 -0.005 
-0.035* 
(0.036) (0.027) (0.036) (0.021) 
South 0.138*** 0.144*** 0.060 0.054** 
(0.049) (0.036) (0.040) (0.023) 
Wales*1 0.027 0.222** 0.103 0.024 
(0.098) (0.092) (0.090) (0.045) 
Scotland -0.016 0.013 0.057 0.076** 
(0.071) (0.067) (0.72) (0.032) 
N. Ireland 0.258 0.179 0.163** 
(0.163) (0.122) (0.075) 
South Asians -0.022 -0.316*** -0.143*** -0.182*** 
(0.032) (0.044) (0.029) (0.022) 
Black -0.076** 0.091 ** -0.006 -0.174*** 
(0.030) (0.045) (0.045) (0.027) 
Mixed & Others -0.156*** -0.195*** -0.113*** -0.110*** 
(0.028) (0.049) (0.035) (0.019) 
Year 2001 -0.016 -0.129*** -0.088** -0.049** 
(0.036) (0.034) (0.038) (0.020) 
2002 -0.017 -0.089** -0.076* -0.023 
(0.038) (0.037) (0.040) (0.016) 
2003 -0.047 -0.047 -0.015 -0.051** 
(0.039) (0.036) (0.039) (0.023) 
2004 0.004 -0.078** -0.040 -0.041 * 
(0.037) (0.037) (0.039) (0.023) 
2005 -0.036 -0.014 -0.037 -0.007 
(0.039) (0.035) (0.036) (0.021) 
No. of Dependent -0.096*** -0.072*** -0.098*** -0.150*** 
Children (0.010) (0.008) (0.004) (0.009) 
Years since 0.026*** 0.008*** 0.011 *** 0.012*** 
Migration (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) 
No. of Observations 1704 1582 1634 4635 
Adj R-squared 0.227 0.284 0.109 0.216 
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Default categories are single, low education, living in North, white 
and year 2006. * p<O.1; ** P <0.005; *** p<O.Ol (two-tailed tests) 
* 1 Wales and N. Ireland is the combined region for category I due to a small number of observations. 
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Regarding ethnicity, for all groups apart from refugees/asylum seekers, Asians are the most 
disadvantaged group, which is consistent with other findings e.g. Lindley (2002a). They are least 
likely to be employed, while the disadvantage is lowest for Black females. In contrast, female 
Black mixed refugees and economic migrants are actually more likely to be employed compared 
to the reference group of whites. 
Again human capital plays an important part in increasing the chances of employment for 
immigrant females. As with male immigrants, the returns to education are greatest for refugees 
and asylum seekers but this time they are least for economic migrants. For economic migrant 
females returns are actually the same for medium and high education groups. For refugees and 
asylum seekers females with high education are almost 20 percentage points more likely to be in 
employment compared to those with low levels of education, which is easily the highest of all 
immigrant groups. 
4.6.4 Multinomial Logit Estimates for Different Job Types for Males and Females 
Multinomial logit estimates and robust standard errors for employment types are reported in 
Table 4.6. Employment types are split into 3 categories i.e. permanent jobs, temporary jobs and 
self- employed. Taking immigrant males first, self-employment tendencies increase with age but 
at a decreasing rate as older and more experienced people are more inclined to be self employed. 
While married males are far more likely to be in permanent employment as compared to 
temporary employment. The number of dependent children also significantly increases self-
employment. 
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Table 4.6 Multinomial Logit Estimates for Different Job Ty f E I pes 0 mp oyment 
Males Females 
Temporary Self-Employed Temporary Self-Employed 
Age -0.073** 0.086*** 
-0.075** 
-0.000 (0.034) (0.032) (0.037) (0.052) 
Age Squared 0.010** 
-0.008* 0.080 0.040 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Married -0.405*** 
-0.029 
-0.306*** 0.118 (0.108) (0.1 03) (0.097) (0.l34) 
Medium Education 0.362*** 0.146 0.410*** 
-0.099 (0.130) (0.100) (0.l34) (0.158) 
High Education 0.514*** 
-0.154 0.590*** 0.232 
(0.118) (0.094) (0.128) (0.l39) 
Midlands -0.357* -0.234 
-0.345* 
-0.175 
(0.170) (0.163) (0.179) (0.276) 
East -0.396** -0.168 
-0.503*** 
-0.177 
(0.179) (0.171) (0.173) (0.260) 
London -0.415*** 0.264** 
-0.569*** 0.517*** 
(0.128) (0.118) (0.l33) (0.193) 
South -0.364** 0.035 -0.771 *** 0.065 
(0.149) (0.135) (0.151) (0.211) 
Wales 0.309 -0.037 0.087 -0.404 
(0.255) (0.304) (0.284) (0.485) 
Scotland 0.140 0.234 0.097 0.239 
(0.215) (0.247) (0.214) (0.296) 
N. Ireland 0.559 0.243 -0.067 -0.354 
(0.461) (0.632) (0.465) (1.053) 
South Asians -0.004 -0.440*** 0.053 -0.595*** 
(0.128) (0.105) (0.l35) (0.171) 
Black 0.366** -1.267*** 0.201 -1.602*** 
(0.152) (0.165) (0.153) (0.277) 
Mixed & Others 0.323*** -0.674*** 0.156 -0.431 ** 
(0.127) (0.129) (0.129) (0.165) 
Year 2001 0.429*** 0.042 0.665*** -0.067 
(0.133) (0.124) (0.143) (0.179) 
2002 0.128 -0.071 0.330* -0.022 
(0.154) (0.137) (0.162) (0.199) 
2003 0.083 0.121 0.242 0.055 
(0.159) (0.131) (0.162) (0.194) 
2004 -0.041 * -0.132 0.211 0.299 
(0.152) (0.131) (0.164) (0.178) 
2005 0.066* -0.082 0.278* 0.171 
(0.143) (0.125) (0.153) (0.182) 
No. of Dependent Children -0.039 0.096** -0.033 0.248*** 
(0.035) (0.038) (0.047) (0.078) 
Mixed Refugees & Economic Migrants -0.417** 0.036 -0.214 0.495* 
(0.162) (0.129) (0.190) (0.264) 
Mainly Economic Migrants -0.129 -0.304** -0.224 0.533** 
(0.146) (0.135) (0.163) (0.225) 
Economic Migrants -0.432*** -0.365*** -0.330** 0.389** 
(0.137) (0.114) (0.146) (0.192) 
Years since Migration -0.114*** 0.089*** -0.114*** 0.050*** 
(0.014) (0.008) (0.014) (0.0l3) 
No. of Observations 6344 5222 
.!seudo R-squared 0.066 0.069 
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Default categories are single, low education, living in North, white, 
year 2006, in permanent employment and refugees and asylum seekers (Category 1). * p<O.I: ** p <0.005; *** 
P<O.OI (two-tailed tests) 
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Education is not a strong predictor of self-employment status, reflecting heterogeneity amongst 
self-employment occupations (Clark and Drinkwater, 2002). However, higher levels of education 
do increase the probability of temporary employment both for males and females. This is a 
somewhat surprising result and requires further investigation. It could be that more highly 
educated immigrants enter the UK on short-term employment contracts, remembering that a 
higher proportion of less educated have been excluded from this analysis because they are not in 
employment. In terms of region, self-employment is most and temporary employment is least 
likely in London. After controlling for other factors significant differences remain for all ethnic 
communities. Self-employment probabilities are lower for all ethnic groups compared to whites 
but are by far the lowest for Black immigrants. Comparatively, Black and mixed and other ethnic 
groups are more likely to be in temporary employment as compared to whites. Years since 
migration reduce the likelihood of being temporarily employed and increase the probability of 
self-employment. 
All three categories of male immigrants (i.e. category II-category IV) are less likely to have 
temporary jobs as compared to the reference category of refugees and asylum seekers and this 
effect is significant at least at the 5% level for mixed refugees/economic migrants and economic 
migrants whilst, self-employment is significantly higher for refugees and asylum seekers than for 
either mainly economic or economic migrants. The estimates for females are fairly similar to 
those for males but there are some notable exceptions. Age is not a significant determinant of job 
type. Whilst for immigrant group, all three other categories are significantly more likely than 
refugees/asylum seekers to be self-employed for females. However, as with males, 
refugees/asylum seekers have a higher chance of being in temporary employment but this only 
significant at the 5% level compared to economic migrants. 
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4.7 Conclusion 
The employment analysis shows that refugees/asylum seekers do worst in terms of having a job 
compared to other categories of immigrants. This demonstrates that there are significant 
differences in the performance of immigrants in the UK labour market and both categories of 
economic migrants perform substantially better than refugees/asylum seekers in terms of 
employment. Employment outcomes of immigrants are also greatly influenced by different 
factors, especially education, location, ethnicity and years since migration. 
Ethnicity plays a vital role in determining employment and non-white immigrants suffer more 
than white-immigrants, which may be due to discrimination or language difficulties. Mixed and 
other males and Asian females are the most disadvantaged groups and have poor employment 
outcomes. Education as is usually the case has a powerful influence on employment. The 
separate results for education and migrant categories show that the highest returns to education 
for employment are experienced by refugees/asylum seekers. A year since migration has the 
largest effect for refugees/asylum seekers, indicating that assimilation is the greatest for this 
group of immigrants. However, the quality of jobs is important and the multinomial estimates 
suggest refugees/asylum seekers males are less likely to have permanent jobs and be self 
employed for males compared to economic migrants. The heterogeneity of labour market 
outcomes for immigrants in the UK emphasises that the policy focus should target the welfare of 
different migrant and ethnic groups (Clark and Drinkwater, 2007). 
However, only employment outcomes have been analysed in this chapter. Therefore, building on 
these findings the next chapter will focus on the performance of different immigrant groups 
whilst in employment and the factors responsible for generating earnings differentials. 
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Appendices 4 
Appendix 4.1 List of Asylum Sending Countries 
,is Country No. of Asylum Refugee-Business Category 
ode Applications Ratio (2000-2006) I, II, III,IV 
UK UK Born 
Ireland IV 
Channel Islands IV 
Isle of Man 
Australia 0 IV 
Canada 0 IV 
New Zealand 0 IV 
Kenya High in Mid 1990s 1-5 II 
Uganda High in early >5 1>=1989 
1990s & 2000 
Tanzania High 1993-96 1-5 I: 1989-1996 
II >=1997 
Malawi 
Zambia <1 III 
Zimbabwe Nothing until 
1996, V. high since <1: 2000 & 2006 IV: 1989-96 
then, especially >1:2003 11>=1997 
early 2000s 
Botswana 
Gambia High 1995-97 II >=1989 
Lower since then 
Ghana V. High in early 1-5: 2000 & 2006 I: 1989-96 
1990s <1: 2003 II >=1997 
Lower since then 
Nigeria V. high in mid-90s <1:2000 
& high since then 1-5: 2003 & 2006 II >=1989 
Sierra Leone V. High until 2002 >5 1>=1989 
Barbados IV 
Jamaica Nothing until 1996 >5:2000 IV: 1989-95 
High in Early 2000 <1: 2003 & 2006 111>=1996 
32 Trinidad & Tobago, 
West Indies, Caribbean, IV 
Belize, & Guyana 
Nothing until <1:2000 
Bangladesh 1997, Quite high 1-5: 2003 & 2006 IV: 1989-96 
till 2003, lower II >=1997 
since then 
India Generally quite <1 III 
high, especially in 
mid 1990s 
Sri Lanka V. high especially >5: 2000 & 2006 1>=1989 
early 2000s 1-5: 2003 
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:FS Country No. of Asylum Refugee-Business Category 
'ode Applications Ratio (2000-2006) I, II, III,IV 
- Hong Kong, Malaysia <1 &0 ;-38 IV 
& Singapore 
1-44 Gibraltar, Malta, 
Seychelles, Mauritius & 0 IV 
Other New 
Commonwealth 
Algeria High 1994-2002 >5 1>=1989 
Lower since then 
Morocco 1:2000 III 
<1 2003 & 2006 
Tunisia >5:2000 II 
1: 2003 & 2006 
Libya 1-5: 2000 & 2006 II 
<1 : 2003 
-50 Egypt & South Africa <1 III 
Other Africa Fairly large >1 II 
number each year 
-54 USA, Caribbean & <1 IV 
other America 
Ecuador II 
Pakistan High till 2002 1-5 : 2000 & 2006 II 
Lower since then <1 : 2003 
Burma 
China V. High since 1997 <1 III 
-60 Japan & Philippines <1 IV 
Vietnam Nothing until 1996 1>=1997 
High from 2001 
Iran V. High in early >5 1>= 1989 
2000s 
Israel <1 IV 
Other Middle East High in early 2000 >5 II 
Other Asia High 1994-2002 >5 II 
Lower since then 
·73 Western Europe IV 
Albania Nothing till 1991. 
High 1997-02 >5: 2006 1>= 1991 
Lower since then 
Bulgaria 1989-97 <1 I 1989-97 
Nothing after that IV >=1998 
Germany IV 
Czechoslovakia 1-5 : 2000 I : 1989-99 
0: 2003 IV: >=2000 
Hungary IV 
Poland High in late 1990s <1 I : 1989-99 
Nothing after 2000 IV >=2000 
-
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- Country No. of Asylum Refugee-Business ,FS Category 
ode Applications Ratio(2000-2006) I, II, [II,IV 
- Romania High in late 1990s 1 : 2000 ~ I : 1989-99 
& early 2000s <1 : 2003 & 2006 III >=2000 
-88 Other Western IV 
European Countries 
Yugoslavia, Other & High from 1992-99 >5 1>= 1989 
Former Yugoslavia Nothing after that 
Iceland IV 
Turkey V. High until 2003 >5 1>= 1989 
Lower since then 
Former USSR High in late 1990s 1-5 II 
Rest of the World 
Angola High in early >5 1>=1989 
2000s 
Ethiopia High in early 90s >5 1>=1989 
Somalia High throughout >5 1>=1989 
Zaire High in early 90s, I: 1989-97 
Nothing after 1997 
0 Cuba 
1-104 Mexico, Argentina, <1 IV 
Brazil & Chile 
5 Columbia High in late 1990s 1-5 : 2000 II 
>5 : 2003 & 2006 
~ Uruguay IV 
7 Venezuela <1 IV 
~ Iraq High in late 1990s >5 1>=1989 
and early 2000s 
High in early >5: 2000 
Lebanon 1990s, Nothing >5 : 2003 & 2006 II 
after that 
~ Bali, Timor etc I 
l Korea 0 IV 
!·115 Macao, Liechtenstein, IV 
Andorra, Belarus 
~ Bosnia I 
7 Croatia >5 : 2000, 2006 I 
1-5: 2003 
~ Czech Republic High 1997-99 1-5 : 2000 I :1989-1999 
<1 : 2003 IV >=2000 
~ Estonia <1 I :1989-1999 
IV >=2000 
Macedonia Fairly low 1997- 1>=1997 
2000 
Lithuania >5: 2000 I : 1989-2003 
1-5 : 2003 IV >=2004 




- Country No. of Asylum 
.FS Refugee-Business Category 
()de Applications Ratio(2000-2006) I, II, III,IV 
- Moldova Some from 1997, <1 3 I : 1997-2006 
High in early 2000 
5 Slovak Republic I : 1989-1999 
6 Slovenia 
IV >=2000 
I : 1989-1999 
IV >=2000 
7 Ukraine Nothing until 1995 I : 1997 -1999 
High 1996-2003 111>=2000 
8·129 San Marino & Vatican IV 
city 
0 Sudan High in early >5 : 2000 & 2003 I 
1990s 1-5 : 2006 
1 Cambodia I 
Z Indonesia 0 IV 
J·136 Micronesia, Miquelon, IV 
Greenland, Bermuda 
7 Taiwan 0 IV 
~ Laos I 
) Afghanistan High in late 1990s >5: 2006 1>=1989 
& early 2000 
} Thailand <1 IV 
l·142 Former soviet states 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, V. High in late >5 I : 1989-2000 





Category I: Refugees and asylum seekers Rb-ratio >5 
Category II: Mixed Refugees and Economic Migrants Rb-ratio 1 - 5 
Category III: Mainly Economic Migrants Rb-ratio 0< & < 1 
Category IV: Economic Migrants Rb-ratio = 0 
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Appendix 4.2: Distribution in Each Category by Country 
Category I Percentage Category II Percentage Category III Percentage 
Uganda 2.80% Kenya 6.34% Zambia 2.78% 
Tanzania 1.06% Tanzania 0.460/0 Jamaica 4.64% 
Ghana 3.77% Zimbabwe 11.68% India 46.49% 
Sierra Leone 2.18% Gambia 1.14% Morocco 2.03% 
Sri Lanka 11.23% Ghana 3.29% Egypt 1.86% 
Algeria 2.56% Nigeria 12.04% South Africa 29.70% 
Vietnam 0.53% Bangladesh 10.47% China 7.59% 
Iran 6.28% Cyprus 1.79% Romania 1.83% 
Albania 2.06% Tunisia 0.52% Russia 2.42% Federation 
Bulgaria 0.71% Libya 1.40% Ukraine 0.98% 
Czechoslovakia 0.44% Other South 2.41% America 
Poland 4.04% Pakistan 35.36% 
Romania 1.18% other middle east 5.07% 
Yugoslavia 7.46% Other Asia 2.80% 
Turkey 12.15% former USSR 1.21% 
Angola 2.06% Columbia 2.41% 




















Former USSR 0.70% 
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Table A4.2 Continued: 
Category IV Percentage Category IV Percentage 
Ireland, 7.87% Netherlands 1.86% 
Australia 6.44% Gennany 5.17% 
Canada 2.49% Bulgaria 0.61% 
New Zealand 3.46% Czechoslovakia 0.20% 
Zimbabwe 1.15% Hungary 0.53% 
Barbados 0.19% Poland 6.35% 
Jamaica 1.01% Austria 0.39% 
Trinidad and Tobago 0.76% Switzerland 0.52% 
West Indies 0.19% Greece 1.20% 
Caribbean 0.56% Portugal 4.06% 
Belize 0.04% Spain 3.06% 
Guyana 0.36% Finland 0.75% 
Bangladesh 5.13% Norway 0.61% 
Hong Kong 2.00% Sweden 1.35% 
Malaysia 1.34% Iceland 0.15% 
Singapore 0.40% Mexico 0.36% 
Cyprus 0.02% Argentina 0.31% 
Gibraltar 0.05% Brazil 1.57% 
Malta 0.17% Chile 0.15% 
Seychelles 0.06% Uraguay 0.06% 
Mauritius 0.77% Venezuela 0.21% 
Other New Commonwealth 0.45% Korea 0.69% 
Other Africa 3.97% Macao, Macau 0.14% 
United States 7.54% Belarus 0.11% 
Caribbean 0.11% Czech 0.68% 
Other Central America 0.13% Estonia 0.08% 
Japan 2.27% Lithuania 0.82% 
Philippines 5.24% Latvia 0.30% 
Israel 0.44% Slovak Republic 1.31% 
Belgium 0.82% Slovenia 0.01% 
Denmark 0.83% Indonesia 0.31% 
France 5.59% Bennuda 0.01% 




Appendix 4.3: Probit and Logit Estimates for Employment for Males and Females 
Probit Logit 
Males Females Males Females 
Age 0.126*** 0.133*** 0.219*** 0.229*** (0.012) (0.013) (0.021) (0.021) 
Age Squared -0.002*** 
-0.002*** 
-0.003*** 
-0.003*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Married 0.307*** -0.245*** 0.533*** 
-0.392*** 
(0.046) (0.035) (0.081) (0.059) 
Medium Education 0.331 *** 0.369*** 0.570*** 0.607*** 
(0.044) (0.037) (0.076) (0.063) 
High Education 0.475*** 0.388*** 0.831 *** 0.634*** 
(0.041) (0.035) (0.072) (0.059) 
Midlands -0.010 0.076 
-0.025 0.122 
(0.063) (0.058) (0.109) (0.097) 
East 0.386*** 0.263*** 0.693*** 0.426*** 
(0.079) (0.062) (0.144) (0.1 05) 
London 0.009 -0.062 0.006 
-0.115 
(0.050) (0.044) (0.088) (0.075) 
South 0.394*** 0.277*** 0.709*** 0.455 
(0.065) (0.052) (0.120) (0.088) 
Wales 0.422** 0.245** 0.769** 0.439** 
(0.151) (0.116) (0.286) (0.201) 
Scotland 0.031 0.222** 0.043 0.368** 
(0.097) (0.083) (0.171) (0.142) 
N. Ireland 0.274 0.565** 0.442 0.905** 
(0.276) (0.202) (0.496) (0.343) 
South Asians -0.174*** -0.569*** -0.280** -0.946*** 
(0.050) (0.041) (0.089) (0.070) 
Black -0.341 *** -0.125** -0.574*** -0.206** 
(0.058) (0.048) (0.104) (0.081) 
Mixed & Others -0.374*** -0.424*** -0.655*** -0.707*** 
(0.049) (0.041) (0.085) (0.070) 
Year 2001 -0.294*** -0.221 *** -0.515*** -0.361*** 
(0.056) (0.047) (0.101) (0.079) 
2002 -0.199** -0.172*** -0.346** -0.281 *** 
(0.063) (0.052) (0.113) (0.087) 
2003 -0.253*** -0.166*** -0.426*** -0.267** 
(0.063) (0.052) (0.113) (0.087) 
2004 -0.153** -0.143** -0.266** -0.231 ** 
(0.062) (0.051) (0.111) (0.087) 
2005 -0.136** -0.046 -0.223** -0.063 
(0.059) (0.049) (0.107) (0.084) 
No. of Dependent Children -0.090*** -0.412*** -0.176*** -0.722 
(0.018) (0.020) (0.032) (0.029) 
Mixed Refugees & Economic Migrants 0.410*** 0.277*** 0.694*** 0.467*** 
(0.053) (0.052) (0.091) (0.087) 
Mainly Economic Migrants 0.799*** 0.668*** 1.378*** 1.117*** 
(0.058) (0.051) (0.104) (0.087) 
Economic Migrants 0.676*** 0.508*** 1.171*** 0.839*** 
(0.046) (0.041) (0.080) (0.068) 
Years since Migration 0.035*** 0.042*** 0.064*** 0.072*** 
(0.005) (0.004) (0.008) (0.006) 
No. of Observations 8039 9555 8039 9555 
_Pseudo R-squared 0.141 0.207 0.141 0.209 
148 
Appendix 4.4 
Marginal Probabilities for key variables* (Males) 
LPM PROBIT LOGIT 
Medium Education 0.096*** 0.079*** 0.073*** 
(0.012) (0.009) (0.009) 
High Education 0.124*** 0.118*** 0.112*** 
(0.011) (0.009) (0.009) 
Years since 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 
Migration (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Mixed Refugees & 0.141 *** 0.092*** 0.083*** 
Economic Migrants (0.016) (0.010) (0.009) 
Mainly Economic 0.227*** 0.156*** 0.143*** 
Migrants (0.015) (0.008) (0.008) 
Economic Migrants 0.206*** 0.167*** 0.158*** 
(0.014) (0.011) (0.010) 
Marginal Probabilities for key variables* (Females) 
LPM PROBIT LOGIT 
Medium Education 0.121 *** 0.143*** 0.146*** 
(0.012) (0.014) (0.015) 
High Education 0.129*** 0.152*** 0.154*** 
(0.011) (0.014) (0.014) 
Years since 0.012*** 0.016*** 0:018*** 
Migration (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Mixed Refugees & 0.087*** 0.107*** 0.112*** 
Economic Migrants (0.016) (0.019) (0.020) 
Mainly Economic 0.219*** 0.246*** 0.251 *** 
Migrants (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) 
Economic Migrants 0.170*** 0.198*** 0.204*** 
(0.013) (0.016) (0.016) 
* Note: The LPM used here and OLS model in text are the same. 
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Chapter 5 
Earnings and Occupational Attainment of Refugees and Asvlum Seekers 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter focused on the economic activity and employment of refugees/asylum 
seekers and confirmed that significant differences are present between the labour market 
performances of immigrant groups. This chapter will examine the earnings gap between different 
immigrant categories (as described in the previous chapter). Along with employment, earnings 
are another important indicator of labour market success so it is important to analyze the 
earnings differentials between different immigrant groups such as refugees/asylum seekers and 
economic migrants and also to investigate if any double disadvantage exists for female refugees 
and asylum seekers. 
Based on previous evidence, it is expected that earnings differentials will be directly linked with 
differences in the education, skill, social, demographic and cultural background of immigrants. 
These factors may affect wages in one way or another resulting in advantages or disadvantages 
for the particular immigrant group as immigrants assimilate in host societies in terms of their 
. . 
earnings and occupational attainment. Along with economic motives and SOCIOeconomIC 
background, ethnicity has a separate impact on labour market considerations. 
In the same way as the employment gap is associated with ethnicity, research has shown that 
different ethnic groups assimilate differently in the labour market as compared to whites, in 
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terms of their earnings. Therefore this study will explore further the difference in earnings across 
different ethnic groups, given that the earnings assimilation has been one of the main concerns 
for economists interested in migration. 
The study will also look at another measure of employment success i.e. occupational attainment. 
Occupation is broadly defined as the job or profession which a person adopts to earn a livelihood 
and whatever he earns is directly linked with the type of occupation adopted. The choice of 
occupation has a direct impact on an individual's earnings and earnings may vary with the 
occupation and in this regard, implying that occupational analysis cannot be ignored in assessing 
labour market performance of a person. Nickell (1982) regards a person's occupation as a 
portrayal of his general well-being such as his health condition, language usage, food taste, 
clothes, cars, and his position in society and being in high level occupation means a chance to 
earn a high income. 
Conversely, a low level occupation is related with poor rewards and less opportunities. 
Occupational analysis is also very important in the other disciplines. For example an extensive 
literature in sociology has investigated how educational achievements and other individual 
characteristics affect a person's achieved socio-economic status. For example, Blau and Duncan 
(1967) is one of the classic studies in sociology. 
Finally, not all the individuals interviewed in the LFS answer the earnings questions, some may 
misrepresent their earnings or sometimes earnings proxies are used instead. So because of 
measurement error and missing observations in the earnings data it seems appropriate to examine 
occupational attainment as well as another measure of success at work. 
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5.2 Empirical Literature Review 
There has been extensive research on the earnings assimilation of immigrants from different 
perspectives. An immigrant's integration and assimilation is of great concern for governments in 
the US, Europe, Asia to Australia for policy reasons. The study of immigrants' earnings 
assimilation was pioneered by Chiswick (1978) following his examination of the US labour 
market using cross sectional regression analysis. His findings were that the initial earnings of 
newly arrived immigrants were 17% less than native workers because of a lack of specific skills 
e.g. language and education but over time they accumulated country-specific human capital and 
their earnings grew at a rate faster than native born workers, eventually overtaking natives after 
around 14 years in the US. Borjas (1985) re-examined the Chiswick conclusion using a cohort 
analysis for the US and finds a slower rate of assimilation for immigrants and this decline in the 
earnings of earlier cohorts as compared to more recent cohorts can be attributed to the 
consequence of being from different waves of immigration. In particular, there was a decline in 
the characteristics of immigrants admitted to the US in the later part of his period of analysis. 
Hatton (1997) also discussed differences in the assimilation of pre-1890 immigrants. His 
findings were that immigrants who arrived as children had similar earnings profiles to the native-
born while those who arrived as adults suffered an initial earnings disadvantage but their 
earnings grew at a rate faster than the native-born. 
McDonald and W orswick (1998) looked at the earnings of immigrants in Canada and found that 
differences in job tenure were a significant factor in explaining the earnings gap relative to 
natives. Furthermore the rate of earnings convergence was also dependent upon the labour 
market or macroeconomic conditions on arrival for each immigrant cohort. Schaeffer (1995) 
presented a theoretical framework for the analysis of work effort and consumption of US 
immigrants relative to native born citizens and found that immigrants perform differently 
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because of externally imposed differences in incentives such as the monetary cost of moving, 
staying in touch with family and obligations left behind. In particular, immigrants outperfonn 
natives, and also that immigrants as well as the host society both invest in the assimilation 
process. Bratsberg and Ragan (2002) also support the fact that immigrants who acquire US 
schooling earn higher wages than other immigrants and this advantage is mainly due to greater 
educational attainment and higher returns to education for those who complete their schooling 
outside the US. Bleakley and Chin (2004) concluded that English language proficiency also 
significantly positively affected wages among adults who immigrated to the US as children 
although much of the English language skills are mediated by years of schooling. 
Chiswick and Miller (2002) analyze the impact of language fluency on U.S. immigrant earnings 
and find a 14% wage differential between fluent and non-fluent immigrants from non-English 
speaking countries. They also find some evidence of a complementary relationship between 
language ability and other forms of human capital. Various other US studies also show a positive 
relationship between language skills and immigrants success e.g. Chiswick (1993); Carliner 
(1995); White and Kaufman, (1997). Friedberg (2000) considers the source of human capital as 
the most important determinant of the earnings gap between immigrants and natives and that 
education obtained before migration is an important explanation of the initial earnings 
disadvantage of different immigrants including refugees and asylum seekers. She also concludes 
that experience and education obtained domestically is more valuable than human capital 
attained in the home country. 
British research confirms many of these broad findings for immigrants to the UK. Chiswick 
(1980) was the first study on the adaptation of immigrants to the UK labour market. He used the 
1972 General Household Survey (GHS) and found no significant earnings gap between white 
immigrants and non-white UK-born individuals, but a 25% gap between white UK-born and 
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non-white immigrants. He also finds no wage gap between white and non-white UK-born 
individuals, though the sample size for the latter group was quite small. Bell (1997) used the 
GHS for 1973-1992 and found that immigrants in the UK have on average more years of 
schooling and that this gap increased across successive cohorts. He also found black immigrants 
were the most disadvantaged group in terms of earnings but that this gap significantly decreases 
with the increase in the duration of stay in the UK. Shields and Wheatley-Price (1998) also 
report that UK labour market assimilation is dependent upon ethnicity and different socio-
economic characteristics. Most immigrants received lower returns to schooling obtained in the 
UK than native born whites and education obtained abroad was less valuable for all immigrants 
than that obtained in the UK. Whereas Battu and Sloane (2004) found that over education is 
higher and under education is lower for nonwhites relative to whites and their earnings 
regression results also confirm that there exist differences for returns to over-education, required 
education and under-education. They also found that UK born nonwhites have lower returns to 
required education compared to non-white immigrants and whites and receive no premium for 
over-education. 
Furthermore, potential UK expenence was more valuable for non-whites than all other 
immigrants. A lack of language fluency is also a part of economic disadvantage and acts as an 
incentive in the acquisition of the host country's language. Leslie and Lindley (2001) established 
in their study that the higher earnings of white natives in Britain are heavily influenced by their 
comparative advantage in terms of language. Both from a social and economic point of view, 
language is a separating barrier between immigrants and natives and actually facilitates 
discrimination and so plays an important role in widening the earnings gap between immigrants 
and natives. The presence of fluency related earnings gaps between ethnic minority immigrants 
and natives is also confirmed by Dustmann and Fabbri (2003, 2005). 
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In terms of refugees and asylum seekers, the empirical work of Khan (1997) analyzing both 
refugees and economic migrants found that refugees have a higher probability of investing in 
schooling than other foreign born immigrants but she analyzed only Cuban and Vietnamese 
refugees in the US. Also, in this regard the distinctive work by Cortes (2004) analyzes the 
differences in time horizons between refugees and economic immigrants and its effect on 
subsequent human capital investments and wage assimilation. Using the 1980 and 1990 
Integrated Public Use Samples of the US Census and comparing both groups, she finds that in 
1980 refugees earned less but after their arrival they made substantial gains and in 1990 
surpassed the earnings of economic immigrants and the greater accumulation of human capital 
actually contributed to the higher earnings of refugees. She concludes that refugees on average 
start at lower annual earnings but have faster earnings growth over time and have relatively 
higher country-specific human capital investment than economic migrants. A study of the Dutch 
labour market by Hartog and ZorIu (2005) found that during the first five years, higher education 
achieved at home does not payoff for refugees. A number of factors account for this such as 
language barriers, the equivalency of certifications of professional qualifications in the host 
country, an element of discrimination, either physical or mental distress for refugees and asylum 
seekers or social integration problems for other immigrants. 
For the UK, Lindley (2002a) undertook an analysis of the labour market performance of British 
refugees and economic migrants and finds that economic migrants self select into those who 
perform well in the labour market whereas refugees are the forced migrants and are relatively 
poor labour market performers. Ethnic comparisons show lower earnings and employment 
outcomes for non-whites, both for refugees and non-refugees immigrants. This implies 
significant differences between the labour market performance of these two groups and refugee 
earnings assimilation patterns differ from those of non-refugee immigrants. Lindley (2002a) also 
finds that a lack of fluency has a negative impact on the earnings of ethnic minority men and 
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women and there also exist significant unexplainable ethnic penalties for UK-born south Asians 
and non-whites, relative to native born whites with an underlying element of discrimination to 
this. 
The earnings of economic migrants and refugees are greatly influenced by their choice of 
occupation. As with earnings, one's occupational success in the labour market depends on a 
number of factors such as education, experience, skills and other expertise. For immigrants it 
includes some other factors, as they have to compete with natives, such as country-specific skills 
which can also be enhanced over time implying assimilation. Chiswick and Miller (2007) 
examine the determinants of occupational attainment and the impact of occupation on earnings 
both for native born and foreign born individuals using a longitudinal survey of immigrants to 
Australia. Their comparison shows an association between earnings penalties and less-than-
perfect transferability of human capital skills internationally and estimates of occupational 
attainment show that years of schooling and English language proficiency mainly determine 
access to high paying occupations. Similarly Shields and Wheatley-Price (2001) consider 
English language fluency as an important determinant of occupational success amongst British 
immigrants and an increase in the provision of English language training would reduce the 
employment gap by 10% between white natives and ethnic minorities in the UK. 
The study by Elliott and Lindley (2008) on UK immigrants suggests that higher and lower pay 
occupations have an overrepresentation of immigrants and there is an ethnic pay penalty even 
after taking into account occupational segregation. Their occupational segregation model has 
used LFS data for 1993-2003 and shows that white immigrants are overrepresented in the 
professional category and non-white immigrants in low paid occupations possibly having an 
element of ethnic-based discrimination which prevents those individuals from obtaining higher 
paying occupations. 
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The study here will attempt to add to the literature by differentiating between refugees and 
asylum seekers, mainly economic migrants and economic migrants to explore the earnings 
differentials between them using LFS data from 2001 to 2006. The focus will remain on refugees 
and asylum seekers and their performance will be compared with other immigrants to the UK 
using regression techniques separately by gender. The influence of characteristics such as 
ethnicity and education on the earnings of these immigrant categories will also be investigated. 
The determinants of occupation will also be analysed as an alternative measure of labour market 
success to earnings, although the influence of occupation on earnings will not be investigated. 
5.3 Data Sources 
As in the previous chapter, the main data source to be examined here is the LFS. This is because 
the LFS, the largest social survey carried out across the UK, contains information on the 
immigrant's country of origin, year of arrival in the UK, earnings, education and other socio-
economic characteristics. LFS data is again used from 2001 to 2006 as during this period the 
number of asylum applications filed in the UK reached its peak. 
Again only the working age population (16 to 59/64) excluding those in full time education are 
included in the sample. Furthermore it just includes employees and so excludes the self-
employed. LFS data is also used to construct an earnings variable. This has been widely used in 
the literature e.g. Dustmann and Fabbri (2005) and Clark and Lindley (2006) and has better 
information on low earners than other earnings data sources in the UK Gross hourly earnings 
from the LFS are deflated using the Retail Price Index (RPI) values from Economic Trends 
Annual Supplement 2006 edition, a measure of inflation, so that real earnings are used in the 
comparisons. 
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In the LFS, individuals sometimes either refuse to report their earnings or proxy respondents are 
used. So there are missing values or they are assigned imputed earnings by choosing a 
respondent with similar characteristics as non-respondents. Thus, earnings data have the 
drawback of measurement error due to missing observations and proxy earnings. Therefore, to 
complement earnings, an occupational analysis also becomes important, in order to compare the 
findings. The occupational classification is defined in the LFS using the NS-SEC measure. This 
is the National Statistics Socio-economic Classification (NS-SEC) which is an occupationally 
based classification and the grouped variable has eight classes. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, there is no indicator in the LFS that can be used to identify 
different types of immigrants e.g. asylum seekers/refugees and economic migrants. Therefore in 
order to construct four different categories of immigrants including asylum seekers/refugees, 
information on the migrant's country of origin and year of arrival from the LFS is matched with 
other data sources using information from the UNHCR's Global Refugee Trends and asylum 
statistics from the Home Office in the same manner as described in chapter 4. 
The following four categories of immigrants will be used in the following analysis; 
Category I: Refugees and asylum seekers 
Category II: Mixed Refugees and Economic Migrants 
Category III: Mainly Economic Migrants 
Category IV: Economic Migrants 
Key socio-economic variables will be agam be used as explanatory variables, as well as 
employment related variables. However, as discussed in the literature review, an important 
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determinant of earnings assimilation is language proficiency which unc'ortun t I ld 
' 1. a e y cou not be 
used as it is not available in the LFS on a consistent basis. 
5.4 Descriptive Statistics 
Given that socio-economic characteristics were analysed in the previous chapters, just the labour 
market characteristics of different immigrant categories are discussed below. 
5.4.1 Job Related Characteristics by Immigrant Category 
Males 
Table 5.1(a) displays descriptive statistics for job related characteristics including job tenure, 
firm size, sector and industry for different categories of male immigrants. The results are 
discussed separately for each gender excluding those who are self-employed and so the focus is 
just on those in the paid employment. 
In terms of industry, a similar percentage of all categories of immigrants work in production and 
manufacturing industries. Refugees/asylum seekers and the mixed category of male migrants are 
relatively highly concentrated in the retail sector, hospitality and transport/communications as 
compared to other industries, all of which tend to be low paying sectors. A higher proportion of 
both mainly economic and economic male migrants are found in finance/real estate, public and 
social services such as education and other services, including IT related office jobs. The 
percentage of economic migrants involved in health and social work is lowest among all 
migrants. 
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Table 5.1 (a) 
Job Related Characteristics by Immigrant Category; Males 
Refugees Mixed Mainly Economic 
Category & Refugees Economic Migrants Total Asylum &Eco Migrants 
Seekers Migrants 
1-Grouped Industries 
Production 0.00% 1.06% 1.02% 1.53% 1.22% 
Manufacturing/Supply 16.65% 19.45% 17.01 % 17.23% 17.48% 
Construction 4.79% 2.34% 5.18% 4.77% 4.44% 
Retail Industry 18.99 % 25.47 % 14.48 % 10.39 % 15.46 % 
Hospitality 15.26% 13.28% 8.13% 12.56% 12.21 % 
Transport/Communications 10.34% 10.31% 7.67% 8.19% 8.76% 
Finance/ Real estate 3.15% 4.36% 6.28% 8.05% 6.38% 
Public Admin! Education 6.94% 6.06% 6.28% 9.29% 7.82% 
Health / Social Work 8.45% 11.26% 15.43% 7.90% 10.01 % 
Other Services 13.11% 17.32% 20.33% 20.36% 18.81% 
2-Part Time 15.52% 17.970/0 7.10% 6.29% 9.75% 
3-Firm Size 
Less than 25 Employees 37.86% 40.54% 27.92% 30.26% 32.63% 
25-50 Employees 47.13% 45.69% 48.74% 50.90% 49.06% 
More than 50 Employees 15.01% 13.77% 23.35% 18.84% 18.31% 
4-Tenure 
Under 1 Year 33.04% 32.59% 35.34% 33.17% 33.48% 
2-5 Years 47.58% 52.03% 47.22% 45.14% 47.06% 
5-10 Years 15.43% 10.90% 13.73% 12.07% 12.67% 
10+ Years 3.95% 4.49% 3.71% 9.61% 6.79% 
5-Sector 
Private 84.74% 84.91% 79.76% 82.91% 82.90% 
Public 15.26% 15.09% 20.24% 17.06% 17.10% 
No. of Observations 793 941 1082 2746 5562 
A relatively high percentage of refugees/asylum seekers are part time (more than 15%), 
compared with well under 10% of economic migrants. Approximately a half of all immigrant 
males work in average size firms, having 25-50 employees, and have 2-5 years of job tenure, 
which is even more than 50% for mixed refugees and economic migrants. But a relatively large 
proportion of refugees/asylum seekers and mixed refugees are present in smaller firms, at around 
40%, whereas a higher proportion of economic migrant males are employed in larger firms, 
those which have more than 50 workers. 
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Economic migrants have the highest proportion with tenure of over 10 years, while over 80% of 
refugees/asylum seekers have less than 5 years tenure Again consistent wI·th fi . 
. Inn sIze, more 
than three quarters of immigrants work in the private sector, with the highest percentage amongst 
refugees and asylum seekers. 
Females 
lob-related characteristics for female immigrants are shown in Table 5.1 (b). These descriptive 
statistics show that health and social services is the most preferred industry for each of the 
female immigrant categories i.e. particularly for mixed refugees/economic migrants, in which 
more than a third work in this sector. Production and construction are the least preferred 
industries as less than 1 % of each category work in these industries. Female immigrants are also 
under-represented in the transport/communication industry, with around half the proportion seen 
here as compared to male immigrants. 
The proportion of economIC migrant women in finance and real estate is higher than 
refugees/asylum seekers, as was seen for males. For all other industries their distribution is more 
or less the same. A quarter of all immigrant females work part time, but again this is higher 
among refugees and asylum seekers, where more than one-third are in part time work. 
As with males nearly a half of females are employed in medium sized finns, with 25-50 
employees. Less than three-quarters work in the private sector but this is still the highest of all 
groups. The percentage in smaller firms with less than 25 employees is highest for refugees and 




Job Related Characteristics by Immigrant Category; Females 
Refugees Mixed Mainly Economic 
Category & Refugees Economic Migrants Total Asylum &Eco Migrants 
Seekers Migrants 
I-Grouped Industries 
Production 0.68% 0.18% 0.54% 0.52% 0.51% 
Manufacturing/Supply 10.09% 7.38% 9.74% 9.28% 9.26% 
Construction 1.54% 0.37% 1.62% 0.77% 0.98% 
Retail Industry 16.07% 12.36 % 11.80% 9.74% 11.17% 
Hospitality 9.06% 6.64% 5.30% 8.76% 7.91% 
Transport/Communications 5.98% 3.51% 4.65% 4.96% 4.86% 
Finance/ Real estate 4.96% 4.98% 8.23% 7.23% 6.90% 
Public Admin! Education 12.99% 14.76% 13.64% 16.06% 15.09% 
Health / Social Work 20.21% 34.69% 30.09% 20.73% 24.08% 
Other Services 17.44 % 15.13% 14.39% 21.95% 19.24% 
2-Part Time 33.22% 34.56% 23.30% 22.96% 25.53% 
3-Firm Size 
Less than 25 Employees 40.18% 39.030/0 29.98% 32.87% 33.87% 
25-50 Employees 44.29% 42.14% 49.43% 49.43% 48.02% 
More than 50 Employees 15.54% 18.83% 20.59% 17.70% 18.11 % 
4-Tenure 
Under 1 Year 30.48% 36.60% 38.19% 36.57% 36.15% 
2-5 Years 49.32% 51.39% 53.07% 47.78% 49.36% 
5-10 Years 15.75% 9.43% 6.69% 11.35% 10.78% 
10+ Years 4.45% 2.59% 2.05% 4.31% 3.71% 
5-Sector 
Private 75.51 % 69.06% 70.23% 71.37% 71.39% 
Public 24.49% 30.94% 29.77% 28.63% 28.61% 
No. of Observations 585 542 924 2865 4916 
5.4.2. Hourly Earnings 
It is important to have a look at raw statistics for the hourly earnings of both males and females 
immigrants before proceeding to any regression analysis to have a general idea of these 
differentials. The earnings data relates to gross hourly pay prior to any tax deductions and has 
been deflated using the RPI. Also, the number of observations is much lower than in the previous 
analyses because not all those in employment answer the earnings questions. The pattern of gross 
hourly earnings for both males and females is discussed below. 
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Males 
Table 5.2(a) shows gross hourly earnings for male immigrant categories. The hourly earnings are 
on average pretty similar for both categories I and II i.e. the refugee categories, but much higher, 
in relative terms, for categories III and IV i.e. the economic migrants. 
Table 5.2(a) 
Gross Hourly Earnings in £ by Immigrant Category; Males 
Variable -"Hourearn No.of Mean Std .Dev Min Max % with 
Obs. Earnings 
>£15 
Refugees & Asylum seekers 536 8.46 5.39 1.97 65.l5 10.26% 
Mixed refugees & Eco. Migrants 610 8.67 6.83 0.71 86.63 12.46% 
Mainly Economic Migrants 743 12.81 8.94 1.31 75.43 30.01% 
Economic Migrants 1845 12.86 12.03 0.l3 228.80 26.83% 
All Immigrants 3757 11.53 10.13 0.13 228.80 22.74% 
Average earnings of the economic migrant groups are over £4 an hour higher. As discussed 
previously, this may be because of the fact that they are self selecting in their objective to 
maximize their economic welfare and are more likely to be highly skilled and educated, in tum 
maximizing their chances of getting higher returns for their skills and education. This will be 
explored more fully in the regression analysis. 
Category III and IV immigrants also have far more dispersed earnings, especially for economic 
migrants due to the higher levels in professional and managerial jobs, also to be discussed later. 
The percentage of those with hourly earnings of more than £ 15 an hour is more than double for 
mainly economic and economic migrants as compared to asylum seekers and refugees. Almost 
one-third of mainly economic migrant males earn more than £15 an hour, while over a quarter of 
economic migrants earn over this amount, while this fraction is around one-tenth for both 
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categories I and II of refugees/asylum seekers. Their lower hourly wages indicate that they are 
more likely to do routine and semi routine jobs as shown by their high percentage in retail and 
hospitality industries, which will again be explored later in the occupational analysis. 
Females 
Female hourly earnings are presented in Table 5.2(b) and again the dispersion is quite high for 
economic migrants. Hourly earnings for categories I and II of refugees/asylum seekers and 
mixed immigrants are very similar to males but average earnings for females are much lower for 
mainly economic and economic migrants compared to their male counterparts. Thus the gap 
between the groups is narrower than seen for males. 
Table 5.2 (b) 
Gross Hourly Earnings in £ by Immigrant Category; Females 
Variable =Hourearn No.of Mean Std .Dev Min Max % with 
Obs. Earnings 
>£15 
Refugees & Asylum seekers 421 8.76 7.38 1.42 98.09 9.03% 
Mixed refugees & Eco. Migrants 371 8.36 4.54 0.68 32.29 7.01% 
Mainly Economic Migrants 675 9.69 5.85 0.27 47.81 14.37% 
Economic Migrants 2086 10.50 8.56 0.19 189.74 16.68% 
All Immigrants 3587 9.92 7.65 0.19 189.74 14.33% 
Also the percentage of females earning more than £ 15 an hour is lower than males for all four 
categories, but the differential is not great for refugees and asylum seekers between males and 
females. In contrast, this difference is quite high for mainly economic and economic migrant 
females as the percentage of females earning more than £ 15 an hour is around half that seen for 
their male counterparts. 
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5.4.3 Occupational Attainment 
Males 
Descriptive statistics for the occupational distribution of jobs are reported here in Table 5.3(a) 
for males for different immigrant categories. The statistics show that professional and elementary 
occupations have the highest percentages of immigrants in them. There are some differences 
between the groups, with refugees/asylum seekers concentrated in the latter occupation and 
economic migrants in the former. While personal services and administrative and secretarial jobs 
are the least preferred occupations for males, with the smallest fraction of refugees/asylum 
seekers in these categories as both require language fluency along with other skills. 
Table S.3(a) 
Occupational Attainment by Immigrant Category; Males 
Refugees Mixed Refugees Mainly Economic 
Category & Asylum & Eco .Migrants Economic Migrants Total 
Seekers Mif(rants 
Managers and Senior 7.83% 8.29% 13.14% 18.87% 14.39% 
Officials 
Professional 11.74% 12.96% 31.54% 19.82% 19.79% 
Occupations 
Associate Professional 7.59% 9.46% 10.08% 14.21% 11.71 % 
and Technical 
Administrative and 4.80% 5.95% 5.37% 4.52% 4.96% 
Secretarial 
Skilled Trade 14.52% 10.84% 8.88% 11.99% 11.55% 
Occupations 
2.59% 3.53% 3.38% Personal Service 2.40% 4.68% 
Occupations 
Sales and Customer 9.72% 7.12% 5.92% 3.57% 5.50% 
Service Occupations 
9.25% 7.50% 10.13% Process, Plant and 14.77% 14.88% 
machine Operatives 
13.23% 15.99% 18.58% Elementary 26.26% 25.82% 
Occupations 
No. of Observations 792 941 1081 2745 5559 
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The percentage in professional occupations is the highest for mainly economic and economic 
migrants and around one-third of mainly economic and one-fifth of economic migrant males are 
in such jobs. This is not that surprising as economic migrants who have a strong educational and 
professional background can easily fit into these jobs. Chiswick and Miller (2007) also found 
similar results for Australia, and agree that years of schooling and the proficiency in English are 
the key influential factors for the access to high paying occupations. 
Over 10% of immigrants from categories III and IV are in associate professional and technical 
jobs and a much higher percentage from categories I and II are in skilled trade or manual jobs 
such as process, plant and machine operative jobs. Refugees and asylum seekers are therefore 
much more concentrated in lower skilled occupations. For example, around 40% are in 
operatives or in elementary occupations, compared with less than a quarter of economic or 
mainly economic migrants. 
Females 
The occupational distribution of females by immigrant category is shown in Table 5.3(b). The 
table shows that the highest percentage of women is employed in professional and associate 
professional and technical jobs and personal services. The later category was the least preferred 
type of job for males. 
Again there are large differences by immigrant category. Mainly economic and economic female 
migrants are more inclined towards associated professional or technical jobs and the highest 
.. d·· (C t II) are in personal service proportIon of mIxed refugees an economIC mIgrants a egory 
occupations, as more than 20% of each category are in these occupations. 
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Table 5.3(b) 
Occupational Attainment by Immigrant Category; Females 
Refugees Mixed Mainly Economic 
Category & Asylum Refugees & Economic Migrants Total Seekers Eco. Mif(rants Mif(rants 
Managers and Senior 7.34% 4.05% 6.69% 10.51% 8.70% 
Officials 
Professional 10.58% 10.31% 
Occupations 
17.80% 18.19% 16.34% 
Associate Professional 12.12% 17.50% 21.47% 19.87% 18.98% 
and Technical 
Administrative and 15.19% 16.94% 18.12% 14.70% 15.65% 
Secretarial 
Skilled Trade 1.71% 1.47% 1.19% 1.43% 1.42 % 
Occupations 
Personal Service 16.72% 21.55% 11.76% 12.88% 14.09% 
Occupations 
Sales and Customer 10.75% 10.87% 8.20% 6.88% 8.03% 
Service Occupations 
Process, Plant and 3.07% 3.31% 3.13% 2.93% 3.03% 
machine Operatives 
Elementary 22.53% 14.00% 11.65% 12.60% 13.76% 
Occupations 
No. of Observations 543 543 927 2864 4920 
On the other hand, similar to their male counterparts and consistent with other results, the highest 
percentage of female refugees and asylum seekers is seen in low level elementary jobs. The 
lowest percentage of each category is in skilled trade jobs, which is just a mere fraction, of less 
than 2%. At least 15% of each category, with the highest percentage seen for mainly economic 
migrants, is in administrative or secretarial jobs as women generally find office and secretarial 
work relatively easier, not normally requiring many specific skills. While personal service 
occupations are dominated by both refugee categories, with about 22% mixed refugees and 
economic migrant females in this occupation. 
Overall the results show that differentials exist for both males and females, though with similar 
findings for economic migrants and refugees and asylum seekers across the genders. Economic 
167 
migrants are more likely to have professional J·obs while refugees and asylum k 
' see ers are more 
involved in elementary level jobs. Personal services and administrative and secretarial jobs are 
more dominated by females, with relatively few male immigrants in these occupations. These 
differentials will be further examined using regression analysis in the following sections. 
5.5 Empirical Methodology 
Labour market outcomes for asylum seekers/refugees and economic immigrants in terms of their 
earnings and occupational success will now be compared using regression analysis. This study 
differentiates between asylum seekers/refugees and economic immigrants and investigates ethnic 
. 
variations and other differences within immigrant groups by focusing on differences in earnings 
and occupational achievements. Thus regression techniques are used to compare earnings and 
occupational attainment between the different categories of immigrants, with separate analysis 
for male and female immigrants. 
Earnings Equation 
Formal regression analysis is used to explore the determinants of earnings for immigrants and to 




InCY{) = Log hourly earnings 
X. = Set of control variables (e.g. age, education, region, marital status) 
I 
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P = Associated vector of coefficients for X-, 
lm.miYi = Set of dummies for Immigrant Category 
Yi = Associated vector of coefficients for ImmiOi 
ac. = Constant and Ei = Error Term 
Therefore, the coefficients in the vector Y give the difference in log earnings of other immigrants 
relative to asylum seekers/refugees, after controlling for other factors. Multiplying this 
coefficient by 100 gives approximately the percentage differential in earnings for a particular 
category. Earnings are estimated using a basic specification, including just socio-economic 
characteristics and an augmented specification which adds job related factors. 
Earnings differentials for different categories of immigrants will be estimated using Equation 
(5.1). As discussed in chapter 4, the empirical specification is based on some of the key papers in 
the literature including Wheatley-Price (2001), Lindley (2002a), Dustmann and Fabbri (2005) 
and Clark and Lindley (2006). 
Occupational Attainment Equation 
Given the categories of occupations used to classify occupational attainment, the observed 
dependent variable is of an ordered and categorical nature. The NS-SEC categorizes occupations 
into eight classes, as discussed previously in the descriptive statistics for occupational success. 
For the simplicity, these eight classes have been grouped into four job types i.e. routine, semi-
routine, intermediate and professional/managerial jobs. This occupational distribution is thus 
described on a 1-4 scale with 1 being lowest and 4 the highest. Therefore, an ordered response 
model is used for the occupational analysis. 
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The observed categorical dependent variable is related to occupation I tta' 
a a mment as follows: 
(5.2) 
where Or is an unobserved variable indicating the individual's occupational attainment. 
Individual characteristics are included as the explanatory variables and are represented by X and 
its associated coefficient vector by p. 7 
The latent dependent variable (On is related to the variable (OJ as follows: 
where the o's are the unknown parameters to be estimated jointly with,B. 
The logical order of alternative choices implies that ordered probit models which are estimated 
as an ordered response model, which is more parsimonious than an unordered model. The 
explanatory variables are the same as in the basic specification. The occupational attainment of 
different immigrant categories is estimated along with the effect of other variables. Marginal 
effects of being in professional/managerial occupations are also reported. The specification 
comprises of age in quadratic form and educational dummies. Education is again measured on 
the basis of age left full time education and is divided into three levels i.e. high, medium and low 
levels of education. 
7 For a detailed discussion of the application of an ordered probit model see Verbeek (2000) pp 190-194. 
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Equation (5.1) will be estimated using two sets of control variables for both males and females. 
Firstly, controls for ethnic origin, region dummies marital status year of· t· d 
' ,Ill ervlew an years 
since migration, as an indicator of assimilation, are included. Secondly, controls are also added 
for labour market variables such as industry, job tenure, firm size and sector to see their impact 
on earnings variations between different categories of immigrants. 
Separate estimates for each immigrant group and gender are also reported using the basic 
specification. Earnings estimates for all immigrant males and females with the workplace control 
variables are then presented. Robust standard errors are used and also the number of observations 
and adjusted R-squared statistics are reported at the end of each table. 
5.6 Regression Results for Earnings 
5.6.1 Earnings Estimates for Immigrant Males and Females 
Males 
Table 5.4 reports log hourly earnings estimates for an earnings regression for all immigrants and 
includes the migrant group dummies. The results are typical from those of standard wage 
equations, with more educated and experienced workers earning significantly higher wages and 
there being an earnings premium for those living in London. The estimates for males show that 
age, education, ethnicity and years since migration are quite important determinants of earnings. 
Age has a very significant positive but overtime decreasing impact on earnings and initially 
increases an individual's earnings by around 7%. Marital status is not significant for male 
immigrants, although the impact of being married is positive on earnings. 
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Table 5.4: Log Hourly Earnings Estimates for Earnings· Mid 
, a es an Females 
Males Females 
Age 0.069*** 0.105*** 
(0.008) (0.007) 






Medium Education 0.159*** 0.154*** 
(0.024) (0.023) 
High Education 0.492*** 0.413*** 
(0.023) (0.022) 
Midlands -0.007 0.028 
(0.033) (0.036) 
East 0.190*** 0.131*** 
(0.039) (0.038) 
London 0.208*** 0.245*** 
(0.028) (0.030) 
South 0.170*** 0.099*** 
(0.032) (0.031) 
Wales 0.008 0.115* 
(0.069) (0.067) 
Scotland 0.004 0.041 
(0.047) (0.046) 
N. Ireland 0.029 -0.019 
(0.118) (0.111) 
South Asians -0.382*** -0.212*** 
(0.025) (0.026) 
Black -0.326*** -0.151*** 
(0.031) (0.027) 
Mixed & Others -0.273*** -0.141 *** 
(0.029) (0.026) 
Year 2001 0.046 -0.073** 
(0.030) (0.029) 
2002 0.046 -0.033 
(0.032) (0.031) 
2003 0.045 -0.021 
(0.031) (0.031) 
2004 0.083** -0.017 
(0.031) (0.029) 
2005 0.022 -0.010 
(0.028) (0.028) 
Mixed Refugees & Economic 0.062* 0.158*** 
Migrants (0.032) (0.035) 
Mainly Economic Migrants 0.314*** 0.249*** 
(0.029) (0.032) 
Economic Migrants 0.132*** 0.195*** 
(0.027) (0.028) 
Years since Migration 0.011 *** 0.015*** 
(0.002) (0.002) 
No. of Observations 3671 3508 
Adjusted R-squared 0.296 0.236 
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses and default categories are single, low educated, living in the North, 
White, year 2006 and refugees and asylum seekers (Category 1). *p<O.1; ** P <0.05; *** p<O.Ol (two-tailed tests) 
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Region of residence also affects earnings, since as well as in London eaml·ng ··fi 1 
' s are slgm lcant y 
higher in the East and the South compared to the North. The earnings advantage is over 20% 
higher for those living in London as compared to the North. Being in the East and the South has 
an earnings premium of just less than that seen in London. Clark and Drinkwater (2007) find that 
living in London and the South East increases the probability of getting a 
professional/managerial position for an individual and this impact is greater for men than women 
which can be another obvious reason for locating in London, even if the cost of living is much 
higher there. 
Education plays a very important role in improving earnings as is obvious from the large positive 
returns to education for earnings. For example the hourly earnings of male workers are more 
than 16% higher for the medium education group and around 50% higher for highly educated 
group compared to the low education reference group. Years since migration are also positively 
associated with earnings, which is consistent with the Chiswick (1978) findings that immigrant 
earnings are initially lower and then over time grow as they assimilate into the host labour 
market. An extra year in the UK increases earnings by more than 1 %. Year dummies are not very 
significant for males and only year 2004 is significant at the 5% level reflecting real earnings 
premium for males in year 2004 as compared to reference year of 2006. This could be because of 
influx of Eastern Europeans to low wage jobs after 2004. 
All ethnic minority males have a significant earnings gap and earn less than comparable whites. 
Asians, Blacks, other and mixed groups earn significantly less and the difference in earnings is 
more than a quarter for all ethnic groups, especially for Asians male migrants who have the 
highest earnings disadvantage as they earn more than 35% less than the comparable category of 
whites. The estimates of the earnings of the immigrant categories are also what we might expect. 
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All immigrant categories for males have significantly higher earnings compared to asylum 
seekers/refugees, apart from the mixed refugees and economic migrant category, which is 
significant only at the 10% level. This confirms that refugees earn significantly less than 
economic immigrants in accordance with the results for raw hourly wages, even after controlling 
for characteristics. In particular, asylum seekers/refugees earn approximately 6% less than the 
mixed category, more than 30% less than mainly economic migrants and around 13% less than 
economic migrants. Mainly economic migrant males are the highest earning group among all 
immigrant categories, performing better than economic migrants after controlling for observed 
characteristics. 
Females 
The estimates for females show that age is relatively more important for females, with young 
females earning approximately 3% more than their male counterparts of the same age. Married 
females have a comparative disadvantage and their earnings are lower by around 3% as 
compared to singles, although this is only significant at the 10% level. As far as regions are 
concerned, immigrant females in the East, South and London and to some extent Wales have 
significantly higher earnings. For example, female immigrant workers in London earn around a 
quarter more than female workers in the north. All year dummies are not significant except for 
year 2001 which is significant at 5% level of significance and shows that females' real earnings 
are around 7% less for those interviewed in year 2001 as compared to the reference year of 2006. 
Similar to males, years since migration are also very significant for females, with a slightly 
greater impact seen compared to males. 
Like for males, education is very important for females and returns to education are far higher 
for both the medium and high education groups as compared to the low education group. In 
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Particular, they earn respectively around 15% and 40% more than the re-cer f I 11 ence group 0 ow 
education. Ethnic penalties also exist for females and they earn less than white females but this 
earnings differential is less for ethnic females than compared to males. The earnings 
disadvantage is nearly half as high for the Black and Other and mixed groups for females as 
compared to males. Earnings penalties are around 6% higher for Asian women as compared to 
Blacks and Other and mixed ethnic groups. 
Females from all other immigrant categories earn more than refugees and asylum seekers. 
Mainly economic migrant females have the highest earnings advantage, which is approximately 
10% more than the mixed refugees/economic migrants' category and 5% more than economic 
migrants and 25% more than the default refugee/asylum seeker category. Thus mainly economic 
migrants have a large advantage relative to refugees, and the mixed category a smaller 
disadvantage for females compared to males. 
A comparison between the results for males and females reveals that generally the signs and 
significance levels are similar for both genders but some differences are present. For example 
female refugees seem to do relatively worse in terms of earnings compared to the other 
categories of immigrants, although mainly economic migrant males have the largest advantage. 
Age, education, ethnicity and years since migration are roughly equally important for both 
genders. Returns to education are similar for both males and females for medium levels of 
education but slightly greater for highly educated males. Both genders suffer ethnic penalties but 
the differentials are about half as high for Black and Other and mixed ethnic females. South 
Asians are the most disadvantaged group both for males and females. Furthermore, mainly 
economic migrants are the most advantaged group among all immigrants for both males and 
females. 
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5.6.2 Estimates for Earnings by Immigrant Category, Males 
Earnings estimates for all four categories of male immigrants are reported in Table 5.5. The 
estimates show that earnings differentials are present among males of different migrant 
categories, some of which are due to differences in education, ethnicity, regions and years since 
migration along with other factors. As expected education, ethnicity and years since migration 
has a typical and similar influence on earnings for all categories of immigrants. Though 
somewhat surprisingly age has no significant effect on refugees/asylum seekers and mixed 
refugees and economic migrants but a highly significant effect for mainly economic and 
economic migrants, for whom age also increases earnings by a significant 8% initially. 
Marital status is also not important for the earnings of any of the immigrant groups. The highest 
returns to education are seen for economic migrants. For example for the medium education 
group, earnings adds around 5% more for economic migrants compared to the other categories of 
immigrants relative to those with no qualifications. While highly educated mainly economic 
migrants earn relatively more than all other immigrant groups and their earnings are more than 
60% higher than those with low education, nearly double the advantage compared to refugees 
and asylum seekers. Economic migrants in the high education group also have a similar, 
although slightly smaller earnings advantage. 
Regional differences vary across the four immigrant categories. Earnings are significantly higher 
in the East, London and the South than in other regions both for mainly economic and economic 
migrants but for mixed refugees and economic migrants only for those living in the South and 
Northern Ireland region there is a significantly positive effect on earnings, where they earn 
approximately 16% more in the South as compared to the North. 
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Refugees & Asylum Mixed Refugees & Mainly Economic Economic Seekers Economic Migrants 
0.014 Migrants Migrants Age 0.029 0.076*** (0.015) (0.018) 0.081 *** (0.018) (0.014) Age Squared -0.080 
-0.020 
-0.080*** (0.000) (0.000) -0.080*** (0.000) (0.000) Married 0.028 
-0.047 0.059 (0.046) (0.057) 0.038 (0.047) (0.032) Medium 0.145*** 0.172** 0.140** 0.203*** Education (0.044) (0.049) (0.055) (0.041) High Education 0.365*** 0.321 *** 0.595*** 0.549*** (0.049) (0.051) (0.049) (0.039) Midlands -0.098 0.104 
-0.137* 0.015 (0.072) (0.071) (0.073) (0.052) East 0.106 0.108 0.188** 0.237*** (0.111) (0.076) (0.088) (0.060) London -0.007 0.083 0.112* 0.336*** (0.061) (0.057) (0.062) (0.045) South 0.040 0.162** 0.134** 0.198*** (0.072) (0.081) (0.065) (0.048) Walesl -0.141 0.064 0.095 
-0.015 (0.147) (0.198) (0.116) (0.105) Scotland -0.152 0.121 0.045 0.033 (0.152) (0.121) (0.114) (0.064) N. Ireland 0.407*** 
-0.016 
-0.147 








-0.445*** (0.055) (0.084) (0.068) (0.054) 





























(0.071) (0.067) (0.056) (0.043) 
Years since 0.023*** 0.012** 0.013** 0.012*** 
Migration (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.003) 
No. of 
Observations 534 607 738 1792 
Adjusted 
0.164 0.198 0.334 0.317 R-squared 
Note: Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Default categories are single, low educated, living in the North, 
white and year 2006. *p<O.1; ** P <0.05; *** p<O.OI (two-tailed tests) 
1 Wales and N. Ireland is a combined region for category I due to a small number of observations. 
For economic migrants the earnings advantage is around 10% higher in London than in the East 
and South while mainly economic migrants in the East have the highest earnings. 
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Years since migration has a stronger effect on the earnings of refugees and I k' 
asy urn see ers SInce 
their earnings increase by more than a 2% for an extra year in the UK For th th . f 
. e 0 er categones 0 
male immigrants, earnings increase by only around 1 % for each additional year. All ethnic 
groups earn less than whites but earnings differentials are smaller for ethnic minority refugees 
and asylum seekers and higher for other categories of economic migrants from all ethnic 
backgrounds. Asians males from the mixed migrant category and economic migrants have the 
largest earnings penalties and their earnings are around 50% lower than comparable white 
immigrants. Black economic migrants and mainly economic Mixed and other migrants are also 
very disadvantaged groups in terms of their earnings. Finally, the fit of the earnings equations is 
much better for categories III and IV compared to categories I and II. 
5.6.3 Estimates for Earnings by Immigrant Category, Females 
Estimates for log hourly earnings for female immigrant groups are presented in Table 5.6. From 
the table it can be seen that age, education and years since migration are also important 
determinants of female earnings in the different migrant groups. Age effects are highest for 
economic migrants and although being in a married relationship depresses earnings for all female 
immigrant groups but this is not significant for any of them. Similar to men, regional earnings 
differentials for refugees and asylum seekers and mixed refugees and economic migrant female 
categories are not significant for any area. While for mainly economic and economic migrants 
earnings are significantly higher in the East and South but the highest in London, as their 
earnings gains are around 30% higher compared to the North. The estimates for ethnicity and 
education in Table 5.6 show many significant differences. 
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Refugees & Asylum Mixed Refugees & Mainly Economic Economic Seekers Economic Migrants 
0.072*** Migrants Migrants Age 0.085*** 0.077*** (0.018) (0.021) 0.124*** (0.014) (0.011) Age Squared -0.090*** 
-0.010*** 
-0.010) *** (0.0002) (0.000) -0.010*** (0.000) (0.000) Married -0.001 
-0.073 
-0.050 (0.056) (0.055) -0.028 (0.046) (0.025) Medium 0.160*** 0.209*** 0.094* 0.170*** Education (0.059) (0.055) (0.049) (0.034) High Education 0.373*** 0.274*** 0.374*** 0.464*** (0.061) (0.057) (0.045) (0.032) Midlands 0.015 
-0.025 0.090 0.008 (0.128) (0.099) (0.086) (0.046) East -0.068 0.112 0.272** 0.122** (0.106) (0.109) (0.095) (0.051) London 0.086 0.079 0.277** 0.281 *** (0.097) (0.082) (0.081) (0.038) South -0.081 0.014 0.183** 0.104** (0.107) (0.082) (0.081 ) (0.038) Wales 0.114 0.181 0.279 0.037 (0.140) (0.207) (0.172) (0.087) Scotland 0.140 




















Others (0.064) (0.084) (0.058) (0.035) 








(0.098) (0.071) (0.069) (0.044) 
2003 0.095) 
-0.098 
-0.131 ** 0.018 









(0.079) (0.068) (0.061) (0.042) 
Years since 0.031 *** 0.005 0.012** 0.014*** 
Migration (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.003) 
No.ofObs 418 370 673 2047 
Adj R-squared 0.176 0.178 0.188 0.264 
Note: Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Default categories are single, low educated, living in the North, 
white and year 2006. *p<O.I; ** P <0.05; *** p<O.OI (two-tailed tests) 
1 Wales and N. Ireland is a combined region for category I due to a smaller number of observations. 
Again, returns are large for highly educated females. Highly educated female refugees/asylum 
seekers and mainly economic migrants have similar returns to education and their earnings are 
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around 40% higher than those with low education which is around 100 / th . d 
' /0 more an mlxe 
refugees and economic migrants but about 10% less than for highly educated economic migrants. 
Relative returns to medium levels of education are similar for refugees/asylum seekers and 
economic migrants but highest for the mixed refugees and economic migrant group who earn 
more than 20% more than comparable workers with low levels of education. 
The ethnicity results show differences between both refugees and economic migrants. Earnings 
of Asian females in categories II-IV are reduced roughly by a quarter as compared to white 
female immigrants. For female Asian refugees and asylum seekers there is a smaller earnings 
penalty Gust below 5%). The table clearly shows that the relative penalties are less for Asian 
females as compared to their male counterparts. Mainly economic Black migrants also suffer a 
large disadvantage. Earnings assimilate fastest for refugees/asylum seekers over time since an 
extra year in the UK increases earnings by 3%, the highest of all immigrant categories. Years 
since migration are not significant for the mixed refugees and economic migrant category, and 
just over 1 % for the two economic migrant categories. The year dummies are not significant 
apart from the mainly economic migrant category. 
To summarise, the main findings from the separate earnings estimates by immigrant group and 
gender indicate that returns to education are similar for both male and female immigrants and are 
greater for the highly educated as compared to those with lower levels of education. For both 
males and females, economic migrants have the highest rewards. Also there are large earnings 
ethnic penalties for some of the Asian and Black migrant groups. However, amongst Asian 
females, ethnic penalties are lowest for refugees and asylum seekers. Furthermore. years since 
migration have a more influential impact on refugees and asylum seekers than economic 
migrants both for males and females, suggesting more rapid earnings assimilation for this group. 
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5.6.4 Earnings Estimates for Males and Females with additional Workplace 
Controls 
Table 5.7 contains separate estimates for males and females for earnings including the additional 
workplace controls. These relate to grouped industry, tenure, firm size, sector and part time 
dummies which are added to the existing specification to see the influence of these controls 
compared to the earlier results. 
A companson of the results for males and females reveals that generally the signs and 
significance levels for most of the variables are similar to before, as reported in Table 5.4. 
However the impact and significance of some variables is reduced after additional controls are 
added e.g. for age, education and years since migration. In particular the advantage of highly 
qualified immigrants falls to just over 30% from over 40% when job-related characteristics are 
included. The patterns of regional and ethnic effects are very similar to before. The fit of the 
model also increases quite considerably as compared to the basic model, especially for males. 
F or males, employees in finance and real estate earn the most, while those in manufacturing, 
energy supply, retail industry, hospitality, transport and telecommunications earn less than the 
reference group of other services. Manufacturing, supply, Transport and communications 
workers earn around 20% less while Finance workers earn about 20% more than those in other 
services and those in hospitality have the highest earnings deficit of over 30%. Workers in the 
retail sector also earn around a quarter less than those in other services. Health and social care 
service workers enjoy a slight but not significant earnings premium. 
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Table 5.7: Earnings Estimates with Additional Controls; Males and Females 
Males Females 
Age 0.046*** 0.081 *** 
(0.008) (0.007) 






Medium Education 0.106*** 0.108*** 
(0.023) (0.022) 
High Education 0.331*** 0.323*** 
(0.023) (0.022) 
Midlands -0.017 0.031 
(0.031) (0.035) 
East 0.156*** 0.113** 
(0.037) (0.037) 
London 0.180*** 0.238*** 
(0.027) (0.030) 
South 0.152*** 0.113*** 
(0.031) (0.031) 
Wales -0.023 0.122* 
(0.063) (0.069) 
Scotland 0.022 0.088* 
(0.043) (0.046) 
N. Ireland 0.042 -0.006 
(0.109) (0.110) 
South Asians -0.317*** -0.174*** 
(0.025) (0.027) 
Black -0.299*** -0.156*** 
(0.028) (0.028) 
Mixed & Others -0.238*** -0.128*** 
(0.029) (0.024) 
Year 2001 0.050* -0.064** 
(0.028) (0.027) 
2002 0.023 -0.024 
(0.031) (0.032) 
2003 0.036 -0.024 
(0.028) (0.029) 
2004 0.076* -0.020 
(0.028) (0.028) 
2005 0.025 -0.009 
(0.026) (0.027) 
Production -0.112 -0.109 
(0.096) (0.134) 
Manufacturing/Supply -0.195*** -0.082** 
(0.032) (0.034) 
Construction -0.114** 0.119* 
(0.041) (0.069) 
Retail Industry -0.263*** -0.204*** 
(0.033) (0.032) 
Hospitality -0.358*** -0.279*** 
(0.032) (0.036) 
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Finance/ Real estate 0.207*** 0.165*** 
(0.049) (0.040) 
Public Admin! Education -0.060 
-0.049 
(0.046) (0.040) 
Health / Social Work 0.025 
-0.053* 
(0.043) (0.031) 
Part Time -0.209*** 
-0.131 *** 
(0.031) (0.022) 
Less than 25 Employee -0.261 *** 
-0.224*** 
(0.028) (0.028) 
25-50 Employee -0.152*** 
-0.099*** 
(0.024) (0.024) 
2-5 Years of Tenure 0.101 *** 0.128*** 
(0.019) (0.019) 
5-10 Years of Tenure 0.198*** 0.253*** 
(0.031) (0.034) 
10+ Years of Tenure 0.441 *** 0.179*** 
(0.051) (0.062) 
Public Sector -0.016 0.072** 
(0.037) (0.028) 
Mixed Refugees & Economic 0.049* 0.136*** 
Migrants (0.029) (0.034) 
Mainly Economic Migrants 0.224*** 0.189*** 
(0.027) (0.031) 
Economic Migrants 0.073*** 0.150*** 
(0.025) (0.028) 
Years since Migration 0.006** 0.009*** 
(0.002) (0.002) 
No. of Observations 3505 3366 
Adj. R-squared 0.413 0.331 
Note: Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Default categories are single, low educated, living in the North" 
white, year 2006, in other services, working full time, firm size of more than 50 employees, less than one year of 
tenure, in private sector and refugees and asylum seekers (Category 1). *p<O.l; ** P <0.05; *** p<O.Ol (two-tailed 
tests) 
Earnings increase as the firm size increases as is clear from Table 5.7, which is a standard 
finding in the literature possibly because of the union effect on wages, deferred compensation or 
possibly efficiency wages. Those working in smaller firms, of less than 25 employees, earn 
around a quarter less and those in firms with 25-50 employees earn around 15% less than 
comparable workers with over 50 colleagues. Earnings rise significantly as tenure increases and 
all immigrants earn more with larger tenure as compared to the reference category of less than 
one year. Earnings increase by around 10% for each tenure period of 2-5 years and 5-10 years 
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whilst individuals with more than 10 years have the highest returns as earmn· 4 ~ 0 
, gs are over 0 Yo 
higher for this category compared to those with less than 1 year of tenu Th 
reo ere are no 
significant differences between the earnings of male immigrants in the public and private sectors 
but full-time employees earn 20% more. 
Finally, earnings gains remain significant for all three categories of immigrants as compared to 
the reference group of refugees and asylum seekers. Again this differential is highest for mainly 
economic migrant males with an earnings premium of over 20%. While the earnings premium 
for mixed refugees and economic migrant category and economic migrant category is around 5% 
and 7% respectively. All of these relative earnings advantages are smaller than before, especially 
for economic migrants, which has more or less halved. 
For female workers employed in production, manufacturing and supply, retail, transport and 
communications and health and education all have lower earnings as compared to those in other 
services. While females in finance and real estate as well as in construction have earnings 
advantages over workers in other services. The relative earnings advantage for those in 
finance/real estate is similar to males, but female construction workers enjoy an earnings 
advantage, which is opposite to what was seen for males. 
Earnings are lower for part time women who earn around 13% less than full-timers. Similar to 
men, earnings differentials for women also increase with firm size. Those working in larger 
firms, with more than 50 employees, are the largest earners while those females working in 
smaller firms of less than 25 and 25-50 employees have earnings gaps of around 20% and 10% 
respectively as compared to workers in firms with more than 50 employees. Tenure also 
significantly increases earnings since females with 5-10 years of tenure have an earnings gain of 
more than a quarter compared to workers with less than 1 year of tenure. However, the return to 
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more than 10 years of tenure is smaller than for the previous category F 1 kin. 
. ema es wor g III the 
public sector, earn a significant 7% more than those in the private sector. 
Earnings differences are agaIn significant for all three categories of female immigrants as 
compared to reference group of refugees and asylum seekers. This differential is highest for 
mainly economic migrants, with an earnings premium of around 20%. While for mixed refugees 
and economic migrants the earnings are very similar at around 15%. As with males the 
, 
differentials have been lowered compared to the previous specification but the earnings gap 
between refugees/asylum seekers and other immigrant categories remain larger for females than 
males, even after controlling for workplace factors. 
5.6.5 Estimates for Occupational Attainment 
The main objective of the occupational analysis is to compare the determinants of occupational 
success with those for earnings. The dependent variable is coded such that higher (positive) 
values of coefficients indicate greater chances of success in high level jobs and lower values 
indicate a higher probability of having lower level jobs. Separate estimates for males and females 
for occupational attainment are presented in Table 5.8. The results show that age and education 
are very significant for both males and females as mentioned earlier in relation to earnings, with 
education and experience increasing occupational attainment. Age equally affects the 
occupational level of males and females while marital status matters for both but differently. For 
males, occupational success increases with marriage while for women it decreases. This is not an 
unexpected finding as family responsibilities often force men to find better jobs and earn more 
while for women family and child care responsibilities are often an obstacle to success in the 
labour market. 
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Table 5.8: Ordered Probit Estimates and Marginal Effects for 0 ti I . M I ccupa ona Attamment 
a es Females 
Coef. Marginal Effects Marginal Effects Coef. (Prof/man) (Prof/man) 
Age 0.133*** 0.047*** 0.124*** 0.036*** (0.013) (0.005) (0.014) (0.004) 
Age Squared -0.010*** 
-0.010*** 
-0.010*** 
-0.000*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Married 0.103** 0.036** 
-0.079** 
-0.023** (0.039) (0.013) (0.036) (0.010) 
Medium Education 0.246*** 0.089*** 0.357*** 0.109*** (0.043) (0.016) (0.045) (0.014) 
High Education 1.021 *** 0.351 *** 1.032*** 0.302*** 
(0.040) (0.013) (0.044) (0.012) 
Midlands -0.227*** -0.076*** 
-0.097 
-0.027 
(0.066) (0.021) (0.073) (0.020) 
East 0.038 0.014 0.108 0.033 
(0.065) (0.023) (0.069) (0.021 ) 
London 0.016 0.006 0.094* 0.028 
(0.049) (0.017) (0.055) (0.016) 
South 0.095 0.034 0.041 0.012 
(0.056) (0.203) (0.057) (0.017) 
Wales 0.276** 0.103** 0.060 0.018 
(0.109) (0.042) (0.1 09) (0.033) 
Scotland 0.048 0.017 0.001 0.000 
(0.088) (0.032) (0.092) (0.027) 
N. Ireland 0.475** 0.181** 0.451 ** 0.153** 
(0.206) (0.082) (0.153) (0.057) 
South Asians -0.573*** -0.185*** -0.496*** -0.126*** 
(0.046) (0.013) (0.049) (0.011) 
Black -0.574*** -0.176*** -0.432*** -0.110*** 
(0.058) (0.015) (0.053) (0.012) 
Mixed & Others -0.307*** -0.102*** -0.366*** -0.096*** 
(0.047) (0.015) (0.048) (0.011) 
Year 2001 0.293*** 0.107*** 0.195*** 0.059*** 
(0.051) (0.019) (0.053) (0.017) 
2002 0.277*** 0.102*** 0.169*** 0.052** 
(0.057) (0.022) (0.058) (0.018) 
2003 0.196*** 0.071 ** 0.188*** 0.058** 
(0.057) (0.022) (0.056) (0.018) 
2004 0.198*** 0.072*** 0.150** 0.046** 
(0.055) (0.020) (0.057) (0.018) 
2005 0.100* 0.036 0.028 0.008 
(0.053) (0.019) (0.055) (0.016) 
Mixed Refugees & Economic 0.203** 0.074** 0.400*** 0.l30*** 
Migrants (0.062) (0.023) (0.069) (0.025) 
Mainly Economic Migrants 0.691 *** 0.259*** 0.594*** 0.196*** 
(0.060) (0.023) (0.063) (0.022) 
Economic Migrants 0.420*** 0.147*** 0.440*** 0.l24*** 
(0.052) (0.018) (0.055) (0.015) 
Years since Migration 0.024*** 0.008*** 0.034*** 0.010*** 
(0.004) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) 
No. of Observations 5465 4831 
Pseudo R-squared 0.131 0.094 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. p<O.l; ** P <0.005; *** p<O.Ol (two-tailed test). 
Default categories are single, living in the North, white, year 2006 and refugees and asylum seekers (Category 1). 
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The marginal effects imply that males and females with high levels of education are 30 
percentage points more likely to have a professional/managerial job and those with medium 
education around 10 percentage points more likely compared to migrant workers with low leyels 
of education. Apart from Wales and N. Ireland, regions do not playa significant role in migrant 
males' occupational success. Male immigrants in N. Ireland and Wales are more likely to obtain 
high level professional and managerial jobs. Female immigrants in London and N. Ireland have 
better chances of being successful in terms of occupation. Ethnic penalties are present for all 
ethnic groups including the Mixed and other ethnic group compared to whites. These 
differentials are largest for Asians and Blacks for both males and females. For Asians and Black 
males the chances of getting a professional or managerial job are around 18% points lower than 
for whites. Instead, they are more likely to do routine and semi-routine jobs. While males and 
females from the Mixed and other ethnic group have a lower disadvantage compared to whites. 
Years since migration provides better opportunities for success and females are relatively more 
likely to do well than males with more years spent in the UK. For them an extra year in the UK 
increases the probability of having a high level job by 1 percentage point compared to slightly 
less than this for males. 
Immigrants from other categories are more successful in the labour market in terms of 
occupational success compared to refugees and asylum seekers. Mainly economic migrant males 
and females are the most likely to have professional and managerial jobs, which is quite 
consistent with the earnings estimates. The probability of an immigrant from this group having a 
high level job is 26 percentage points higher for males and 20 percentage points higher for 
females compared with refugees/asylum seekers. Economic migrant males and females are also 
more successful relative to refugees and asylum seekers but are less likely to get professional and 
managerial jobs compared to mainly economic migrants. In fact female economic migrants have 
a lower probability of having a top job than the mixed category. 
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5.7 Conclusion 
The labour market outcomes for earnings and occupation are similar to those for employment in 
that they reveal that for both males and females, refugees/asylum seekers do far worse than other 
immigrants after controlling for personal, as well as workplace, characteristics. It is also found 
that education, location, ethnicity and years since migration are important in determining the 
earnings and occupational achievements of immigrants. 
Consistent with Lindley (2002) findings, refugees' earnings patterns differ from non-refugee 
migrants and they assimilate differently from economic migrants. It is found that asylum seekers 
and refugees get the largest return to their education in terms of employment while lowest 
returns to their education in terms of earnings. In addition to this ethnicity also plays an 
important role in determining economic performance and assimilation. Ethnicity can not be 
ignored while analyzing the labour market performance of immigrants as it is an important factor 
affecting their assimilation and there also exists large element of disadvantage, possibly due to 
discrimination for all ethnic groups as compared to whites. The influence of education on 
immigrant labour market success shows that returns to education in terms of earnings are 
positive but returns to education are lower for refugees/asylum seekers, especially for males. 
Asylum seekers/refugees earn significantly less than other migrants after controlling for other 
variables, with larger differentials for females. The significantly lower earnings of refugees and 
asylum seekers are consistent with the results for occupation, where it is found that this group is 
concentrated in low level jobs. However, once again assimilation has the highest effects for 
asylum seekers/refugees, implying those who stay in the UK for long periods often perform well. 
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Assimilation over time is a consistent finding with Cortes (2004) that due to implicit difference 
in the time horizon of economic and refugee immigrant categories, higher rates of human capital 
accumulation leads to substantial gains over time for refugee immigrants. As most of the 
immigrants arrived in the UK during 1990s, they are expected to perform better in the labour 
market with the accumulation of country-specific skills over time even though they may have 
started from a very low position on average. 
Nevertheless, the poorer performance of refugees and asylum seekers compared to other 
immigrant categories both in terms of earnings and occupational achievement is likely to be 
attributed to a number of factors including a lack of country specific human capital, non-
recognition of their education and as well as discrimination. As they earn significantly less their 
tax contributions are lower as well, especially as they are less likely to have top level jobs. For 
this reason they are often viewed as a greater burden on the government and people become 
more and more hostile in their attitudes towards them. 
The next chapter will analyze the changes in people's attitudes towards refugees and asylum 
seekers over the last decade. The impact of the socio-economic factors in affecting these 
attitudes will also be discussed. 
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Chapter 6 
Attitudes towards Asvlum Seekers and Refugees in the UK 
6.1 Introduction 
The arrival and settlement of new ethnic migrant groups, including refugees and asylum seekers, 
has made a massive social, cultural and economic contribution to the history of the UK, despite 
hostile negative responses from some sections of the general public and sometimes from the 
government. This has become a very serious public and political issue not only in the UK but in 
almost all European countries. Usually negative attitudes are associated with native views 
towards immigrants as the native population slowly adjusts and accepts the new social and 
cultural impacts. 
The complexity of the issue can be seen by the fact that even basic economic theories and 
evidence can seemingly not make people believe that immigration can playa positive role in the 
country's economy. Their contribution towards enhancing economic growth and balancing skill 
shortages has been ignored by some people leading to increasingly polarised race relations. 
Attitudes are influenced by a number of factors as the formation of people's attitudes depends on 
a complex mix of personal circumstances, values and the external environment and challenging 
them requires action at the local and national level (Lewis, 2006). 
A recent survey undertaken in September 2008 by the British Council reported that almost two-
thirds (60%) of young people thought that the presence of foreign immigrants was "diluting" 
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their sense of national identity and young people think that a steady t f '. . 
s ream 0 llmmgrants IS 
eroding Britain's national identity and threatening jobs. 
Race is basically an orgamsmg principle of society's social order, but due to increasing 
xenophobia and racism, the proportion of people identifying immigration and race as one of the 
most important issues facing the UK has been on the rise, especially reaching high levels since 
the late 1990s. It has been argued that some people are quite ignorant and that a considerable 
amount of confusion and poor knowledge is present regarding asylum and immigration issues. 
For example, a MORl/Migration Watch poll (2003) found that on average people thought that 
the UK had 23% of the world's refugees but the actual figure was closer to 2%. 
A number of surveys have been conducted to analyse the different attitudes of the population 
towards ethnic minorities including asylum seekers and refugees. Several polls have found that 
according to people's responses, the issues of immigration, asylum and race have to be 
considered among the most important issues facing Britain today. A MORl Political Monitor 
poll (2003) and a YouGov poll (2004) both found the issue to be second most important to their 
respondents after defence/foreign affairs/international terrorism and health respectively. 
A Y ouGov poll in 2005 reported that 49% of the respondents considered immigration and 
asylum among the three most important issues in the UK and 78% said that government 
immigration and asylum policies are not tough enough to stop people coming and seeking 
asylum in the UK. While the same poll in 2006 reported that 69% believed that Britain was 
already crowded and another 76% agreed that there should be an annual limit to the number of 
migrants entering the UK. According to the polling agency Populus, nine out of 10 voters in 
2003 believed the number of asylum seekers in the UK was a serious problem and 67% said that 
the immigration laws should be tougher. In February 2005, for the first time in this polL 40% of 
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People polled viewed race and immigration as ahead of any other set of publ· 1·· c IC po ICY Issues lor 
the government. 
Research published by the National Centre for Social Research in the 21 5t Annual British Social 
Attitudes (BSA) Survey for 2003 showed that the proportion wanting the number of immigrants 
to be curbed increased from two thirds in 1995 to three-quarters in 2003. Indeed, more than 60% 
of the population felt there are too many immigrants in Britain. It is argued that many people are 
concerned about preserving the British culture and feel that it is being endangered by the 
presence of migrants. The same survey also indicates that most people thought that Britishness 
could be acquired and did not depend on ethnic factors. But people do seem concerned about the 
social consequences of immigration. The BSA Survey for 2006 reports that people who believe 
that Britishness is declining and fewer people said that British is the right word to describe them 
now compared to 10 years ago. But the fact that the Britishness of the 60 million living in Britain 
is thought to being endangered by 3 million migrant raises fears of negative racial attitudes. 
6.1.1 Attitudes towards Immigrants 
The study of social attitudes is not new to the economics. Becker (1957) represents the first 
effort to construct an economic theory of discrimination drawing from social psychology and 
functionalism, according to his theory some people have a taste for discrimination (cognative 
prejudice). Despite the increased number of anti-racist movements across Europe, increased 
prejudice, direct and indirect discrimination, political opposition and extreme violence are major 
European reactions to new minorities. All of these suggest that anti-immigration attitudes and 
openly racist parties have succeeded in shifting the political spectrum on this issue. These 
phenomena are remarkably consistent across Western Europe (Pettigrew, 1998). 
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Native attitudes and sentiments towards immigrants are directly related with the country's 
immigration policies. Bloch (2000) examines the direction and impact of social policy towards 
asylum seekers/refugees in Britain (drawing on a sample of 180 refugees and asylum seekers 
from Somali, Tamil and Congolese communities in East London) and concludes that the 
direction of government policy, which has continued to erode access to social institutions has 
, 
had an adverse effect on the settlement of refugees in Britain. Thus open migration policies are 
often a reflection of positive attitudes and vice versa. 
Bauer, Lofstrom and Zimmermann (2000) analysed native attitudes towards immigrants across a 
range of developed countries and attempted to explain the differences in attitudes between 
countries by differences in socio-economic characteristics. They used the International Social 
Survey Programme, of which the BSA survey is one element. They analysed individual data 
from 12 OECD countries and found that countries selecting immigrants on their skills are more 
likely to be in favour of immigration and to believe that immigrants are good for the economy 
than the natives in countries mainly receiving refugees and asylum seekers. But Scheve and 
Slaughter (2001) in their empirical results find no strong evidence for a relationship between 
skills and immigration opinions in high immigration communities. 
Dustmann and Preston (2001) using the BSA Survey for several years analysed the effect of 
individual characteristics, labour market conditions and most importantly the concentration of 
ethnic minorities on the hostility of the native population towards ethnic minorities. Their 
findings are that a high concentration of ethnic minorities does lead to more hostile attitudes of 
the majority group towards ethnic minorities and these are an important determinant of ethnic 
minorities' welfare and social exclusion. 
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The debates on immigration and race relations must also be seen against the background of wider 
social-political and economic scenario in the country. "The rapid transformation of many inner 
city localities, particularly in relation to economic and social infrastructure, provided a fertile 
ground for the racialisation of issues such as employment, housing, education and law and order" 
(Solomos, 2003: p. 66). High concentrations of ethnic minorities in different regions often result 
in the occurrence of increased resentment against minorities and this prejudice may lead to 
physical violence, death or severe injuries (Krueger and Pischke, 1997). 
By looking at the history of UK's Immigration and Asylum legislation it becomes obvious that 
the racialisation of British politics took place during the 1970s and 1980s. The decade of 1961-71 
can be seen as an era of major concerns about immigration and the social and cultural impact of 
migrant communities. Although the main aim of the immigration laws and race relation acts was 
to produce an environment of good race relations and integration, it could not successfully 
depoliticise the question of black immigration (Solomos, 2003). 
The anxiety about large scale immigration and its impact has been fuelled by politicians as well 
as by media attention. The image of immigrants being portrayed in some quarters as criminals 
and a burden on society is often inaccurate. Despite some local perceptions of the link between 
crime and immigrants, an empirical study by Butcher (2005) for the US concludes from ten years 
of data that cities with higher immigration had no higher crime rates than otherwise similar cities 
and the involvement of immigrants in crime is less than for the native born. The perceived 
entrance of coloured immigrants into the community, perceived job and housing competition are 
likely to be factors leading individuals to form an opinion of having more stringent controls of 
immigration (Studler, 1977). 
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The study of racial attitudes has been a well established tradition in British race relations 
research. A considerable amount of hostility towards ethnic minorities existed in the UK in the 
1980s and similar results were found in the 1990s and afterwards. According to the 1994 BSA 
survey 'colour first and culture second' continued to influence people's responses. Since the first 
research into the attitudes of whites towards coloured immigrants, a number of hypotheses have 
been put forward in a sociological context to find an associated link between the attitudes of 
natives and the number of immigrants. Three of these are particularly important. The first argues 
that there is a linear relationship i.e. the hostility towards immigrants increases as the number of 
immigrants in the community increases. Second, is the states of the colours 'shock effect', 
where people feel more threatened by commonwealth immigrants but the hostility declines over 
time as the number of immigrants increase and become accepted in the community. Third, the 
proximity hypothesis is based on a 'tipping point' for racial hostility, i.e. intolerance increases 
disproportionately after reaching a certain high level (Studlar, 1977). 
As far refugees are concerned Daley (2009) has explored community relationships between 
refugees and asylum seekers, other immigrants and long term residents with in local area of 
refugee settlement in the UK. The study has discovered a lack of meaningful relationships 
between people from different backgrounds, significant prejudice, underlying tensions and few 
opportunities for inter-group contact. Shared aspects helped to bring people together while 
differences in culture and faith are linked to stronger division. 
The aim of this study is to examine the overall change in people's attitudes over a decade (1995-
2006) and also to establish the characteristics that affect an individual's opinion towards asylum 
seekers and refugees in the UK. How people's attitudes vary between different groups and how 
their attitudes are linked with different aspects related to the presence and impact of immigrants 
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are important questions to be answered. This is achieved using data from the 1995 and 2006 
BSA Surveys. 
The contribution of the analysis here is that it enables us to draw a general I· b conc USlOn a out 
people's attitudes towards refugees and asylum seekers based on their different individual socio-
economic characteristics. The approach adopted is to show and explain differences in responses 
over time to the particular questions asked in the 1995 and 2006 surveys, of letting in the 
political refugees stay in the UK. The results are further analysed using ordered probit analysis 
which is used due to the categorical nature of the variable of interest. 
6.2 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
This analysis of attitudes of the British population is based on information obtained from the 
1995 and 2006 BSA Surveys. The BSA survey has been conducted almost every year since 1983 
and is a repeated cross-sectional data set based on annual surveys. It consists of randomly 
selected samples of adults aged 18 and over living in households in Great Britain, excluding 
areas of north of the Caledonian canal because of their dispersed population. A separate survey is 
conducted in Northern Ireland which is not included in the analysis here. 
The BSA survey covers and charts a variety of topics including social, economic, political and 
moral issues in relation to other changes in society. Each year up to 3600 respondents are asked 
about their attitudes and opinions on a wide range of issues, some of which are covered every 
year. The questionnaire covers a wide range of topics such as social benefits, education, labour 
market, economic prospects, poverty, health, race, religion, immigration, sex and violence etc. 
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The data set contains information not only on . d"d 1 . 
III IVI ua attItudes towards refugees and 
immigrants but a large range of information rel t d t 1 
a e 0 persona and socio-economic 
characteristics. One of the main objectives of this survey is to monl'tor th l' f 
e re at! ve rates 0 
change of people's attitudes over time on different social issues. This 1995 BSA survey had a 
total sample size of 3633, with a slightly higher proportion of females (57%), a specific 
characteristic of the BSA survey series since its introduction in 1983. The 1995 survey contained 
several questions associated with immigration which were asked to around a third of the sample. 
Each individual taking part in the survey was allocated to a questionnaire which was divided into 
A, Band C parts. Only the individuals allocated to part A of the questionnaire were asked to 
answer the questions on migration issues. Thus the sample size used here is reduced to less than 
one thousand once non-responses are excluded as only the information relevant to the refugee 
question has been used. 
The 2006 BSA survey had 4290 respondents and assesses the consequences for public attitudes 
of a number of recent fundamental social issues including an aging society, terrorism, the growth 
of the internet, Britishness, globalization and increasingly competitive labour markets. The BSA 
Survey for 2006 was divided into four questionnaires: version A, version B, version C and 
version D, in order to increase the number of topics on the BSA Survey and respondents were 
randomly assigned to one of the versions. All individuals answered the core set of demographic 
and other classificatory questions before carrying on with other versions. Only those answering 
the B version of the questionnaire were asked to respond to the refugee question used here. 
which again reduced the sample to less than 1000 once the exclusions have been made. 
The variable being analyzed here is about refugees, which was asked in both surveys with a 
relatively minor change to the question wording between the two years, which should be noted. 
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The exact question asked in the 1995 BSA survey was "How much do you agree or disagree that 
refugees who have suffered political repression in their country should be allowed to stay in the 
UK?" (refstay1). The comparable question asked in the 2006 BSA survey was "How much do 
you agree or disagree that refugees who are in danger because of their political beliefs should 
always be welcome in Britain?" (refstay2). Arguably, the question included in 1995 was more 
restrictive than that in 2006 since the former asks about staying in the UK rather than just being 
welcome. 
Despite the difference in the exact wordings, both questions enable us to draw a general 
conclusion about people attitudes towards political refugees, based on their socio-economic 
characteristics and an overall change in their attitude towards refugees can be analysed. In 
particular, although the two questions are different, general patterns and a hardening of attitudes 
can still be identified, even if two years' data are not directly comparable. 
The respondents were given five options to express their preferences, which are recoded on a 





5- Strongly Agree. 
Table 6.1 shows the cross tabulation results concerning the attitudes of different sub groups of 
. h UK fi 1995 and Table 6.2 the British population towards allowing refugees to stay III t e or 
displays cross tabulation results for 2006. 
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It can be seen from the Table 6.1 that on the whole people are relatl'vely . 
compasSIOnate towards 
refugees, which to some extent contradicts the general image portrayed b th d' . y e me la, SInce a 
fairly large proportion (around 43%) of the people agreed that the political refugees should be 
allowed to stay in the UK, compared to just over a one quarter who disagreed with this idea. The 
remaining 31 % neither agreed nor disagreed with the statement. 
However Table 6.2 indicates that people have become more negative towards asylum seekers by 
2006. In this year, a half of the people disagreed with political refugees should be welcome in 
Britain, with 14% of these respondents strongly disagreeing with the idea. Just over 20% agreed 
(only 3% strongly so) and again around 30% neither agreed nor disagreed. Women have long 
been stereotyped as having more liberal attitudes and men as being more conservative. 
According to research in the socio-political literature, women's views are more liberal than 
men's on social compassionate issues and more conservative on traditional morality issues 
(Eagly et aI, 2004). The results for 1995 support this view as well. The cross tabulation of 
refstay1 with gender shows that women are more sympathetic towards refugees as nearly half 
(45%) of the women in sample agreed that political refugees should be allowed to stay in the 
UK, compared to 40% of males who showed slightly more restrictive responses than women. 
Furthermore, almost one third of males disagreed with the statement, of whom 12% strongly 
disagreed, while only 21 % of women disagreed or strongly disagreed. But in the 2006 survey, 
the majority of both male and female respondents were negative about welcoming political 
refugees to Britain and the proportion of females agreeing with the statement fell substantially 
compared to 1995. In 2006 almost a half of females were against asylum seekers but the 
percentage disagreeing or strongly disagreeing was still higher for males. 
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Age is also likely to affect attitudes towards refugees for various reasons. In particular. it is a 
measure of lifetime experience and so has a strong impact on attitudes towards minorities. 
People exposed to ethnic minorities at later stages of their life are likely to be less flexible 
(Dustmann and Preston, 2001). In terms of age, middle-aged persons appear to show both a 
much stronger response for and against letting refugees stay compared to the young and old. 
However, there seems to be no clear relationship between attitudes and the age bands. The 
percentage agreeing in 1995 and disagreeing in 2006 that political refugees should be allowed to 
stay was highest amongst the middle-aged group. Whilst, the largest proportion of respondents 
who strongly agreed with the statement was found among the young in 1995 and the smallest 
among the old. Part of the reason for the unclear impact of age may be that young individuals 
often have to compete for similar jobs as immigrants. 
The differences in terms of marital status do not appear that great. In contrast with the other two 
categories, unmarried people are more sympathetic to refugees since they had the highest 
proportion in both the strongly agree and agree categories for 1995 and for the strongly agreed 
category in 2006. 
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Table 6.1 
Attitudes towards Refugees, 1995 
Let political refugees stay in the Strongly Disagree Neither Agree Strongly No 
UK(refstay 1) Disagree Agree Of 
Obs. 
TOTAL 8.620/0 17.44% 31.03% 33.16% 9.74% 986 
1- SEX (rsex) 
MALE 12.07% 20.69% 27.09% 31.03% 9.11% 406 
FEMALE 6.21% 15.17% 33.79% 34.66% 10.17% 580 
2- AGE(rage1) 
YOUNG (18-40) 10.82% 14.35% 32.00% 31.53% 11.29% 425 
MIDDLE AGE (41-59) 7.92% 21.45% 24.42% 37.29% 8.91% 303 
OLD (60-95) 5.86% 17.97% 37.11% 30.86% 8.20% 256 
3-MARITAL STATUS 
(marstatl) 
MARRIED 9.74% 18.46% 30.60% 32.65% 8.55% 585 
SEPERATED &WIDOWED 5.58% 16.28% 37.21% 31.16% 9.77% 215 




DEGREE QUALIFICATION 4.42% 12.05% 19.28% 46.99% 17.27% 249 
NO QUALIFICATION 10.96% 20.21% 40.07% 23.97% 4.79% 292 
SOME QUALIFICATION 9.44% 18.65% 31.69% 31.46% 8.76% 445 
5-ECONOMIC 
ACTIVITY (reconactl) 
EMPLOYED 8.11% 18.87% 27.92% 35.28% 9.81% 530 
UNEMPLOYED 15.63% 7.81% 37.50% 31.25% 7.81% 64 
INACTIVE 8.16% 17.09% 34.18% 30.61% 9.95% 392 
6-ETHNIC ORIGIN 
(etbnico rig) 
24.00% 28.00% 25 NON-WHITES 8.00% 4.00% 36.00% 
WHITES 8.72% 17.96% 30.99% 33.19% 9.14% 952 
7-S0CIO- ECONOMIC. 
CLASS (rrgcIass1) 
25.95% 40.19% 12.97% 316 PROFESSIONAL / 5.06% 15.82% 
MANAGER 
7.95% 239 SKILLED NON-MANUAL 9.62% 17.15% 33.47% 31.80% I 
SKILLED MANUAL 10.53% 20.53% 34.21% 26.84% 7.89% 190 
PARTL Y SKILLED 11.76% 19.61% 32.03% 28.10% 8.50% 153 
_UNSKILLED 8.33% 18.75% 31.25% 37.50% 4.17% .+8 
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Table 6.1 Continued: 
Let political Refugees stay Strongly Disagree Neither Agree Strongly No in UK(refstayl) Disagree Agree Of 
8-RELIGION (Religion 1) Obs. 
NO RELIGION 11.69% 15.42% 30.85% 29.60% 12.44% 402 
CHURCH OF ENGLAND 5.43% 16.28% 30.23% 41.09% 6.98% 129 
ROMAN CATHOLIC 5.10% 12.24% 34.69% 35.71% 12.24% 98 
OTHER CHRISTIANS 6.90% 23.51% 31.35% 33.23% 5.02% 319 
OTHER RELIGIONS 10.81% 5.41% 24.32% 35.14% 24.32% 37 
9-REGION (stregionl) 
SCOTLAND 10.75% 13.98% 27.96% 38.71% 8.60% 93 
NORTH 8.23% 17.75% 36.36% 30.74% 6.93% 231 
MIDLANDS 11.38% 16.77% 34.13% 29.34% 8.38% 167 
SOUTH 7.74% 17.56% 28.57% 36.61% 9.52% 336 
GREATER LONDON 7.29% 16.67% 26.04% 31.25% 18.75% 96 
WALES 6.35% 23.81% 28.57% 28.57% 12.70% 63 
A possible explanation for the more restrictive attitudes of the married can be their social and 
economic responsibilities which make them feel that an additional number of refugees would be 
a burden on society and the economy. The separated and widowed for 1995 and the not married 
for 2006 showed the most indifferent attitudes. 
Education, as expected, broadens people's views and results in a very positive impact in terms of 
individual attitudes towards refugees. Education may affect attitudes in two ways. Firstly higher 
education may reduce the prejudice towards individuals from different ethnic backgrounds. 
Secondly education may pick up the long term prospects of individuals (Dustmann and Preston, 
2001). In 1995 around 47 per cent of graduates agreed with the statement and a further 17% 
strongly agreed, whilst people having some qualifications showed a fairly similar response in all 
five categories. People with no qualifications were the most indifferent (40%) and more likely to 
disagree or strongly disagree compared to the other two educational categories. By 2006 even 
degree holders had become more negative towards refugees but the proportion agreeing was still 
much higher than for the other two categories and over a half of the people with no or some 
qualifications disagreed with the statement. 
Table 6.2 
Attitudes towards Refugees, 2006 
Let political refugees welcome in Strongly Disagree Neither Agree Strongly No Britain (refstay2) Disagree Agree Of 
TOTAL 13.94% 36.01% 29.100/0 
Obs. 
17.73% 3.23% 897 
l-SEX(rsex) 
MALE 17.20% 36.02% 28.49% 15.86% 2.42% 372 
FEMALE 11.62% 36.00 % 29.52% 19.05% 3.81% 525 
2- AGE(ragel) 
YOUNG (18-40) 11.61 % 37.80% 32.14% 15.77% 2.68% 336 
MIDDLEAGE (41-59) 18.60% 36.54% 23.59% 16.94% 4.32% 301 
OLD (60-95) 11.54% 33.08% 31.54% 21.15% 2.69% 260 
3-MARITAL STATUS 
(marstatl) 
MARRIED 14.12% 38.43% 28.04% 16.27% 3.14% 510 
SEPERATED &WIDOWED 11.76% 35.78% 29.90% 20.10% 2.45% 204 
NOT MARRIED 15.93% 29.67% 30.77% 19.23% 4.40% 182 
4-HIGHEST EDUCATION 
QUALIFICATION(hedquall ) 
DEGREE QUALIFICATION 10.00% 33.57% 28.21% 23.21% 5.00% 280 
NO QUALIFICATION 13.02% 40.29% 29.98% 13.76% 2.95% 407 
SOME QUALIFICATION 21.05% 30.62% 28.71% 18.18% 1.44% 209 
5-ECONOMIC 
ACTIVITY (reconactl) 
EMPLOYED 13.80% 39.60% 28.40% 14.80% 3.40% 500 
UNEMPLOYED 35.71% 14.29% 28.57% 17.86% 3.57% 28 
INACTIVE 13.37% 33.72% 30.23% 20.35% 2.33% 344 
6-ETHNIC ORIGIN 
(ethnico rig) 
NON-WHITES 6.00% 14.00% 52.00% 26.00% 2.00% 50 
WHITES 14.49% 37.20% 27.78% 17.39% 3.14% 828 
7-S0CIO- ECONOMIC. 
CLASS (RRGCLASS1) 
PROFESSIONAL / MANAGER 6.02% 40.96% 20.48% 27.71% 4.82% 83 
SKILLED NON-MANUAL 11.53% 39.56% 27.73% 16.51% 4.67% 321 
SKILLED MANUAL 25.74% 28.71% 31.68% 13.86% 0.00% 101 
P ARTL Y SKILLED 14.29% 38.31% 25.97% 20.13% 1.30% 154 
UNSKILLED 14.63% 32.68% 33.66% 15.61% 3.41% 205 
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Table 6.2 Continued: 
Let political refugees Strongly Disagree Neither Agree Strongly No 
welcome in Britain (refstay2) Disagree Agree Of 
Obs. 
8-RELIGION (Religionl) 
NO RELIGION 16.50% 34.98% 28.33% 15.76% 4.43% 406 
CHURCH OF ENGLAND 10.60% 41.47% 29.95% 17.05% 0.92% 217 
ROMAN CATHOLIC 14.94% 37.93% 17.24% 25.29% 4.60% 87 
OTHER CHRISTIANS 12.84% 33.11% 34.46% 17.57% 2.03% 148 
OTHER RELIGIONS 7.89% 21.05% 39.47% 26.32% 5.26% 38 
9-REGION (stregion) 
SCOTLAND 11.39% 34.18% 31.65% 17.72% 5.06% 79 
NORTH 11.92% 41.15% 27.31% 17.31% 2.31% 260 
MIDLANDS 17.57% 31.76% 30.41% 16.89% 3.38% 148 
SOUTH 13.82% 33.64% 30.88% 19.35% 2.30% 217 
GREATER LONDON 14.29% 37.41% 27.89% 15.65% 4.76% 147 
WALES 17.39% 30.43% 26.09% 21.74% 4.35% 46 
Economic activity has been divided into three categories i.e. employed, unemployed and inactive 
(including permanently sick, looking after the home and students). For 1995 around twice the 
amount of unemployed people strongly disagreed that refugees should be allowed to stay 
compared to the other two groups. On the other hand, the employed were the most likely to agree 
or strongly agree (45%). For 2006, the employed were the most likely to disagree (39%), but the 
unemployed again have the highest percentage strongly disagreeing (35%) although there are a 
very small number of people unemployed in this year. The category showing more indifferent 
views appears to be those inactive in the labour market. 
Table 6.1 reveals that there are only a small number of ethnic minority individuals in the sample. 
However for 1995 it shows a relatively high percentage from the ethnic minorities strongly 
agreed with the statement. Whilst over a quarter of whites disagreed or strongly disagreed, only a 
few non-whites (12%) disagreed. This is not an unexpected result as many of the non-whites 
themselves or their parents came to Britain as immigrants. 
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But in Table 6.2 even non-whites have shown some restrictive attl'tudes d h h f 
an more t an al of 
non-whites are indifferent and for the remainder more than half agreed b t th h 
u ose w 0 strongly 
agreed with the statement are just a mere fraction of 2% This may confi "d f 
. rm some eVl ence 0 
hostility from ethnic minorities but it may not be very surprising as they may simply want to 
"kick the ladder away". But it should be noted here that the number of ethnic minorities is again 
very small (a sample of only 50). In contrast, more than half of the whites disagreed to 
welcoming political refugees to Britain and among those who opposed around 15% strongly 
disagreed. 
Among the different social classes, professionals and managers showed the strongest response in 
1995 in favour of refugees, with more than half of them agreeing to allow refugees to stay in the 
UK and a mere 5 per cent strongly disagreeing. The availability of cheap labour to these 
managers is a possible explanation for this support or perhaps the correlation with education, 
which the regression analysis will help to separate out. Among the skilled and non skilled 
categories, the unskilled were least likely to strongly agree with the statement. Similar results are 
found by Scheve and Slaughter (2001) in their empirical analysis that less-skilled workers are 
significantly more likely to prefer limiting immigrant inflows into the United States. Non-skilled 
workers were found to have similar views to the partly skilled. These differences in attitudes 
towards immigrants on the part of skilled and unskilled workers (in a skill abundant economy 
like the US) is consistent with the Heckscher-Ohlin model of international trade since 
immigrants will be boosting the stock of labour in the country and hence seen as a threat to 
unskilled workers. 
In 2006 the picture by social class was again very different, with far more negative attitudes 
b . k'll d I I strongly disagreed with the emg observed. More than a quarter of the s 1 e -manua c ass 
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statement while a high percentage neither agreeing nor disagreel'ng 
was seen amongst the 
unskilled. Professionals and managers were again most likely to agree or t I ·th s rong y agree WI the 
statement. 
Surprisingly among the different religious groups, those who were amongst the most likely to 
strongly agree with the statement in the 1995 survey had no-religion, contradicting the views that 
religious people should be more sympathetic towards other people and their problems. Attitudes 
are most likely to be influenced by religions on the basis of tolerance and brotherhood preached 
by these religions and by the historic experiences of persecution of particular groups of the 
population (Dustmann and Preston, 2001). However, this group also had the highest proportion 
strongly disagreeing. This suggests that those with a religion had more homogeneous views. 
More than a quarter of the other Christians category disagreed and just 5% strongly agreed with 
the statement. The other religions category (including Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs etc) showed a 
very considerate response in 1995 and almost 60% agreed with the idea of letting refugees stay 
in the UK, which was the highest percentage of people strongly agreeing with the statement. 
This amount dropped to less than one-third in 2006, although again the number with other 
religions who responded to this question is small. Roman Catholics appeared to have more 
lenient views than Protestants as 12% of them strongly agreed in comparison with 7% of 
Protestants in 1995. By 2006, although attitudes of each had become more hostile, this was less 
so for Roman Catholics. 
The region-wise comparison also shows some interesting results. In 1995 more than a quarter in 
each region disagreed with allowing refugees to stay in the UK but this amount was more or less 
twice as high in 2006. People living in the Midlands showed relatively more hostile attitudes in 
both years in terms of strongly disagreeing with the statement. The lowest proportion strongly 
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disagreeing In 1995 was in Wales but for 2006 the highest percentage 
who disagreed in 
welcoming refugees came from Wales. These results seem to be cons' t t . h h . 
IS en Wit ot er studIes 
which have found higher hostility in the Midlands towards immigrants (Studlar, 1977). 
Greater London had by far the highest proportion of the regions with people strongly agreeing 
and lowest strongly disagreeing in 1995, showing its openness to multiculturalism. However, 
even in the capital in 2006, positive attitudes appear to have weakened with a higher proportion 
strongly agreeing with the statement in Scotland and over 14% in London strongly disagreeing in 
this year. 
6.3 Econometric Methodology 
Given that respondents have a five point scale to state their attitudes towards refugees/asylum 
seekers, the observed dependent variable is of an ordered and categorical nature. Moreover, due 
to the conceptual difficulties in answering the question, respondents may be unwilling or unable 
to give a precise answer. Therefore, a multi response model is used. 
The nature of the data implies that ordered probit models are estimated. The important 
distinction between an ordered response model and an unordered model is that an order response 
model is more parsimonious but is applicable only if there exists a logical order of alternative 
choices as it is sensitive to the ordering of the alternatives. While an unordered model is not 
sensitive to the different ways in which the alternatives are numbered/ordered. 
Two different sets of ordered probit models are estimated here. The first model uses an 
individual's main personal characteristics whilst the other model uses some additional questions 
which were asked in 1995, that may potentially have an influential effect on their responses. 
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The observed categorical dependent variable is related to Refstay1 d R C: 2 
an elstay as follows: 
(6.1) 
Where R; is an unobserved variable indicating the individual's opinion towards the question of 
letting refugees stay in the UK. Individual characteristics are the explanatory variables and are 
represented by x~ and its associated coefficient vector by p. The existence of latent dependent 
variable (y) is related to the refugee opinion variables Refstay1 and Refstay2 (Rn as follows: 
R· = 1 [. if R~ < Yl 
R· = 2 I· if Yl < R: < Y2 
R· = 3 t if Y2: < Rj < Y3 
R· =4 t if Y3 < R; < Y4 
R. = 5 t if Y4 < R: < Ys 
where the }"s are the unknown parameters to be estimated jointly with po 
The personal characteristics to be included are those discussed in Tables 6.1 and 6.2. Therefore, 
the inclusion of controls for age, gender, marital status, qualification, economic activity, region 
along with ethnic origin as explanatory variables enables us to estimate the influence of these 
variables on refstay1 and refstay2. Detailed information is available in the BSA survey on these 
personal characteristics. Dummy variables are then constructed and added to indicate the 
response of each individual. 
Augmented Specification 
In the second specification additional controls for social class and religion, which may influence 
on individual's opinion, are added to their basic characteristics. Due to the possible correlation 
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between education and social class and ethnicity and religion separate d I . 
, mo e s are estImated to 
explore the effect of each variable more vividly. Consequently two dl'f:C: t d d b' 
, leren or ere pro It 
models are estimated here, one with the basic specification and one with augme t d 'fi' n e speCI lcatlOg 
for each year. The results are presented in Tables 6.3 and 6.4. 
6.3.1. Estimates of Attitudes towards Refugees 
The main objective of this analysis is to examine the attitudes towards letting refugees stay in the 
UK for the different sub-groups of the British people based on their individual characteristics. 
Table 6.3 reports the ordered probit estimates for the basic specification and Table 6.4 presents 
similar information for the augmented specification. The reference or base category in the basic 
specification is female, old, has no qualifications, inactive, non-whites, and those living in 
Wales. The refstay variables are coded such that a higher value indicates those who are more 
sympathetic towards refugees/asylum seekers (those who strongly agree with the statement that 
political refugees should be allowed to stay), so a positive coefficient attached to a particular 
variable implies that the variable is associated with a more sympathetic opinion towards political 
refugees/asylum seekers and a negative coefficient implies a more negative attitude, holding 
other characteristics constant, relative to the base category. 
a- Basic Specification 
Due to a relatively small sample size, many of the estimated coefficients reported in Table 6.3 
are insignificant. Indeed some of the interesting results found in the cross-tabs are not 
significant, though many of the econometric estimates do support the initial findings. Only 
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gender, age, marital status, educational qualifications and ethnicity are fi d t b " 1 
oun 0 e stabstlca h-
significant at the 5 or 1 % levels of significance in one or both of the years. 
Gender is found to be significant at the 5 per cent level for 1995 and at the 1 per cent level for 
2006. Females appear to be more sympathetic in agreeing with the statement of allowing 
refugees to stay in the UK. Age does not exert a very significant effect in 1995 but the 2006 data 
shows that both young and middle aged groups are more negative as compared to the reference 
category of old after controlling for other characteristics. Marital status has a significant effect in 
1995 on attitudes towards refugees, with married people less likely to agree with the statement 
compared to the reference category of unmarried. Whilst although negative, the coefficient for 
separated/widowed is not significant in either year. Ethnicity is also very significant and whites 
are much less welcoming than non-whites and this attitude becomes more significant and 
stronger in 2006. However, some ethnic minority individuals may be opposed towards refugees 
and immigrants because of a fear of competition from newcomers. 
The educational qualification dummies are highly significant for both years and the coefficient 
values on the qualification dummies increase as the education level rises. Since people tend to be 
more liberal as they become more educated, those with degrees are significantly more in favour 
of letting political refugees stay. The extent of the difference decreases by 2006, possibly 
because of the larger and more diverse number of graduates in 2006. Those with some 
qualifications were also significantly more sympathetic relative to those with no qualifications in 
1995 but not in 2006. 
There was no significant effect for economic activity or regional differences in either year. 
H . . ., L d . 1995 b e negative in 2006 although it was owever the pOSItIve coefficIent III on on III ecam ' 
not significant in either year. 
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Table 6.3 
Ordered Probit Estimates of Attitudes towards R f (B' e ugees _ aSlC Specification) 
















































No. of Observations 975 852 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0304 0.0177 
Note: Default categories are female, old, has no qualifications, inactive, non-whites and those living in Wales. 
Standard errors are in parenthesis. *p<O.l; ** P <0.05; *** p<O.OI (two-tailed tests) 
b- Augmented Specification 
The augmented specification allows for the potentially influential variables of social class and 
religion to be added to the basic specification. The inclusion of these potentially important 
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covariates helps in further collaboration of the estimated results Aga' . 
. III sex, age, mantal status , 
education and ethnicity are significant for one or both years. 
Although the attitudes of males are still the same i e negative compared to w 't . 
. . omen, 1 IS more 
profound in 1995 than in 2006 but age is once again significant in 2006, though only at 10% 
level of significance. None of the respondent's economic activity or region are significant'at any 
level whilst ethnic origin is significant at the 5 per cent level with more negative attitudes 
displayed by whites. In terms of social class, only the professional and managerial dummy is 
significant for 2006 but only at the 10% level of significance. 
Concerning religion, only the other-Christians category is significant for 1995 and this group 
appears to be less tolerant than the default category of Roman Catholic. As expected, people with 
religion have shown more positive attitudes towards refugees/asylum seekers than the people 
with no-religion, although the dummy for those not following a particular religion is 
insignificant in either year. 
Interestingly, the significance of the educational qualification dummies has decreased to quite a 
noticeable extent. In 1995 both those with a degree and some qualifications, were sympathetic 
towards allowing more refugees to stay in the UK but in 2006 the educational qualifications 
dummies are not as significant as in 1995 and only those with a degree qualification is 
significant and that is at 1 % level. This may again be because of the larger cohorts of graduates 
in recent decades but also this specification includes occupational controls, which are highly 
correlated with education. Interestingly, only the professional managerial dummy is significant 
Gust at the 10% level) in 2006, whereas there are no significant occupational effects in 1995, 
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Table 6.4 
Ordered Probit Estimates of the Attitudes towards R f ( e ugees _Augmented Specification) 














Separated & widowed 




Degree 0.706*** 0.366*** 
(0.115) (0.122) 





Unemployed -0.055 0.014 
(0.166) (0.249) 
Whites -0.312 -0.480** 
(0.267) (0.239) 
Scotland -0.094 -0.022 
(0.182) (0.208) 
North -0.068 -0.l13 
(0.154) (0.l75) 
Midlands -0.149 -0.125 
(0.161) (0.l86) 
South -0.021 -0.083 
(0.149) (0.179) 
Greater London 0.067 -0.233 
(0.181) (0.187) 
Professional! Managerial 0.096 0.315* 
(0.120) (0.162) 
Skilled non-manual -0.078 0.062 
(0.116) (0.116) 
Skilled manual 0.023 -0.116 
(0.118) (0.143) 
Unskilled 0.049 0.061 
(0.178) (0.117) 





Other-Christians -0.198* 0.006 
(0.119) (0.289) 
Other Religions 0.142 -0.099 
(0.237) (0.134) 
No. of .Observations 936 829 
Pseudo R-s uared 0.0351 0.0217 
Note: Default categories are female, old, has no qualifications, inactive, non-whites, those living in Wales, partly 
skilled and Roman-Catholic. Standard errors are in parenthesis. *p<O.1; ** P <0.05; *** p<O.Ol (two-tailed tests) 
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6.3.2 Further Analysis on Attitudes towards Refugees 
The 1995 BSA survey also asked several further questions related to immigration, of which four 
questions were related to respondent's views about the impact of immigrants. These questions 
were not asked in the 2006 survey. To see how the responses to these questions affected their 
opinion of letting refugees stay in the UK a separate analysis is reported below. In this case 
equation (6.1) can be rewritten as 
R~ = x~p+ O~y +.S'. I. l l I (6.2) 
Where 0; consists of respondents' opinions regarding immigrants, with the associated vector of 
coefficients y. Each of these may have a very influential impact on the estimates because if 
respondents feel that immigrants are beneficial and they expose the country to new and better 
ideas, they may then be more likely to be in favour of refugees as well. But those who believe 
that the presence of immigrants increases crime rates and native unemployment are expected to 
be less likely to favour refugees. So the controls are added for the following variables relating to 
attitudes towards immigrants; 
Immigrant! : Immigrants increase crime rates 
Immigrant2: Immigrants are good for the British economy 
Immigrant3: Immigrants take jobs away from the British-born. 
Immigrant4: Immigrants make Great Britain open to new ideas. 
The problem of endogeneity due to the inclusion of these potentially influential variables may 
arise here due to possible correlations of these variables and the dependent Refstay variables. In 
. . d tt't d t wards immigrants in general are PartIcular, views towards refugees lettmg stay an a lues 0 
likely to be co-determined rather than the latter having a causal impact on the former. 
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But the problem of this possible endogeneity will not be addres d h k . 
se ere to eep the focus slll1ple 
and on attitudes towards refugees. Because the main objective he . t . I d . 
re IS 0 mc u e these potentIal I y 
influential additional variables to explore the possible links betw . . 
een VIews m general about 
immigrants and the impact on attitudes towards refugees and asylum seek' . I .. 
ers m partIcu ar. ThIS IS 
because of the emphasis on the socio-economic impact of immigrants and fu 1" 
re gees ear Ier m the 
thesis and it is of interest to observe how individual views on these issues are related to attitudes 
towards refugees. 





5- Strongly Agree. 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix for Additional Controls related to Immigrants 
Descriptive statistics for all four of the questions asked about immigrants in the BSA survey for 
1995 are reported and discussed here. In addition to this, the correlation between an individual's 
opinion towards refugees and views towards immigrants are also included here before 
proceeding on to the econometric analysis. 
A general look at Table 6.5 above shows that overall more than half of the people agreed with 
the statement that immigrants make Britain open to new ideas, whilst a half of the sample was 
also of the view that immigrants take jobs away from British people. Moreover, less than 20% 
11-
- ) 
agreed that immigrants are good for the British economy and mo th 
re an a quarter feel that they 
increase crime rates. At least a quarter remains indifferent in each case. 
Table 6.5: Attitudes towards Immigrants, 1995 
Immigrants Strongly Agree Neither Disagree Strongly No. of Agree Disagree Obs. 
Immigrant 1 7.83% 18.17% 34.94% 31.73% 7.33% 996 
Immigrant2 1.85% 15.18% 43.90% 33.54% 5.54% 975 
Immigrant3 14.57% 35.53% 25.39% 19.39% 5.12% 1016 
Immigrant4 6.77% 48.08% 26.77% 15.25% 3.13% 990 
The remaining descriptive statistics are provided in Appendix 6 and are discussed below. 
The gender-wise analysis shows that around 42% of women disagreed that immigrants increase 
crime rates while a one-third of males consider immigrants responsible for an increase in crime 
rates. Roughly a similar percentage of both men and women believe that immigrants take jobs 
away from the British-born but the proportion of those who strongly agreed with the statement is 
slightly higher for males. Regarding age, the young tend to have more liberal views about 
immigrants and this is consistent with nearly half of the sample disagreeing with immigrants 
increasing crime rates. Among the other age groups, middle and older aged people showed a 
very similar response and around 40% of each group disagreed with the statement that 
immigrants are good for the British economy. 
For marital status, the separated and widowed category, which showed an indifferent response 
for refugees, had more negative attitudes towards immigrants as compared to the other two 
categories of married and unmarried. Surprisingly, the highest percentage of people who 
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disagreed that immigrants are good for the British economy and agreed that immigrants make 
Britain open to new ideas belonged to the separated and widowed group. 
Ethnic background is also an important characteristic in attitudes formation, with non-whites 
displaying very sympathetic attitudes towards immigrants compared to whites. For the latter 
group, a half of the sample believed that immigrants take jobs away from natives and a quarter 
also agreed that they increase crime rates. Education, as was the case before, shows a positive 
association with attitudes towards immigrants. A vast majority (67%) of graduates agreed that 
immigrants bring new ideas to society, with 10% among them strongly agreeing with the 
statement. While those with some qualification had a more hostile attitude and two-thirds 
believed that immigrants take their jobs away and among this group a quarter strongly agreed 
with this statement. This is surprising since the less educated are among those groups who 
typically have to compete with easily available cheap substitutes due to immigrants in the job 
market. 
Similarly the unemployed were not likely to think that immigrants took jobs but were also more 
likely to agree and disagree that immigrants are good for the British economy. But again a very 
small number of people in the sample are unemployed, whilst the employed category showed the 
most indifferent response for this latter statement. Furthermore, those most likely to consider 
immigrants to be good for the British economy were among the professional and managerial 
social classes, while over a third of the skilled category believed that immigrants increased crime 
rates, over 10% of whom strongly agreed with this belief. 
Among the different religions, Roman-Catholic and other religion categories show a very 
h · . t good for the economy and bring favourable response towards the statements t at lmmlgran s are '-
. . I . fi th two categories should be noted. 
new ideas to the SOCIety but agam a small samp e SIze or ese 
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While over 40% of the other Christians category disagreed that immigrants are good for the 
British economy and in addition to this more than a quarter consider that 1· • t· 
mmlgran s mcrease 
crime rates. 
In terms of regions, people have more opposing attitudes in the Northern regions including 
Scotland, as the most likely group to disagree that the immigrants are good for the economy was 
in the North. Almost an equal proportion (45%) in the Midlands, the South and Wales agreed 
that immigrants takes jobs away from the British-born but the percentage is a bit higher (nearly 
50%) in London, which could be due to the clusters of immigrants in the London area. Also, 
around a quarter in these regions believed that immigrants increase crime rates. 
On the whole, a majority of the people in 1995 believed that immigrants bring new ideas with 
them but at the same time they tended to disagree with the statement that immigrants are good 
for the British economy and that they increase crime rates. People are more concerned about 
immigrants from a jobs market perspective and strongly believe that they take jobs away from 
British people. 
Correlation with letting refugees stay in the Country 
As one might expect, there exists a general correlation between different attitudes towards 
migration. If people have more open views towards immigrants, they are more likely to have 
favourable attitudes towards allowing refugees stay in the UK and vice versa. 
. . c. 1 d th ther four immigrant attitudinal To analyse the underlymg correlatIOn between relstay an e 0 
variables in the 1995 Survey, a correlation matrix is presented in Table 6.6. The P-values are 
shown in parenthesis and each of the associations is highly significant. 
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Table 6.6 
Correlation Matrix for Attitudes towards Refugees ·th I . WI mmIgrants 
Let political Immigrants Immigrants Immigrants Immigrants 
refugees stay Increase aregoodfor take jobs open Britain 
in the crime rates the British 
UK? (Refstay 1) (Immigrantl) 
away to new ideas 
Economy (Immigrant3) (Immigrant4) 
(Immigrant2) 
Let political 1.000 
refugees stay in 
the UK? 
(Refstayl) 
Immigrants -0.370 1.000 
increase crime (0.000) 
rates (Immigran tl) 
Immigrants are 0.378 -0.405 1.000 
good for Britain (0.000) (0.000) 
Economy 
(Immigrant2) 
Immigrants take -0.429 0.561 -0.440 1.000 
jobs away (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
(Immigrant3 ) 
Immigrants open 0.433 -0.408 0.449 -0.411 1.000 
Britain to new (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ideas (Immigran t4) 
As all the variables are based on an ordered response 1-5 scale, in which 1 relates to strongly 
disagreeing and 5 strongly agreeing, for all of the variables. The matrix shows that a negative 
association exists between immigrantl and ref stay 1 , and between immigrant3 and refstay1, 
meaning those who believe that immigrants increase crime rates and take jobs away are more 
likely to disagree to letting political refugees stay in the UK. 
The correlation is stronger where the belief is that immigrants take jobs away from British-born 
natives, further verifying the initial raw results. Immigrantl and immigrant3 are also positively 
correlated with each other, which is also true for immigrant2 and immigrant4. However the latter 
variables are positively correlated with attitudes to refugees, with the effect stronger for those 
believing immigrants bring new ideas with them. 
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While there exists a positive correlation between immigrant2, immigrant4 and refstay 1 variables, 
supporting the fact that those having opinions that immigrants are good for the British economy 
and bring new ideas in the society are more in favour of allowing political refugees stay in the 
~ . 
UK, with the degree of correlation higher for the latter two variables. 
The correlation is highest of all for immigrantl and immigrant3 as those who think immigrants 
take jobs away have more restrictive attitudes and blame immigrants for increasing crime rates in 
the society. At the same time these people are against the statement that immigrants are good for 
the UK economy. On the contrary those who acknowledge immigrants for new ideas also greatly 
favour them as being good for the economy. Moreover they do not agree with the statements that 
immigrants increase crime rates or takes jobs away from the natives. 
Ordered Probit Estimates 
Table 6.7 shows ordered pro bit estimates with the inclusion of above mentioned attitudes 
towards immigrants' variables for the 1995 BSA survey data. 
Some of the variables in the augmented specification have a very significant influence on 
attitudes towards refugees but there are some differences worth noting. Table 6.7 reports that the 
dummies for sex and religion are no longer significant at the 5 per cent level in the augmented 
.. . h ·11 h . d· ignificant showing more hostile specIficatIOn. The marrIed dummy as stl t e same SIgn an IS s 
attitudes towards refugees. On the contrary, education once again proves to be significant in 
. . . 1 . h d t· n have more positive attitudes. 
affectmg attItudes m such a way that peop e Wit more e uca 10 
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Table 6.7 Ordered Probit Estimates of the Att·t d lues towards Refugees 
with Immigration Controls (1995) 
























Immigrants increase crime rates 
Immigrants good for Economy 
Immigrants take jobs away 
Immigrants open Britain to new ideas 




























































Note: Default categories are female, old, has no qualifications, inactive, non-whites, those living in Wales, partly 
skilled and Roman-Catholic. *p<O.l; ** P <0.05; *** p<O.Ol (two-tailed tests) 
All of the new added control variables on attitudes towards immigrants turn out to be very 
significant at all levels. The direction of the impact of these variables is as expected. Those 
believing that immigrants increase crime rates and take jobs away from natives are far less likely 
to be in favour of allowing refugees stay in the UK. Once again people' s perception that 
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immigrants take jobs away from natives leads to more negative attitudes as compared to the 
belief that they increase crime rates. In contrast, attitudes towards refugees are significantly 
more sympathetic amongst those who consider immigrants to be good for the economy and open 
Britain to new ideas with more positive attitudes towards the latter. This analysis therefore 
suggests that general attitudes on the social and economic impact of immigrants have important 
influences on the formation of attitudes towards refugees. 
At the same time the possibility of endogeneity between dependent variables and additional 
immigrants' attitudinal variables can not be ignored. However the main objective here is to 
include additional variables to explore the possible links between views in general about 
immigrants and their impact on attitudes towards refugees and asylum seekers in particular. Also 
the public appears to be more apprehensive about socio-economic impact of immigration as 
discussed in chapter 2 and as shown by the results here that people are more anxious about 
economic issues i.e. job market competition and their sensitivity is greater in this case as 
compared to the other issues. Secondly, endogeneity is difficult to address in ordered probits 
because of the added complexity due to the categorical nature of the dependent variable. 
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6.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, data from the 1995 and 2006 BSA surveys are used to establish the British 
population's attitudes towards refugees, set against a background of an increasing inflow of this 
type of immigrant. The variations in the attitudes are measured against personal characteristics 
such as age, gender, marital status, qualifications, economic activity, religion, social class, region 
along with ethnic origin. The raw results initially point to some variations according to socio-
economic characteristics. Although the question asked in each of the surveys is worded 
differently, attitudes certainly appear to have become more negative towards refugees. In 
particular the data suggest that proportion of people who were happy to allow refugees to stay in 
the UK has decreased in 2006 relative to 1995. 
The ordered probit results confirm the importance of socio-economic characteristics and it can be 
concluded that educated people and females are far more likely to be sympathetic towards 
refugees. Furthermore, an individual's attitudes towards immigrants per se (including economic 
effects) have an important effect on attitudes towards asylum seekers and people who believe 
that immigrants are good for the economy and bring new ideas are more inclined towards to 
having refugees stay in the country while those who blame the immigrants for increasing crime 
rates and unemployment are against allowing refugees to stay in the UK. 
To summarise, attitudes towards asylum seekers have become harsher in the last decade. Yet 
some of the British public also support political refugees and asylum seekers. Hostility is 
strongest where people have less or no education. Non-white ethnic minority groups were also 
more tolerant towards refugees. 
Appendix 6: Attitudes towards Immigrants, 1995 
Immigrants Strongly Agree Neither Disagree Strongly No. Agree Disagree of 
I-SEX Obs. 
Immigrant 1 10.51% 22.49% 33.50% 26.16% 7.33% 409 Male Immigrant2 1.96% 16.38% 39.36% 33.25% 9.05% 
Immigrant3 15.90% 409 34.94% 25.78% 17.35% 6.02% 415 Immigrant4 6.17% 43.95% 27.41% 18.77% 3.70% 405 
Immigrant 1 5.96% 15.16% 35.95% 35.60% 7.33% 587 
Female Immigrant2 1.77% 14.31 % 47.17% 33.75% 3.00% 566 
Immigrant3 13.64% 35.94% 25.12% 20.80% 6.02% 601 
Immigrant4 7.18 % 50.94% 26.32% 12.82% 2.74% 585 
2-AGE 
Immigrant 1 4.77% 11.36% 34.77% 37.95% 11.14% 440 
Young Immigrant2 1.40% 11.92% 49.07% 31.78% 5.84% 428 
Immigrant3 14.22% 31.15% 26.19% 20.99% 7.45% 443 
Immigrant4 9.49% 46.76% 26.39% 14.35% 3.01% 432 
Immigrant 1 8.41% 22.01% 34.95% 29.13% 5.50% 309 
Middle Immigrant2 1.32 % 17.16% 41.25% 34.98% 5.28% 303 
Immigrant3 13.18% 36.66% 24.76% 21.22% 4.18% 311 
Immigrant4 4.21% 52.10% 24.92% 15.53% 3.24% 309 
Old Immigrant 1 12.65% 25.71% 34.69% 24.08% 2.86% 245 
Immigrant2 3.31% 18.60% 37.60% 35.12% 5.37% 242 
Immigrant3 16.92% 41.54% 24.62% 14.62% 2.31% 260 
Immigrant4 5.26% 45.34% 29.55% 16.60% 3.24% 245 
3-MARITAL 
STATUS Immigrant 1 6.60% 17.77% 36.38% 33.67% 5.58% 591 
Immigrant2 0.86% 15.07% 44.69% 33.73% 5.65% 584 
MARRIED Immigrant3 12.23% 36.85% 25.63% 21.78% 3.52% 597 
Immigrant4 3.23% 49.66% 28.91% 15.65% 2.55% 588 
Immigrant 1 9.30% 23.72% 33.95% 25.58% 7.44% 215 
SEPERATED Immigrant2 4.88% 16.59% 37.56% 36.10% 4.88% 205 
&WIDOWED Immigrant3 18.83% 35.43% 25.11% 15.25% 5.38% 223 
Immigrant4 9.43% 48.11% 23.58% 15.57% 3.30% 212 
Immigrant 1 10.00% 13.16% 31.58% 32.63% 12.63% 190 
NOT MARRIED Immigrant2 1.61% 13.98% 48.39% 30.11% 5.91% 186 
Immigrant3 16.84% 31.63% 25.00% 16.84% 9.69% 196 
Immigrant4 14.74% 43.16% 23.68% 13.68% 4.74% 190 
4-Ethnic Origin 
Immigrant 1 3.85% 3.85% 11.54% 38.46% 42.31% 26 
NON-WHITES Immigrant2 11.54% 50.00% 38.46% 0.00% 0.00% 26 
Immigrant3 0.00% 11.54% 19.23% 26.92% 42.31% 26 
Immigrant4 34.62% 50.00% 11.54% 3.85% 0.00% 26 
Immigrant 1 8.01% 18.63% 35.69% 31.43% 6.24% 961 
WHITES Immigrant2 1.60% 13.94% 44.26% 34.47% 5.74% 940 
Immigrant3 15.09% 36.29% 25.59% 19.16% 3.87% 981 
Immigrant4 5.97% 47.96% 27.23% 15.60% 3.25% 955 
5-HIGHEST 
QUALIFICA TION Immigrant 1 4.71% 11.37% 33.73% 38.04% 12.16% 255 
Immigrant2 2.39% 21.12% 45.82% 25.10% 5.58% 251 
DEGREE Immigrant3 5.10% 24.71% 31.76% 29.41% 9.02% 255 
QUALIFICA TION Immigrant4 9.77% 57.42% 19.14% 12.50% 1.17
0
0 256 
Immigrant 1 6.19% 17.92% 35.84% 32.74% 7.30% 452 
NO- Immigrant2 0.67% 12.78% 47.09% 34.75% 4.71% 446 
QUALIFICATION Immigrant3 13.45% 37.53% 25.60% 18.44% 4.99% 461 




Appendix 6 Continued: 
Immigrants Strongly Agree Neither Disagree Strongly N"o. Agree Disagree of 
Obs. Immigrant 1 13.15% 24.57% 34.60% 24.57% 3.11% 289 SOME- Immigrant2 3.24% 13.67% 37.05% 39.12% 6.83% 278 QUALIFICA nON Immigrant3 24.33% 41.67% 19.67% 12.33% 2.00% 300 Immigrant4 4.96% 39.36% 31.21% 19.86% 4.61% 282 
6-ECONOMIC 
ACTIVITY Immigrantl 4.74% 15.15% 36.68% 34.49% 8.94% 548 
Immigrant2 1.48% 13.89% 47.78% 31.48% 5.37% 540 
EMPLOYED Immigrant3 10.16% 33.76% 27.40% 22.14% 6.53% 551 
Immigrant4 7.01% 50.37% 25.46% 14.76% 2.40% 542 
Immigrant 1 13.43% 25.37% 26.87% 28.36% 5.97% 67 
UNEMPLOYED Immigrant2 1.49% 20.90% 32.84% 38.81% 5.97% 67 
Immigrant3 24.64% 33.33% 24.64% 15.94% 1.45% 69 
Immigrant4 10.45% 40.30% 25.37% 17.91% 5.97% 67 
Immigrant 1 11.29% 21.26% 33.86% 28.35% 5.25% 381 
INACTIVE Immigrant2 2.45% 16.03% 40.22% 35.60% 5.71% 368 
Immigrant3 18.94% 38.38% 22.73% 16.16% 3.79% 396 
Immigrant4 5.77% 46.19% 28.87% 15.49% 3.67% 381 
7-S0CIO-ECON 
CLASS Immigrant 1 6.11% 16.72% 33.44% 34.73% 9.00% 311 
Immigrant2 2.26% 19.68% 46.13% 26.77% 5.16% 310 
PROFESSIONAL / Immigrant3 7.28% 29.11% 31.01% 26.58% 6.01% 316 
MANAGER Immigrant4 7.67% 54.95% 22.68% 13.74% 0.96% 313 
Immigrant 1 7.35% 16.33% 39.59% 29.80% 6.94% 245 
SKILLED NON- Immigrant2 0.42% 12.13% 46.44% 34.31% 6.69% 239 
MANUAL Immigrant3 15.20% 37.60% 26.80% 16.00% 4.40% 250 
Immigrant4 4.10% 52.46% 28.28% 11.89% 3.28% 244 
Immigrant 1 10.36% 22.28% 32.64% 30.57% 4.15% 193 
SKILLED MANUAL Immigrant2 2.09% 14.14% 35.60% 42.93% 5.24% 191 
Immigrant3 18.69% 40.40% 19.19% 16.67% 5.05% 198 
Immigrant4 6.88% 36.51% 30.69% 22.22% 3.70% 189 
Immigrant 1 6.04% 15.44% 36.91% 32.89% 8.72% 149 
PARTL Y SKILLED Immigrant2 0.00% 13.89% 47.92% 31.94% 6.25% 144 
Immigrant3 19.75% 34.39% 22.93% 20.38% 2.55% 157 
Immigr_ant4 7.19% 45.75% 24.84% 14.38% 7.84% 153 
Immigrant 1 11.54% 23.08% 34.62% 28.85% 1.92% 52 
UNSKILLED Immigrant2 6.00% 6.00% 44.00% 40.00% 4.00% 50 
Immigrant3 27.45% 37.25% 23.53% 9.80% 1.96% 51 
Immigrant4 8.16% 32.65% 36.73% 22.45% 0.00% 49 
8-RELIGION 
Immigrant 1 8.35% 16.95% 33.42% 30.96% 10.32% 407 
NO RELIGION Immigrant2 1.75% 13.25% 45.50% 31.75% 7.75% 400 
Immigrant3 17.35% 31.81% 23.61% 20.24% 6.99% 415 
Immigrant4 8.37% 44.83% 25.37% 17.49% 3.94% 406 
Immigrant 1 7.75% 15.50% 37.21% 33.33% 6.20% 129 
CHURCH OF Immigrant2 2.33% 15.50% 42.64% 36.43% 3.10% 129 3.76% 1"" ENGLAND Immigrant3 13.53% 38.35% 29.32% 15.04% 
jj
Immigrant4 4.58% 49.62% 31.30% 12.21% 2.29% 131 
Immigrant 1 10.20% 14.29% 35.71% 30.61% 9.18% 98 
ROMAN CATHOLIC Immigrant2 2.08% 17.71% 50.00% 23.96% 6.25% 96 
Immigrant3 11.00% 35.00% 21.00% 26.00% 7.00% 100 
Immigrant4 9.47% 52.63% 21.05% 13.68% 3.16% 95 
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Appendix 6 Continued: 
Immigrants Strongly Agree Neither Disagree Strongly No. Agree Disagree of 
Obs. Immigrant 1 6.25% 23.75% 37.19% 30.94% 1.88% 320 OTHER Immigrant2 0.64% 14.10% 40.71% 40.38% 4.17% 312 CHRISTIANS Immigrant3 13.98% 41.03% 26.14% 17.33% 1.52% 329 Immigrant4 3.14% 48.43% 30.82% 15.09% 2.52% 318 
Immigrant 1 9.76% 4.88% 24.39% 41.46% 19.51% 41 
OTHER Immigrant2 10.81% 37.84% 40.54% 10.81 % 0.00% 37 
RELIGIONS Immigrant3 2.63% 21.05% 34.21% 26.32% 15.79% 38 
Immigrant4 20.51% 61.54% 7.69% 7.69% 2.56% 39 
9-REGION 
Immigrant 1 4.44% 12.22% 38.89% 33.33% 11.11% 90 
SCOTLAND Immigrant2 1.19% 17.86% 46.43% 28.57% 5.95% 84 
Immigrant3 11.96% 42.39% 21.74% 16.30% 7.61% 92 
Immigrant4 7.87% 47.19% 33.71% 6.74% 4.49% 89 
Immigrant 1 7.79% 12.99% 39.83% 34.20% 5.19% 231 
NORTH Immigrant2 2.65% 11.50% 42.92% 38.05% 4.87% 226 
Immigrant3 13.39% 45.61% 22.18% 16.74% 2.09% 239 
Immigrant4 4.35% 47.83% 26.96% 16.96% 3.91% 230 
Immigrant 1 8.24% 19.41 % 34.71% 28.24% 9.41% 170 
MIDLANDS Immigrant2 1.18% 15.98% 40.24% 37.28% 5.33% 169 
Immigrant3 19.32% 27.84% 27.84% 18.75% 6.25% 176 
Immigrant4 6.47% 45.88% 28.82% 17.06% 1.76% 170 
Immigrant 1 8.48% 20.47% 31.29% 33.63% 6.14% 342 
SOUTH Immigrant2 1.19% 16.07% 45.24% 32.14% 5.36% 336 
Immigrant3 14.12% 31.12% 27.67% 22.77% 4.32% 347 
Immigrant4 5.29% 51.18% 24.12% 16.18% 3.24% 340 
Immigrant! 8.08% 25.25% 28.28% 27.27% 11.11% 99 
GREATER Immigrant2 4.04% 18.18% 44.44% 27.27% 6.06% 99 
LONDON Immigrant3 15.15% 34.34% 20.20% 12.70% 8.08% 99 
Immigrant4 15.15% 46.46% 23.23% 11.11% 4.04% 99 
Immigrant 1 7.81% 18.75% 42.19% 26.56% 4.69% 64 
WALES Immigrant2 1.64% 13.11% 45.90% 31.15% 8.20% 61 
Immigrant3 11.11% 34.92% 31.75% 22.22 % 9.52% 63 




Despite varying political views and public attitudes, the UK has long been considered a safe 
haven for immigrants, especially for genuine refugees and asylum seekers. Refugees and asylum 
seekers have come to Britain from countries not only from areas with already established 
migrant communities (such as India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Yugoslavia and China) but also from 
countries without a previous history of migration to the UK including the Congo, Sudan, 
Colombia and Kosovo. This has contributed considerably to the changing ethnic composition of 
British cities, schools, its cultural and religious landscape and the workforce. The UK has 
traditionally been seen as being unusual among the main countries in North-West Europe, as it 
has been a country of emigration as well as immigration. However, as elsewhere across Europe, 
the past decade has seen a dramatic increase in net immigration to the UK. The different 
religious, social and ethnic background of immigrants to the UK is a key feature of its labour 
market and it is this heterogeneity which makes for an interesting topic of analysis. Immigrants, 
either economic migrants or refugees and asylum seekers, can affect the host country either 
socially or economically. 
The main contribution of this research is the analysis of the labour market performance of the 
different categories of migrants, especially focusing on refugees and asylum seekers. Despite the 
increased interest in immigration there has not been much in the literature on how 
refugees/asylum seekers perform in the host labour market and most studies have examined only 
immigrants as whole and there appears only one study about refugees/asylum seekers in the UK 
using large scale survey data - a working paper by 1. K. Lindley (2002). So in terms of a socio-
economic analysis, this study is most up to date and comprehensive study of labour market 
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performance of refugees and asylum seekers for the UK Moreover th " f 
. , e economIC Impact 0 
immigrants has been an increasingly important issue and labour market pe -c • h rlormance IS t e most 
important determinant of this fiscal contribution. Secondly, the literature on attitudes also tends 
to focus on immigrants as a whole. Social attitudes are a key barometer for social cohesion in the 
UK and refugees and asylum seekers are an important element of views towards immigrants due 
to the growth of their numbers in the late 1990s and due to the fact that they are now integrated 
in the labour market. So the second major contribution is to analyse the attitudes of British 
people towards refugees and the main determinants of those attitudes. 
Given this background, the reVIew of the literature in chapter 2 discussed the social and 
economic impacts of immigration. The chapter led to the conclusion that the fiscal impact is 
mainly dependent on the economic activity and labour market performance of different 
categories of immigrants. The positive fiscal effect is directly related to the migrant's net tax 
contribution and this is a direct result of a person's labour market activity i.e. their employment 
and earnings. The positive fiscal impact is determined by the amount of tax contributions and the 
receipt of welfare and consumption of public goods and services such as education and health 
care. If migrants utilize relatively more in the way of social welfare programmes then they are a 
net burden but if they pay more in the form of taxes and consume less social security benefits 
then they make a positive contribution to the government. It was shown that asylum seekers were 
less likely to be employed and have lower earnings suggesting they were on average less likely 
to make a positive fiscal contribution. The labour market performance is then examined in the 
detail in chapters 4 and 5. 
The analysis of the social impact of immigrants indicates that hostile attitudes are likely to be 
present irrespective of the contribution of immigrants and asylum seekers and the possible 
reasons behind this are economic, labour market concerns and as well as racial discrimination. 
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Demographically, on one hand, immigrants slow down the aging p . h rocess m t e country but at the 
same time their environmental impact is an issue for population experts. 
Chapter 3 contains a detailed analysis of trends in the flow of asylum seek d fu d ers an re gees an 
the evolution of immigration policies in the UK. It therefore shows how immigration control has 
evolved over time and the impact that politicians and the media have had in leading to stricter 
immigration control thus making it more difficult for genuine refugees and asylum seekers to get 
refuge or seek asylum. 
Chapter 3 also includes some useful background information and so provides a helpful 
framework to define the different categories of migrants depending upon their time of arrival and 
the source country's actual political, social and economic conditions. This information is then 
used to differentiate between different categories of migrants in terms of asylum seekers and 
refugees and economic migrants for the empirical analysis that follows. 
Chapter 4 examines the economic activity and employment of asylum seekers using micro data 
from the Quarterly Labour Force Survey for 2001-2006. Immigrants are split into four 
categories: refugees/asylum seekers, mixed refugees/asylum seekers, mainly economic migrants 
and economic migrants. These categories are constructed using information from the Labour 
Force Survey, the Control of Immigration Statistics from Home Office and UNHCR information. 
It also investigates the role of other variables in affecting the labour market performance of 
immigrants. Ethnicity also plays a vital role in determining employment and non-white 
immigrants suffer more than white-immigrants, possibly due to discrimination and a lack of 
language fluency. Chapter 4 concludes that there are significant differences between the labour 
market performances of different immigrant groups in terms of employment. Refugees/asylum 
seekers do worst and that there is not great gender differences between this group and the mixed 
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refugee/economic migrant category and both categories of econo . ~ 
mlc mIgrants perlorm 
substantially better for both males and females. However, the separate estimates by migrant 
group show that highest returns to education and years since migration i.e. assimilation for 
employment belong to refugees/asylum seekers. The quality of jobs is also important and on the 
basis of the multinomial estimates it can be seen that male refugees and asylum seekers are more 
likely to have temporary jobs and be self employed. 
Chapter 5 suggests that the results for earnings and occupation are very similar to those for 
employment and economic activity. In particular, the analysis of the different immigrant 
categories shows that for both males and females, refugees/asylum seekers do worse than other 
immigrants. Again education, location, ethnicity and years since migration are important 
determinants of earnings and occupational achievements. Asylum seekers/refugees earn 
significantly less than other migrants after controlling for other variables, with larger 
differentials present for females. Again rates of earnmgs assimilation are higher for 
refugees/asylum seekers but returns to education in terms of earmngs are lower for 
refugees/asylum seekers earnings, especially for males. 
Occupational attainment is another important measure of labour market success, with the results 
found to be very similar to earnings. Thus the significantly lower earnings of refugees and 
asylum seekers are consistent with their low paying occupations. Again a lack of country specific 
human capital, non-recognition of education and as well as racial discrimination are likely to be 
responsible for the worse performance of refugees and asylum seekers, both in terms of earnings 
and occupational achievement. 
As refugees and asylum seekers earn significantly less than other economic migrants and their 
tax contributions are lower. Their consumption of social services is also higher on average 
1'""0 
--' 
because of their lower employment rate and high rates of benefit . t . kn recelp e.g. SIC ess benefit, 
income support etc. Expenditure on this group is also higher because of the cost of housing 
refugees and asylum seekers and dealing with their cases With thl·S ObVI·OUS t· fii 
. nega lVe e ect on 
the government finances people may have become more hostile with an increasing inflow of 
immigrants. Thus the social impact of refugees and asylum seekers is discussed in Chapter 6, 
which examines attitudes in relation to refugees /asylum seekers. 
In particular, chapter 6 examines changes in the attitudes of the British population towards 
hosting refugees in the UK over time. The questions asked about refugees in the 1995 and 2006 
BSA surveys enables us to draw some general conclusions about people's attitudes towards 
refugees and asylum seekers based on their different socio-economic characteristics. The 
variations in attitudes measured against the personal characteristics such as age, gender, marital 
status, qualifications, economic activity, social class, religion, region along with ethnic origin. 
The results suggest that the number of people who strongly agreed to have refugees stay in the 
UK has decreased in 2006 as compared to 1995. Therefore less favourable attitudes towards 
refugees and asylum seekers appear to have increased in the last decade. It is also found that 
socio-economic characteristics affect attitudes in different ways and the most noticeable finding 
is that educated people are more sympathetic towards refugees'. 
The multicultural nature of immigration from all parts of the world to the UK implies a 
heterogeneous social, economic and demographic impact and this contributes to uneven labour 
market outcomes for refugees and asylum seekers compared to other migrant groups. The 
heterogeneity of labour market outcomes in the UK emphasises that policy should target the 
welfare of different migrants and different ethnic groups within those immigrant categories. 
Economic performance in the host society is strongly determined by human capital endowments 
. .. nh· . ess Human capital imparts skills and 
and educatIOn plays a VItal role III e ancmg economIC succ . 
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increases the productivity of immigrants resulting in a better reward in the labour market. 
Furthermore, ethnicity can not be ignored while analyzing the labour market performance of 
immigrants as it is an important factor affecting their assimilation and there also exists an 
element of discrimination for all ethnic groups as compared to whites. Therefore, policies are 
required to decrease and discourage discrimination. 
However, the hosting of refugees and asylum seekers is not just an economic accounting 
exercise. Despite the poor performance of asylum seekers and refugees, the humanitarian aspect 
is very important. It can not be ignored that they are people who have been deprived of their 
rights, safety and their beloved homelands. With these circumstances and physical and 
psychological problems the adjustment process in the new environment of a host society may 
take some time, a fact indicated by the findings showing the improved labour market adjustment 
of refugees and asylum seekers over time. Therefore, investment in human capital should also be 
encouraged for migrants, including through the provision of English language training, given 
some asylum seekers do very well in the labour market given the chance. Along with this, the 
different origin of the migrant groups also contributes to the multicultural mix in the UK, making 
it attractive for people from all over the world. 
Moreover, not only is the performance of the current generation of refugees of interest but so too 
is that of their children. Therefore, the educational attainment of children of refugees and asylum 
seekers is an important aspect of the subsequent assimilation of the groups in the host society. 
Future research could focus on the educational attainment of children of these migrants and to 
study the differences across different categories of migrants. At the present the sample size is too 
small to make any reasonable analysis but if these groups do succeed in education then they are 
likely to do well in the labour market and contribute positively to the UK economy and society. 
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